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The thesis will examine the extent to which China’s Anti-monopoly Law effectively 
controls the anti-competitive practices of patent owners when exercising their patent rights. 
The relationship between intellectual property law and competition law is no longer 
contradictory but has evolved into a convergent and compatible one. The two bodies of law 
share the same goals to promote competition, encourage innovation and enhance consumer 
welfare in different ways. Therefore, it is appropriate and reasonable to apply competition 
law to regulate the exercise of intellectual property rights in certain circumstances. Given 
the specificity of patent rights and the legal and economic circumstances of China, the 
scope of the thesis will be limited to anti-competitive practices of patent owners when 
exercising their patent rights. 
The research demonstrates the necessity and importance for China to apply its own Anti-
monopoly Law to address anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. However, China’s 
Anti-monopoly Law came into effect in 2008 and it seems not to work as effectively as it 
was expected in regulating such conduct. Despite great achievements, there are still 
deficiencies and uncertainty influencing the effective and efficient competition 
enforcement in the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. The problems not only arise 
from China’s internal competition enforcement system but also arise from the lack of clear 
guidance from the competition enforcement authorities. Facing the challenging 
competition concerns in the 21st century, there are no effective measures available in China. 
It is not clear in what circumstances the failure to disclose patent interest in the standard 
setting process can result in antitrust liabilities and to what extent China’s Anti-monopoly 
Law should intervene. It is also uncertain how to keep a balance between the protection of 
patent rights and the maintenance of market competition when considering the seeking of 
injunctions before national courts by the owners of standard essential patents or the reverse 
payment patent settlement agreements.  
Therefore, the thesis aims to provide some solutions to these problems to facilitate and 
improve the effective application of China’s Anti-monopoly Law to the exercise of patent 
rights. The proposals made in this thesis will be based on the valuable EU and US 
enforcement experience and case law but give significant consideration to the legal and 
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1.1 The Thesis  
The thesis examines the extent to which China’s Anti-monopoly Law effectively controls 
anti-competitive practices1 of owners of patent rights.  
1.2 The Interface between the Intellectual Property Rights and 
Competition Law2 
The effective control by competition law of anti-competitive practices of intellectual 
property rights owners, especially patent rights owners, is a rather difficult and 
complicated issue. In the current knowledge-based economy, both competition law and 
intellectual property law play a key role in achieving specific objectives. Although 
competition law is separate from intellectual property (IP) law, they share a common 
economic goal and are equally important to the economy. On one hand, intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) encourage inventive activities and promote innovation by conferring 
exclusive rights on the owners for a limited period of time; on the other hand, competition 
law aims to maintain the market open by eliminating abuses of dominance and other anti-
competitive practices. The exclusivity granted by intellectual property law was regarded as 
facilitating monopolies and thus gave rise to an inherent tension between competition law 
and intellectual property law. Over time, the relationship between competition law and 
intellectual property law has developed from a conflicting one to a congruent and 
compatible one. It is now globally recognized that competition law and intellectual 
property law in fact share the same goals, namely the promotion of competition, 
encouraging innovation and enhancing consumer welfare, but in different ways.  
However, the interface between the two bodies of law is still a sensitive and complicated 
domain, which leads to significant economic and legal issues. ‘It is a difficult and delicate 
matter to determine at what point, if at all, the exercise of an intellectual property right 
could be so harmful to consumer welfare that competition law should override the position 
                                                          
1 The terminology and concepts are different in the EU, US and China, and for the purpose of this thesis, the 
expression ‘anti-competitive practices/behaviour/conduct’ is used as covering all manners of unlawful 
conduct that distorts competition. 
2 For the purpose of the thesis, although the term ‘competition’ is used in the context of the EU, ‘antitrust’ is 
applied in the context of the US and ‘anti-monopoly’ is adopted in the context of China, this thesis will use 





as it would be on the basis of intellectual property law alone.’3 Either too much or too little 
protection of intellectual property will discourage innovation and slow down economic 
progress.4 Even for the United States (US) with a relatively sound and mature system to 
cope with the interplay of its antitrust and intellectual property policies, it took the US 
several decades to overcome various challenges and finally to find the current balance.  
From an international perspective, the interplay of protecting IPRs and guaranteeing free 
competition is of long standing. Before the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement), the Paris Convention on the Production of 
Industrial Property had provided for compulsory licensing as a tool to regulate abuses5 of 
patent rights. In addition, the United Nations Multilaterally Equitable Principles and Rules 
for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices and some other documents are also 
applied to problems that arise in the areas of market competition, intellectual property 
protection and technology transfer. In terms of the TRIPs Agreement, it does not only pay 
more attention to the protection of IPRs, but it also aims to eliminate the anti-competitive 
practices of IPRs owners in market competition.   
Normally, the exercise of patent rights by patent owners should be excluded from the 
application of competition law. This is for the reason that patent rights are special rights. 
They are not ordinary contract rights. They are property rights given by the state, which are 
granted exclusively to the owner for a definitive number of years. It is a sort of contract 
between an inventor and the state. When the state takes the decision to give exclusivity to 
the inventor, it has already concluded that it is good for consumers and also good for the 
society. For example, ‘[m]ost licence agreements do not restrict competition and create 
pro-competitive efficiencies.’ 6  The licensing of patent rights will greatly promote the 
dissemination of technologies. ‘Intellectual property rights promote dynamic competition 
by encouraging undertakings to invest in developing new or improved products and 
processes. So does competition by putting pressure on undertakings to innovate.’7 ‘In order 
not to reduce dynamic competition and to maintain the incentive to innovate, the innovator 
                                                          
3 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2015), 813. 
4 Rudolph J.R. Peritz,‘Competition within Intellectual Property Regimes: The Instance of Patent Rights’ 
(2012) New York Law School Legal Studies Research Paper, 5. 
5 For the purpose of the thesis, the term ‘abuse’ can also be used as the meaning of ‘misuse’ or ‘inappropriate 
use’ of intellectual property rights in a general manner (this includes but is not limited to all the possible anti-
competitive exercise of IPRs), especially in some Chinese legal measures mentioned in the following parts 
and chapters, unless otherwise specified that it refers to the abuse of a dominant position. 
6 Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
Technology Transfer Agreements [2014] OJ C 89/3, 9. 





must not be unduly restricted in the exploitation of intellectual property rights that turn out 
to be valuable’.8  Neither the possession nor the normal exercise of a patent right does in 
itself infringe competition rules. However, the exclusivity of patent rights does not indicate 
that they are totally exempted from competition law intervention. In substance, the natural 
characteristics of IPRs, and their important role in the current knowledge-based economy, 
mean that the exercise of IPRs can easily be abusive and may distort competition.9 Some of 
the behaviour by inventors may go beyond the rights that the state gives them. The 
consequences are serious and may impair the public interest, especially when it concerns 
patent rights. In this situation, competition law should be applied to impose some control. 
However, it should be only in very exceptional and special circumstances where 
competition law should intervene and control the exercise of patent rights. This thesis will 
examine what constitutes ‘exceptional and special’ circumstances when exercising certain 
kinds of patent rights. 
It may be argued that the public interest has already been taken into account when the state 
decides whether to grant a patent right. The protection of the IPRs is the result of balancing 
the long-term economic interest and the short-term restrictive effects on competition. In 
order to obtain a patent right, the applicant has to demonstrate that the invention satisfies a 
number of stringent conditions which are considered necessary and are in the public 
interest, such as the requirements of novelty, creativity, utility, etc. Accordingly, it is 
argued that the application of competition law in the public interest is not necessary in the 
area of the exercise of patent rights. However, there is a necessity to stress that the public 
interest discussed here is a different kind of public interest. It is not the consideration of 
public interest during the granting process of a patent right, but the consideration of public 
interest when exercising the right. The intervention by competition law will not influence 
the ownership of the right. Its purpose is to supervise the patent owners’ behaviour when 
they are exploiting their rights. Therefore, it is essential and appropriate to take account of 
a public interest factor when determining whether competition law should be applied to 
regulate the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. 
                                                          
8 ibid, 8. 
9 Xianlin Wang, Bu Shou and Liping Wang, ‘Multinationals’ Intellectual Rights Abuse’ (跨国公司在华知识





1.3 The Chinese Context 
The thesis will focus only on the anti-competitive practices of patent owners, though the 
analysis in the following chapters may be applicable to other IPRs. For the sake of context, 
the historical background will be described on the basis of all kinds of IPRs. The thesis 
will then concentrate on the anti-competitive practices in relation to patent rights. This is 
for the reason that compared to other IPRs, a patent right grants the owner stronger 
protection and poses the most threats to fair competition in the market.10 ‘The longest-
standing, best-known, and, arguably, economically most valuable form of protection of 
rights provided by the law of intellectual property comes in the form of the patent.’11 
Therefore, the effective control of anti-competitive practices involving the exercise of 
patent rights has become a contentious issue. This is so especially in China, whose Anti-
monopoly Law (AML) came into effect in 2008 and where the problems seem more 
pressing.  
First, most of the anti-monopoly cases and investigations concerning the exercise of IPRs 
in China point to patent rights as the most problematic field. In recent years, patent rights 
have been used beyond their legal scope as a tool to exclude competition in the relevant 
market.12 In China, even before the adoption of the 2008 AML, there had been some 
alleged anti-competitive cases concerning the exercise of patent rights. The cases 
concerned a range of industries such as DVD production, lighter production, digital 
cameras and motorcycles. 13  Since 2008, the National Development and Reform 
Commission of China (NDRC) as one of the three anti-monopoly enforcement authorities 
(AMEAs) has carried out a total of 129 price-related investigations (9714were conducted 
between 2008 and 2015 and 3215 were conducted between 2016 and April 2018). Among 
all the NDRC investigations, there have been two related to the exercise of IPRs and both 
of them concerned the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. One was the investigation 
                                                          
10 Kexun Xie, The Legal Regulation of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights (知识产权滥用的法律规制) 
(Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 2011), 122. 
11 Paul Torremans, Intellctual Property Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 45. 
12 Guanghai Wu, The Regulation of the Exercise of Patent by Anti-monopoly Law (专利权行使的反垄断法
规制) (Intellectual Property Publishing House 2012) 2. 
13 Dezhong Guo, Applying Anti-monopoly Law to Patent Licensing (专利许可的反垄断规制) (Intellectual 
Property Publishing 2007) 1. 
14 Bureau of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly, ‘Great Progress in Anti-Price-Fixing During the 12th 
Five-Year-Plan’ (‘十二五’期间反价格垄断取得重大进展) (2016) 03 Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly 
in China 13, 13. 
15 This data was researched and collected from the published decisions of the NDRC that includes the 





of Qualcomm; 16  and the other one concerned InterDigital Corporation. The latter 
investigation was suspended on the basis that commitments have been made by 
InterDigital Corporation.17  The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) — another of China’s 
AMEA, that is responsible for merger control review, has adopted 36 conditional approval 
decisions in total and two prohibition decisions, of which at least 10 decisions directly 
involved the exercise of IPRs.18 Almost all these 10 decisions imposed conditions on the 
exercise of patent rights to maintain normal competition in the relevant markets. In 
addition, in 2014 four Microsoft offices in China were raided by the State Administration 
for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) for alleged anti-competitive practices involving the 
exercise of IPRs. 19  The investigation is still in progress. 20  In the light of private 
competition enforcement in China, there has been from 2008 to 2015, a sharp increase in 
the number of private anti-monopoly actions.21 Some of the most noticeable civil anti-
monopoly litigation concerns the exercise of patent rights, such as Huawei vs. InterDigital 
which was related to the licencing of standard essential patents (SEPs).22 As a consequence, 
anti-competitive practices in relation to IPRs in China seem to focus mostly on the exercise 
of patent rights. 
Second, it can be seen from the competition enforcement experience of the European 
Union (EU) and of the US that most IP-related anti-competitive practices arise in the 
                                                          
16 Qualcomm Incorporated, NDRC Administrative Sanction Decision, FaGaiBanJiaJianChuFa [2015] No. 1 
(发改办价监处罚 [2015] 1 号). 
17 The announcement by NDRC <http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201405/t20140522_612466.html>.  
18 MOFCOM announcements <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/?>.  The 10 IP-related conditional 
approval decisions are: Announcement No.44 [2015] of MOFCOM—Announcement on the Conditional 
Approval Decision on the Proposed Acquisition of Equities of Alcatel Lucent by Nokia; Announcement 
No.30 [2014] of MOFCOM—Announcement on the Conditional Approval Decision on the Acquisition of 
AZ Electronic Materials Co., Ltd by Merck KGaA; Announcement No.24 [2014] of MOFCOM—
Announcement on the Conditional Approval Decision on the Acquisition of the Equipment and Services 
Business of Nokia Corp. by Microsoft Inc.; Announcement No.3 [2014] of MOFCOM—Announcement on 
the Conditional Approval Decision on the Acquisition of Lifei Technology Co., Ltd. by Thermo Fisher 
Scientific Co., Ltd.; Announcement No.58 [2013] of MOFCOM—Announcement on the Conditional 
Approval Decision on the Acquisition of Gambro AB by Baxter International Inc.; Announcement No.87 
[2012] of MOFCOM—Announcement on the Conditional Approval Decision on the Establishment of a Joint 
Venture by ARM, G&D and Gemalto; Announcement No.35 [2012] of MOFCOM—Announcement on the 
Conditional Approval Decision on the Acquisition of Goodrich by UTC; Announcement No.25 [2012] of 
MOFCOM—Announcement on the Conditional Approval Decision on the Acquisition of Motorola Mobility 
by Google; Announcement No.82 [2009] of MOFCOM—Announcement on the Conditional Approval 
Decision on the Acquisition of Sanyo by Panasonic; Announcement No.77 [2009] of MOFCOM—
Announcement on the Conditional Approval Decision on the Acquisition of Wyeth by Pfizer. 
19 The announcement by SAIC <http://home.saic.gov.cn/xw/yw/zj/201407/t20140729_210025.html> 
accessed 10 April 2018.  
20 ibid.  
21 Chuang Wang, ‘The Overview of Anti-monopoly Civil Litigations in China and Its Future Outlook’ (中国
反垄断民事诉讼概况及展望) (2016) 02 Competition Policy Research 6, 6. 
22 ibid 8. 





licensing of technologies.23 In the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property Issued by US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, most 
cases provided as examples are on the exercise of patent rights.24 In China, the SAIC 
Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or 
Restrict Competition establish independent articles on issues concerning patent pools and 
SEPs, which are two of the most debated anti-competitive practices in IPR area.25 This 
demonstrates the specificity and importance of the anti-competitive exercise of patent 
rights in competition enforcement from another aspect.  
Third, in the era of knowledge-based economy, China, as a developing country, is still in 
the position of importing most advanced technologies from developed countries.26 In this 
context, many transnational companies have made use of the increased patent protection to 
exercise their patent rights abusively and set up technology barriers to restrict Chinese 
companies from entering the relevant markets. Accordingly, the question of regulating 
effectively anti-competitive practices of patent owners seems to be more important for 
China at this stage of developing its competition enforcement regime. 
Therefore, the focus of the thesis is on the anti-competitive practices in the exercise of 
patent rights by patent owners in China. 
1.4 The Importance of the Topic 
In order to be consistent with the TRIPs Agreement, significant improvements were made 
by China in patent protection before and after China formally became a WTO member in 
2001. Just around 2000, there were a series of anti-competitive cases concerning the 
exercise of patent rights, such as the DVD patent royalties case,27 Cisco Systems, Inc. v. 
Huawei Technologies, Co., 28  and Sichuan Dexian Technology Co., Ltd. v. Shanghai 
                                                          
23 Guidelines [2014] OJ C 89/3; Regulation 316/2014 on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements [2014] OJ L 93/17; 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property by US Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission (US Antitrust Guidelines on IPRs). 
24 Many examples are provided in the US Antitrust Guidelines on IPRs. 
25 Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict 
Competition (国家工商行政管理总局令第 74 号 关于禁止滥用知识产权排除、限制竞争行为的规定). 
26 Xiaoye Wang, Anti-monopoly Law (反垄断法) (Law Press. China 2011) 190. 
27 ‘The DVD Case Related to Intellectual Property Rights’ (DVD 知识产权案) China.com.cn (23rd June 2003) 
<http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/wtobg2003/351820.htm> accessed 17 April 2018. 
See also Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1. 
28 Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Huawei Technologies, Co. 266 F. Supp.2d 551 (E.D.Tex. 2003). 





Suoguang Electronics Co., Ltd. and Sony Corporation,29 which attracted the attention of 
the relevant competition authorities and experts in the field. The failure and helplessness of 
Chinese manufacturers in the aforesaid cases indicate the ineffectiveness of the pre-2008 
Chinese laws and regulations in controlling anti-competitive practices by patent rights 
owners.30 Moreover, it is likely that anti-competitive practices of owners of patent rights 
will become more common in China’s domestic market. As a result, China will need to 
prevent anti-competitive practices of patent owners in the market by enforcing its own 
competition law. 
However, China’s 2008 AML does not work as effectively as it was expected in 
controlling anti-competitive harm that arises from some exercises of patent rights, though a 
number of achievements have been made since its promulgation. In substance, Article 55 
of China’s AML confirms that the legal exploitation of IPRs should be outside the scope of 
the AML; but an abuse of IPRs which eliminates or restricts competition will fall within its 
scope.31 Nevertheless, as stated by Xianlin Wang, Article 55 is a general and declarative 
principle, not an appropriate provision to be applied as a legal basis to determine the 
legality or illegality of the exercise of IPRs.32 China’s AML took many of its features from 
EU competition law. However, unlike the position in the EU, until 2015 there were no 
complementary instructions or guidelines in China to explain or facilitate the application of 
Article 55 to the exercise of IPRs. As a consequence, the NDRC published its first decision 
concerning an anti-competitive exercise of patent rights only in 2015. In 2013 the 
Guangdong Higher People’s Court rendered two final judgments on an anti-competitive 
case between Huawei and InterDigital. Although the two cases mentioned above are 
milestones in China’s anti-monopoly enforcement history, they exposed serious problems 
in applying China’s AML to anti-competitive practices of patent owners. These problems 
were presented from both the perspective of regulating rules and the perspective of specific 
enforcement.33  
                                                          
29 Sichuan Dexian Technology Co., Ltd. vs. Shanghai Suoguang Electronics Co., Ltd. and Sony Corporation, 
Shanghai No.1 Intermediate People’s Court, (2004) Hu Yizhong Minwu (Zhi) Chuzi No. 223 ((2004) 沪一中
民五 (知) 初字第 223 号).  
See also Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3. 
30 See also Chapters 2 and 3. 
31 Anti-monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国反垄断法), Article 55. 
32 Xianlin Wang, ‘Rethinking the Application of China’s Antimonopoly Law in the Area of Intellectual 
Property Rights’ (我国反垄断法适用于知识产权领域的再思考) (2013) 1 Journal of Nanjing University 
(Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences) 34, 38. 





The SAIC issued Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights 
to Eliminate or Restrict Competition (Provisions) in 2015.34 However, it has not been 
applied in any investigation since its enactment. Furthermore, the NDRC and the SAIC 
released draft anti-monopoly guidelines on the abuse of IPRs (consultation paper) at the 
end of 2015 and at the beginning of 2016 respectively. In March 2017, after collecting 
public comments on the two NDRC and SAIC draft guidelines, the Anti-monopoly 
Commission (AMC) released unified draft IPRs guidelines for public comment (the AMC 
draft IPRs guidelines).35 Compared to the NDRC and SAIC drafts, the AMC draft IPRs 
guidelines are much more principled and leave a significant amount of discretion for the 
AMEAs to exercise. Once the guidelines are finally promulgated, together with the 
previous SAIC Provisions, they will hopefully provide certainty and instructions on the 
interplay of competition enforcement and patent protection. However, it has to be admitted 
that from the current components of the adopted SAIC Provisions and the draft guidelines 
(consultation paper), some urgent problems still need to be addressed. For instance, there 
are serious concerns on how the SAIC Provisions will influence competition enforcement 
by other AMEAs in dealing with the anti-competitive exercise of IPRs in similar 
circumstances. What is the relationship between the published SAIC Provisions and the 
anticipated guidelines of the AMC? Faced with the globally debated competition concerns, 
there are no effective measures available to be taken. It is confusing in what circumstances 
the failure to disclose patent interest in the standard setting process can result in antitrust 
liabilities and to what extent the AML should intervene.36 In addition, how to keep a 
balance between patent protection and free competition when considering under the AML 
the seeking of injunctions by the owners of SEPs37 who have committed to license their 
patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, is another serious 
problem waiting to be resolved. 38  In recent years, reverse payment patent settlement 
agreements (RPPSAs)39 have attracted the attention from competition authorities in many 
                                                          
34 The Provisions came into effect on 1 August 2015. 
35 Anti-monopoly Guidelines of the Anti-monopoly Commission of the State Council for the Abuse of 
Intellectual Property Rights (Draft for Comments) (关于滥用知识产权的反垄断指南（征求意见稿）), 
available at: http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/201703/20170302539418.shtml.  
36 See also Chapter 7, Section 7.3. 
37 ‘SEPs are patents essential to implement a specific industry standard.’ Commission, ‘Antitrust Decisions 
on Standard Essential Patents and Samsung Electronics’ Memo/14/322, 29 April 2014.  
38 See also Chapter 7, Section 7.4. 
39 Reverse payment patent settlement agreements (the so-called pay-for-delay agreements) are normally 
concluded between brand-name drug manufacturers and generic drug manufacturers in the context of settling 
a patent dispute, in which the brand-name pharmaceutical company owning a patent on a drug provides 
monetary payments or other forms of value to the generic competitor in exchange for the latter’s commitment 





countries. Despite no case arising at the moment, the legal and economic context in China 
indicates that the seemingly legal RPPSAs have a potential to raise serious competition 
concerns.40 However, no effective and efficient preparation is being undertaken in China. 
On 17 March 2018, the 13th National People’s Congress adopted the Institutional Reform 
Plan of the State Council.41 One important part of this Institutional Reform Plan is that all 
the anti-monopoly responsibilities of the three AMEAs are merged into a newly 
established single and independent organization — the State Administration for Market 
Regulation (SAMR). This means that the tripartite enforcement system in China comes to 
an end. The merger of the multiple AMEAs will, to a great extent, resolve most of the 
problems in competition enforcement caused by the overlapping enforcement powers, and 
will improve the enforcement efficiency.  However, it is not the complete answer to all the 
potential problems that can arise. There are still some problems left that can seriously 
impair the effective and efficient application of the AML, especially in the exercise of 
patent rights, such as the confusion as to legal bases, the relationship between public and 
private enforcement, the coordination between the SAMR and relevant sectoral regulators 
and the lack of professionalism and transparency. 42  Moreover, it is not clear in what 
manner the new single SAMR will discharge its anti-monopoly responsibilities, especially 
in the area of the exercise of patent rights. 
Although improvements and progress made in prohibiting anti-competitive practices of 
patent owners can be identified, the unresolved problems and the uncertainty have made a 
contribution to the ineffectiveness of applying China’s AML. This ineffectiveness may 
discourage innovation and impede competition in China’s domestic market. It means that 
ineffectiveness will be a hindrance to China on the way to becoming a country with strong 
independent IPRs and will stifle China’s economic progress. Free competition and the 
protection of patent rights are both of considerable importance in the economic 
development of one country, especially a developing country like China. Therefore, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Patent Settlement Agreements in the Pharmaceutical Sector Under the EU and US Competition Laws: A 
Comparative Analysis’ (2017) 40(3) World Competition 471, 472. 
40 See also Chapter 8. 
41 The Institutional Reform Plan of the State Council (国务院机构改革方案), available at 
<http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2018-03/17/content_5275116.htm> accessed 20 March 2018. The Plan will 
reduce the number of ministerial-level entities by eight and reduce the number of vice-ministerial-level 
entities by seven. As a result, there will be totally 26 ministries and commissions in the State Council after it 
is reshuffled. 





effective application of China’s AML to regulate anti-competitive practices in exploiting 
patent rights is an urgent problem to be resolved. 
The thesis examines the relevant problems from a more overall and comprehensive 
perspective than other academic work. The discussion in this thesis provides both 
theoretical and practical bases for the necessity and appropriateness of the application of 
the AML to the anti-competitive practices in the exercise of patent rights. The thesis 
systematically introduces the development of China’s anti-monopoly enforcement in the 
area of exercise of patent rights. The thesis adds to the literature by offering a detailed and 
comprehensive analysis of China’s anti-monopoly enforcement system including both the 
regulating rules and the regulating authorities, in a general but patent rights-specific 
manner, and then focusing on two noticeable challenges concerning the exercise of patent 
rights suffered by the global competition authorities in the 21st Century: SEPs and RPPSAs. 
More importantly, based on comparative studies of the EU and US approaches, the thesis 
contributes critical and effective proposals to resolve identified problems and improve 
competition enforcement in the exercise of patent rights in the context of China’s specific 
legal and economic circumstances.  
1.5 Research Questions 
As stated above, the main research question of the thesis is to examine the extent to which 
China’s AML effectively controls anti-competitive practices of owners of patent rights 
with the view to make suitable proposals for reform. In order to answer that main question, 
several sub-research questions have been identified: 
1. Why is it necessary to apply competition law to the exercise of patent rights? 
2. What role do the rules under the current legal system in China play in regulating anti-
competitive practices of patent owners and in what manner they are or will be applied 
in practice?   
3. Whether the current arrangement for the structure and duties of Chinese competition 
authorities result in problems in competition enforcement, especially that concerns the 





4. What are the most noticeable problems in the 21st century challenging China in 
competition enforcement where the anti-competitive practices concern the exercise of 
patent rights? 
5. How do more mature regimes of competition/antitrust laws exercise control over the 
anti-competitive practices of patent owners? 
6. What measures can be taken for Chinese authorities to improve the effectiveness of 
China’s AML in regulating anti-competitive practices of owners of patent rights? 
1.6 Methodology 
In this thesis, the doctrinal method is followed mainly relying on primary sources, such as 
Chinese legislation and legislation and case-law of some other relevant countries; as well 
as secondary sources, namely relevant literature.43 In order to evaluate the Chinese system 
and make effective proposals for the relevant authorities to improve competition 
enforcement concerning the exercise of patent rights, comparative analysis with the EU 
and US will also be undertaken in this research. In terms of the overlapping field of 
competition law and patent law, countries like the US, the UK and the EU have faced the 
issues identified in the thesis for quite a long time and they have significant experience 
both in practice and in theory. On the contrary, the relevant literature in China was firstly 
introduced around 2000, no more than 20 years ago. Therefore, the analysis of the thesis 
will be on the basis of the extensive work by experts and scholars either from China or 
foreign countries. The thesis will examine and compare the relevant EU and US legislation 
according to the different focal points in each chapter. The examination and comparison 
will specifically focus on the rules that are applicable to the exercise of patent rights with 
anti-competitive effects which are also present in China. In addition, case studies play an 
important role in the undertaken research. The cases and investigations conducted by 
Chinese courts and authorities are chosen to display the development of competition 
enforcement in China, especially in the area of exercising patent rights. Of course, not all 
the cases and investigations will be discussed. Cases have been selected on the basis of 
their relevance to the assessment of the application of China’s AML to anti-competitive 
exercise of patent rights. The thesis also compares the relevant EU and US case law to 
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establish how their competition authorities deal with similar anti-competitive practices 
concerning the exercise of patent rights. The EU and US case law provide robust 
foundations for the further proposals to make sure of an effective application of China’s 
AML to the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. 
1.7 Structure 
The whole thesis is divided into 9 chapters. Chapter 1 is the basic chapter to introduce the 
thesis generally. Chapter 9 aims at answering the sixth research question and concludes the 
thesis by gathering the findings and proposing specific solutions to the problems identified 
in each chapter. The fifth research question will be answered throughout the whole thesis 
in accordance with the focal point of each chapter. 
Chapter 2 provides a historical context and a theoretical basis for the appropriateness of 
applying China’s AML to the anti-competitive practices in the exercise of patent rights. 
The relationship between patent rights and anti-monopoly law will be discussed first. Then, 
the necessity and context for China to apply its AML to regulate anti-competitive practices 
of patent rights owners will be analysed. Several influential Chinese cases before 2008 will 
be examined to illustrate how Chinese laws or regulations were applied to the anti-
competitive exercise of patent rights. Thus, Chapter 2 will address the first research 
question. 
As to the second research question, Chapters 3-5 help to understand the Chinese legal 
system. 
In Chapter 3, the Chinese legislation that is applicable to regulate anti-competitive 
practices of owners of patent rights will be analysed. Following from Chapter 2, this is to 
further demonstrate the appropriateness and necessity to apply China’s own Anti-
monopoly Law to such conduct. Both the pre-2008 competition-related rules and the 2008 
AML will be considered. In this chapter, the existing deficiencies and ineffectiveness in 
the current Chinese legal system will be identified, though progress and improvements will 
also be acknowledged.  
In Chapter 4, case studies will be developed on the basis of Huawei vs. InterDigital and the 





ineffective in regulating the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. Although the AML 
came into effect in 2008, without clear and detailed guidance, the only general article 
cannot be applied appropriately in practice. The analysis of these two noticeable cases in 
Chapter 4 aims to show the manner in which the AMEAs and the Chinese courts apply the 
law to anti-competitive practices of patentees in exercising their patent rights. The 
problems unresolved will be identified and discussed.  
In Chapter 5, the 2015 Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property 
Rights to Eliminate or Restrict Competition issued by China’s SAIC will be analysed. 
Previous chapters will show the necessity and importance to adopt clear guidance to 
facilitate the application of China’s AML to regulate the anti-competitive exercise of 
patent rights. Then, this chapter will discuss how China proceeded with the anti-monopoly 
guidelines on IPRs and what kind of guidance has been adopted. The main body of Chapter 
5 will be divided into 7 parts according to the different aims and functions of the rules. The 
deficiencies and uncertainty of the Provisions will be identified and the achievements will 
also be acknowledged. 
In Chapter 6, the two-level and tripartite administrative anti-monopoly enforcement 
structure in China will be examined. This seeks to answer the third research question. 
Previous chapters have discussed the role of the relevant legal rules in prohibiting the anti-
competitive practices in the exercise of patent rights. In addition, whether the anti-
competitive practices can be effectively regulated depends on whether there is effective 
and efficient anti-monopoly enforcement. In order to understand the manner in which 
China’s AML is applied, the institutional framework of China’s anti-monopoly 
enforcement will be elaborated. The main focus of this chapter will be on the analysis of 
the problems that have arisen from the current two-level and tripartite enforcement 
structure. These problems to some extent indicate the reason for the ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency of competition enforcement in the exercise of patent rights. In the context of 
establishing a single and independent SAMR, Chapter 6 will conclude by pointing out 
which problems will be alleviated and which problems will remain post the structural 
reform of the enforcement agencies.  
The aforesaid chapters have discussed the problems and uncertainty of the Chinese anti-
monopoly enforcement system in regulating the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights, 





may be particularly difficult when it comes to the exercise of patent rights in certain 
special circumstances. Chapters 7 and 8 seek to provide answers to the fourth research 
question, which discuss two major problems concerning anti-competitive practices of 
patent owners when exercising their rights in the 21st century. Chapter 7 discusses two 
noticeable concerns arising from the licensing of SEPs. One concerns the situation in 
which the competition rules can be applied to the failure of patent owners to disclose 
patent interest in the standard setting process. The other is about the circumstances in 
which and the extent to which the seeking of injunctions by FRAND-encumbered SEP 
owners should be limited. In order to understand the development of the competition 
enforcement in these two areas, the analysis and comments in this chapter are based on the 
case law in the EU and US. In addition, the relevant enforcement environment in China 
will also be commented on. The discussion and analysis in this chapter provides reasoning 
and support for the proposals to improve the application of China’s AML in these two 
aspects. Chapter 8 examines the likely illegality of RPPSAs in the pharmaceutical industry 
in order to understand how the US and the EU authorities deal with this problem and to 
explain the reasons why Chinese AMEAs should pay attention to such conduct. The 
analysis is on the basis of the US and EU competition enforcement and relevant academic 
literature. The selected US cases are re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,44 Valley Drug 
Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 45  Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 46  Re K-Dur 
Antitrust Litigation, 47  Watson 48  and Actavis. 49  The cases decided by the European 
Commission and the EU courts are Lundbeck, 50  Fentanyl 51  and in Servier. 52  The 
comparison of different approaches of the EU and US and the discussion of the changes in 
China’s pharmaceutical industry in Chapter 8 provide robust basis for the proposals set out 
in the final concluding chapter on how the AML should be applied to regulate such 
problematic agreements.  
In Chapter 9, the conclusion of the thesis as a whole will be presented. Some proposals will 
be made here to improve the effective application of China’s AML in controlling anti-
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competitive practices of patent owners when exercising their patent rights. The proposals 
will seek to provide appropriate answers to the last research question. 






 The Relationship between Patent Law and Anti-
monopoly Law1 
2.1 Introduction  
Patent Law grants exclusive rights to the owners of patents aiming to encourage innovation 
and enhance technology. The exclusive rights allow patent owners to exclude others’ 
unauthorised exploitation of their patents for a limited period of time, which can confer on 
the patentees an advantageous or even dominant position. Patent law protects the normal 
exercise of the granted exclusive rights though in some circumstances the exercise of these 
exclusive rights may lead to anti-competitive effects. However, the main goal of anti-
monopoly law is to remove the anti-competitive behaviour in the market to guarantee fair 
and free competition. In this context, the objectives of patent law seem to be contradictory 
to those of anti-monopoly law. Their relationship had been tough and strained for some 
time. Nevertheless, there is actually some harmony in the two branches of the law which 
pursues the same goal. The relationship between the two fields of law is no longer totally 
contrary but has gradually converged. This kind of compatible relationship can facilitate 
the application of anti-monopoly law to the regulation of anti-competitive practices 
undertaken by patent owners when they exercise patent rights. 
Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China, as one of the largest 
countries in the world, has played an important role in the international trade. In order to 
comply with international standards, China has amended its Patent Law to improve the 
standard of protection of patents to an internationally accepted level. However, in the era 
of knowledge-based economy, as a developing country, China is still in the position of 
importing most advanced technologies from developed countries.2 In this situation, many 
transnational companies have made use of the increased patent protection to exercise their 
patent rights inappropriately and set up technology barriers to restrict Chinese companies 
from entering the markets. Undoubtedly, this has had a detrimental effect on the 
development of relevant industries or companies in China. Although some rules adopted 
before 2008 are available to be applied to the anti-competitive practices concerning 
intellectual property rights in China, they are scattered in several different laws and 
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regulations and have seldom been referred to in practice.3 Therefore, in order to regulate 
effectively the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights, it is necessary for China to apply 
its Anti-monopoly Law. 
In this chapter, the relationship between Patent and Anti-monopoly Laws will be examined 
first. Then, the necessity and appropriateness for China to apply its Anti-monopoly Law 
(AML) to regulate the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights by patentees will be 
analysed. The analysis will be established on the basis of several influential cases taking 
place before the adoption of the 2008 AML to illustrate how Chinese laws were applied to 
such behaviour. Finally, some conclusions or observations will be made. 
2.2 The Relationship between Patent Law and Anti-monopoly Law 
What is the relationship between anti-monopoly law and patent law? Whether they are 
fundamentally contradictory with each other or they pursue the same objective just in 
different ways? The interaction between anti-monopoly law and intellectual property law, 
especially patent law, has become a contentious issue in legal studies all around the world. 
Traditionally, the relationship between the protection of patent rights and the protection of 
competition has been considered complicated owing to the seemingly contradictory 
objectives of these two independent bodies of law. On one hand, patent law is a kind of 
private law, which strives to encourage and promote innovation. It grants patentees 
exclusive rights to exploit their patents and impede others from exploitation without 
consent. The exclusivity to some extent is a kind of legal monopoly and restricts the 
activities of other competitors or potential competitors. On the other hand, the objective of 
anti-monopoly law is to remove anti-competitive behaviour and ensure the maintenance of 
unfettered and effective competition on the market. From this respect, the incompatibility 
between patent law and anti-monopoly law seems to be logical and reasonable. However, 
the alleged conflict and contradiction is only on the surface. In fact, competition authorities 
in the EU and US no longer hold this traditional conflicting view.4 From a modern point of 
view, the relationship between anti-monopoly law and patent law is no longer a black-and-
white question. There are overlapping objectives shared by the two sets of law—promoting 
innovation, encouraging competition and improving consumer welfare. Nowadays, it 
appears to be generally accepted that anti-monopoly law and patent law are 
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complementary and they just try to achieve the same final goals through different means. 
Therefore, patentees should not be perceived as enjoying the monopoly power for just 
possessing patent rights; on the contrary, the ownership of patent rights does not absolutely 
exempt patent right holders from the application of anti-monopoly law.5 The existence of 
conflicts between the two bodies of law cannot be avoided, however, it is not the whole 
issue. The common points should not be ignored and the complementary nature of the 
relationship should be confirmed. 
2.2.1 The Nature of Patent Law 
‘The longest-standing, best-known, and, arguably, economically most valuable form of 
protection of rights provided by the law of intellectual property comes in the form of the 
patent.’ 6  Basically, a patent grants the patent owner certain exclusive rights over the 
innovative and inventive product or process to exclude others from making, using, offering 
for sale, selling, or importing the subject product or from exploiting the subject process 
itself without the consent of the patentee.7 The origins of a patent have a close relation to 
‘monopoly’. In the early stage, the concept of monopoly rights was considered to be firstly 
developed by the German miners of the Alps in their innovative process traced back to 
thirteenth century.8 However, the first patent scheme all around the world which is the 
closest to the modern one was created by a Decree of 1474 in Venice, in which a limited 
monopoly was granted to the inventors of the new objects.9 This patent system has become 
a classic. It has been followed by and developed into the modern patent law but it was not 
a complete patent law. During the evolutionary process of patent law, a number of 
characteristics have been changed fundamentally but what has not been changed is the 
nature of monopoly. 
In the old days in Europe, patents did not completely aim to encourage innovation and 
invention but more for a reward for the loyalty of royal supporters.10 However, in modern 
society, patent law is fundamentally designed for two main purposes, one of which is to 
grant a reward to the inventor for his or her investment and hard work and more important 
is to provide an incentive for innovation. According to China’s Patent Law, ‘this law is 
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enacted for the purpose of protecting the legitimate rights and interests of patentees, 
encouraging inventions, giving an impetus to the application of inventions, improving the 
innovative capabilities, and promoting scientific and technological progress as well as the 
economic and social development.’11 It is widely acknowledged that during the process of 
invention and creation, the inventor normally has to invest a lot of time, money, hard work 
or relevant skill in the innovation process. At the same time, the inventor has to bear the 
risk of failure in which all the investment could be sunk. Therefore, the costs and risks to 
innovate are considerably high. If the state did not provide some exclusive rights to protect 
and reward these inventors, the trouble of ‘free ride’ would come into being.12                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
In this situation, everyone in the society could take advantage of others’ intellectual 
achievements for free and inventors’ innovative results could be invaded or occupied 
unlimitedly. As a consequence, inventors cannot reap enough benefits from their 
inventions or creations and have to afford all the costs of the innovative and creative 
activities by themselves. Moreover, they have to bear the consequence of sharing their 
achievements with others for free. If things carried on like this, the incentives and 
motivations for inventors and investors to undertake innovative and creative activities 
would be substantially undermined and lessened. The concern then arises that almost no 
one would be willing to invest and engage in research and development without the 
appropriate protection form patent law.13 In this situation, what the competitors in the 
market would do would be simply to wait for the achievements of others without bearing 
any cost for innovative activities or any risk of failure.14 Consequently, the development of 
the society would be hampered and the economy would not function well.15 From this 
perspective, patent law which grants exclusive rights to patentees and offers them 
protection will, to a great extent, spur both individuals and undertakings to invest in 
innovative and creative activities and at the same time makes a contribution to the 
promotion of innovation and the enhancement of social welfare. On one hand, the 
protection of patent rights by patent law has the same aim as the protection of normal 
property rights, which is to prevent the deprivation of others’ property illegally and to 
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preclude the use of others’ property without consent.16  On the other hand, patent law 
allows right owners to charge royalties for the use of their patents as a reward for their 
efforts and investment, which provides material incentives for individuals and enterprises 
to undertake and invest more in research and development. Although patent rights will not 
be conferred on inventors for all innovations and there are really some inventors who are 
stimulated to invest in research and development just for their interest, patent law at least 
provides a chance or a hope to encourage innovators to pursue their goals.  
The other main purpose of patent law that must be taken into account is to facilitate the 
dissemination of knowledge and technology and finally to benefit the public. Patent law 
not only aims to protect the interest of inventors but also to guarantee consumer welfare. 
Pursuant to the United States Constitution, the Congress shall have the power “to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writing and discoveries.”17 In general, the 
legal monopoly given by patent law to patentees will only last for a limited period of time, 
normally no more than 20 years. However, the legal monopoly is on condition that when 
the term of patent rights expires, the knowledge should be available to the public to 
produce products or use processes protected by the patent. In addition, patentees are 
entitled by patent law to license their rights. In this way, licensing enables the combination 
of an intangible property—the innovative technology of the licensor with the other 
productive elements of licensees to maximise the efficiency and profits. 18  It can be 
imagined that without the protection of patent law, most inventors would endeavour to 
keep their inventions or creations secret, which to some extent would impede the spread of 
knowledge. Licensing makes it possible to save social resources by removing repeated 
research and development work; simultaneously, the royalties from licensing provides 
further motivations for the original inventors to go on with their innovative activities. 
Licensing facilitates the dispersal of innovation by allowing others to exploit the patents, 
simplifies the follow-on innovation and smooths the realization of the commercial value of 
patent rights. Undoubtedly, this will eventually benefit consumer welfare by providing 
more innovative and better goods with lower prices.  
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Overall, patent law is generally regarded as an important tool to encourage innovation, 
facilitate the dissemination of knowledge and promote consumer welfare by granting 
patentees a legal monopoly for a limited period of time over their inventions.  
2.2.2 The Nature of Anti-monopoly Law 
‘The basis of a free market is competition between firms.’ 19  However, a free market 
economy should not mean completely and absolutely unbridled competition for all the 
participants in any industry.20 Anti-monopoly law is adopted to prevent undertakings from 
distorting or restricting competition and to ensure the optimal functioning of the market. It 
represents the coercive power of the state and is regarded as the ‘economic constitution’.21 
Although it seems to be a little ironic that free competition will be achieved by competition 
law through controlling and interfering the liberty of undertakings’ behaviour, regulatory 
rules are necessary to resolve the imperfections of the market in the background of 
competition.22 Accordingly, it is imperative to apply anti-monopoly law to the correction 
of anti-competitive practices in the market. 
Basically, the objectives of anti-monopoly law differ in different countries according to 
their individual circumstances, such as the economic policy and environment, the judicial 
interpretation and so on. Even in the same country, the goals of its anti-monopoly law will 
vary during different development stages.23 For example, the purpose of the Act Against 
Unfair Competition of Germany in 1896 (Gesetz gegen den Unlauteren Wettbewerb) 
simply focused on the protection of competitors, such as prohibiting false advertising and 
counterfeiting trademarks.24 While after several amendments, its aims have extended to the 
protection of consumers and public interests as well. In addition, according to different 
situations of each country, anti-monopoly law usually strives for multiple objectives not a 
single one.25 Accordingly, there is not a fixed and definite objective properly designed for 
all the countries and the debate on the purposes of anti-monopoly law remains a 
contentious issue. For instance, the popular attitude among German scholars is that what 
anti-monopoly law pursues is to remove monopolies and ensure effective market 
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competition; while the Chicago School in the US holds the opinion that the promotion of 
economic efficiency is the purpose of antitrust law, which has greatly decreased the 
intervention of the US on mergers since 1980s.26  
Although there is a controversy in the legislative objectives of anti-monopoly law around 
the world, the same basic goals have been generally accepted as forbidding monopolistic 
behaviour27 and guaranteeing market competition on one hand and promoting economic 
efficiency and enhancing consumer welfare on the other hand.28 For example, Article 1 of 
China’s AML clearly sets down that this anti-monopoly law is designed for ‘preventing 
and restraining monopolistic conduct, protecting fair market competition, enhancing 
economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of consumers and the interests of the 
society as a whole, and promoting the healthy development of socialist market economy.’29 
Similarly, the EU competition law pursues both welfare and efficiency. In the words of the 
European Commission, Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union as a whole aims to protect the market competition and ultimately achieve the 
promotion of consumer welfare and allocative efficiency. 30  Market competition can 
effectively optimize the allocation of resources in the market through the price 
mechanism.31 At the same time, it also plays a significant role in realizing the productive 
efficiency by fostering undertakings to produce goods at the lowest possible cost in a 
dynamic process. In this sense, the economic efficiency as a whole will be achieved and 
promoted. From a macroeconomic perspective, market competition is like an ‘invisible 
hand’ which leads individuals aiming for their own interests to simultaneously contributing 
to the wealth of the society as a whole.32 In other words, individuals are just focusing on 
their own interests under market competition, however, in this context they can make more 
contributions to the society as a whole than they intend to do. As a result, consumers will 
also benefit from market competition, as they have more product choices with higher 
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quality and lower prices. Efficiency is not the end of the story, while it is the start of the 
process to maximise welfare.33 
Therefore, although the objectives of anti-monopoly law may diverge in different countries 
and may change over time, in modern society, its basic goals seem to be the same—to 
remove the monopolies which distort and restrain market competition and to promote 
economic efficiency and consumer welfare. 
2.2.3 Conflicts and Similarities between Patent Law and Anti-monopoly Law 
On the basis of the analysis of the nature of the two sets of law, it is apparent that the 
conflicts and tensions between patent law and anti-monopoly law are inevitable. First, 
patent law prioritises the protection of the interest of individual innovators, which is a 
matter of a private law; while anti-monopoly law pays more attention to the protection of 
market competition and public interest, which belongs to the sphere of public law. 
Moreover, in order to encourage investment in research and development, patent law 
grants patentees a legal monopoly for a limited period to exclude others from exploiting 
their achievements without consent. This to some extent may provide the right holders 
with a market advantage. If inappropriately used, obstacles may be posed to market 
competition. To stimulate innovation and creation, patent law seems to allow and even 
motivate monopoly. In contrast, anti-monopoly law aims to remove anti-competitive 
conduct in the market to encourage competition among competitors. Anti-monopoly law 
does not permit the monopolistic practices that can distort competition. From this 
perspective, the monopoly nature of patent rights seems to go in the diametrically opposite 
direction to what is pursued in anti-monopoly law and reflects potential conflicts. It would 
be possible for anti-monopoly law to deprive patentees of the protection provided by patent 
law. 
Although the conflicts and tensions between patent law and anti-monopoly law are 
inevitable, they are only on the surface and it is not reasonable to regard patent rights as 
incompatible with the principles of anti-monopoly law. In essence, the relationship 
between the two bodies of law is complementary and they share the same ultimate 
objectives which are to motivate innovation and competition and promote consumer 
                                                          





welfare. 34  Before elaborating the complementary and dialectical relationship, it is 
necessary to clarify that the ‘monopoly’ appearing in the two bodies of law has different 
meanings. On one hand, the ‘monopoly’ we mentioned in patent law refers to the 
exclusivity of patent rights and it is similar to normal property rights by nature, like 
ownership.35 This ‘monopoly’ is obtained legally through patent law and should not be 
construed as what is understood under anti-monopoly law. On the other hand, according to 
Donald (1980), ‘monopoly’ in anti-monopoly law should be interpreted as a kind of illegal 
behaviour, which aims to deprive people of something.36 These predatory practices include, 
but, are, not limited to, monopoly agreements, abuse of a dominant position and so on. 
However, inventors not only take nothing away from the public but contribute a lot to the 
society and enrich the current knowledge with their innovation. Therefore, in a normal 
situation, the protection for patent rights does not fall within the scope of anti-monopoly 
law. 
Anti-monopoly law pursues its final goal through protecting effective competition in the 
market. In order not to be knocked out of the market, competitors endeavour to improve 
the product quality and lower the price by innovation. Ultimately, consumers can benefit. 
Patent law aims to encourage innovation to enhance the technology and bring benefits to 
consumers. With the emergence of various kinds of innovative technologies, competition 
in the technology or innovation market will also be promoted. As early as in 1942, it had 
been suggested that public interest was the ultimate objective of both patent law and anti-
monopoly law.37  Moreover, the idea has also been reflected in Atari Games Corp. v. 
Nintendo of Am.38 It is stated that although the goals and objectives of the two sets of law 
might be at odds at the beginning, the relationship between patent law and anti-monopoly 
law was in principle complementary as a result of their same aims to promote innovation, 
industry and competition.39 Additionally, the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property issued by the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission highlights that ‘[t]he intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the 
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common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.’ 40  The 
European Commission holds a very similar view that intellectual property laws and 
competition law ultimately pursue the same basic goal to enhance consumer welfare and 
achieve the allocation efficiency of resources.41 In addition, Article 2 of the Provisions on 
the Prohibition of the Abuse42  of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict 
Competition adopted by the SAIC states that ‘[a]nti-monopoly and intellectual property 
rights protection share common goals, namely to promote competition and innovation, to 
enhance economic efficiency, and to safeguard consumer and public interests.’43 
In terms of encouraging innovation, there is no doubt that patent law provides an incentive 
for inventors by granting them some exclusive rights for a limited period over their 
inventions. From the perspective of anti-monopoly law, the promotion of innovation is 
achieved through market competition. Fair and free competition provides undertakings 
with a good environment and platform in which they may produce innovative and better 
products. To some extent, innovation and creation can be considered as the outcome of 
market competition as well as the tool to compete. In order to occupy and maintain a 
position in a market, enterprises have to compete with each other. The best way they can 
adopt to stand out in the competition seems to develop innovative technologies to lower 
the price as well as to improve the quality of products. In this context, market competition 
fosters manufacturers to innovate and develop new technologies so that they can find out 
and satisfy the needs of consumers. 
With regard to the promotion of competition, anti-monopoly law is designed to protect 
market competition through removing anti-competitive practices from the market. Any 
monopolistic conduct that has the potential to distort or eliminate competition in the 
market is prohibited by anti-monopoly law. From the perspective of patent law, despite the 
exclusivity and monopoly of patent rights, it does not mean that patent rights are 
incompatible with competition like oil and water. Patent rights can also make a 
contribution to promoting competition. First, like competition as a driving force for 
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undertakings to innovate, patent rights on the other side act as an incentive to promote 
dynamic competition.44 Basically, innovation and creation have played a significant role in 
a competitive free market economy and they make great contribution to economic growth 
and prosperity.45 It is believed that limitations on competition at one level may be essential 
for the promotion of competition at another level.46 For example, although the exclusivity 
of patent rights may pose restraints to the competition in the production stage, it enhances 
at the same time competition in the innovative stage. In order to obtain the advantageous 
position in the market provided by a patent, undertakings invest in research and 
development for new or improved products or processes to compete with each other. In 
this situation, innovative competition will be encouraged. In addition, patent law allows the 
right holders to license others to exploit their patents. This not only stimulates the diffusion 
of knowledge but also ‘create competition on downstream product markets.'47 Furthermore, 
patent rights are not absolute. The limitations listed in patent law not only reflect the 
restrictions on monopoly but also demonstrate the confirmation and admission of the value 
of competition. Specifically, the term of patent rights only lasts for a limited period of time, 
generally no more than 20 years. When the term of a patent expires, the patent has to be 
disclosed to the public. At that time, anyone in this area is permitted to exploit this patent. 
In other words, the influence of the restraints on competition is short-term and it is only a 
leverage used to exchange for long-term public welfare. As the court expressed in Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Graft Boats, Inc.,48 the constraint on the duration of patent rights in 
patent law itself depicted the balance between the need for motivating innovation and the 
avoidance of the unnecessary monopolies that would not only restrain competition but also 
had no positive influence on the progress of technology and science. In addition to the 
limited term, patent rights are only conferred to those substantially creative inventions 
under the rigorous requirements such as creativity, novelty and utility. Not all the 
inventions can be granted patent. If common sense or the ideas which are easy to obtain 
were granted patents, it would prevent others from exploiting them and restrict competition 
on the market. Accordingly, strict requirements for granting patent rights are essential to 
avoid the unnecessary limitations on competition in the market. Moreover, compulsory 
licensing is also available in patent law in most countries to protect the public interest. The 
doctrine of compulsory licensing as a remedy may enable other competitors to operate in 
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the market when patent right holders seek to exclude them from the market by refusing to 
license. Therefore, all the limitations to patent rights themselves in patent law system seem 
to protect and promote market competition in a different way. 
In the matter of improving consumer welfare, effective competition between enterprises 
enables consumers to enjoy the best product at the lowest price. At the same time, 
innovation can lead to the appearance of new technology and the production of new 
products, which will be able to satisfy various kinds of needs of consumers and bring a 
great deal of convenience to them. Innovation enables undertakings to produce goods or 
provide services at a low cost and effective competition will finally lower their price. At 
last, consumers will benefit most. Accordingly, no matter what means is adopted, the final 
results of both competition and innovation are to improve consumer welfare.  
In summary, the relationship between patent law and anti-monopoly law should not be a 
question of black-and-white. Patent law mainly aims to provide an incentive for innovation 
by granting exclusive rights and legal monopoly to patentees; while the main task of anti-
monopoly law is to encourage competition by removing unlawful behaviour on the market 
that restricts or eliminates competition. Although there are some inevitable conflicts and 
tensions between the two bodies of law, they have the same ultimate goals to promote 
innovation, enhance competition and improve consumer welfare. They just achieve the 
same objectives through different means. In essence, their relationship is a dialectical and 
complementary one, which is not opposite. 
With this theoretical basis of the relationship between patent law and anti-monopoly law, it 
will be appropriate and justifiable to apply anti-monopoly law to regulate the anti-
competitive practices in the exercise of patent rights by patent owners in some situations. 
Although patent law imposes some restraints on the exclusive rights of patentees, it is still 
easy for rights holders to abuse the advantageous or even dominant position obtained from 
their patent rights to distort competition. In this situation, patent law itself seems to be 
inadequate to cope with the abuse. Once the exercise of patent rights has anti-competitive 
effects on the market, anti-monopoly law will be necessary and reasonable to be applied to 
such conduct.49 This is particularly so, as such investigations are costly and complicated. 
Only the State can afford the high costs in both labour and materials to investigate and 
                                                          





tackle such anti-competitive issues.50 In general, the possession of patent rights should not 
be taken as an excuse for patentees to be exempted from the regulation of anti-monopoly 
law; however, the patent right itself does not automatically constitute a monopoly that is 
prohibited by anti-monopoly law. The situations where anti-monopoly law can be applied 
to regulate the conduct of patent owners are very exceptional. As long as the exercise of 
patent rights is within the legal scope of the patent and does not result in substantially 
adverse effects on market competition, anti-monopoly law will not be triggered.  
2.3 The Necessity and Context for China to Apply Its Anti-monopoly Law 
to Regulating the Anti-competitive Exercise of Patent Rights 
Before and after China formally became a member of the WTO in 2001, the protection of 
patent rights in China was significantly improved to be consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement. However, as a developing country which is mainly dependent on importing 
advanced technologies from developed countries, the consequence for China has been a 
high number of disputes involving foreign companies concerning alleged infringement of 
patent rights. Among these disputes, there are also some situations where transnational 
companies have used their patent rights to impede competition and set up technical barriers 
for Chinese undertakings. This was particularly so before the adoption of the AML in 2008. 
The Chinese rules prior to 2008 were not effective to deal with anti-competitive practices 
resulting from the exercise of patent rights. 51  The consequence was that Chinese 
undertakings had no means to protect their legitimate rights when faced with such practices 
of foreign companies. Three cases that took place before 2008 will be discussed below to 
demonstrate the necessity and analyze the context for China to apply its AML to the 
exercise of patent rights and the need for further implementing measures. 
2.3.1 The DVD Patent Royalties Case 
When it comes to the exercise of patent rights by foreign undertakings that allegedly 
restricts or eliminates competition from Chinese companies, the case that must be taken 
into account is the DVD patent royalties case. 
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The production of DVD players in China has developed so quickly that according to the 
statistics, the production amount was increased by a factor of 400, from only 50,000 in 
1997 to approximately 19,945,000 in 2001. 52  China had been the largest country to 
manufacture DVD players around the world, whose output had constituted about 80% of 
all the DVD players.53 The exportation share then of the DVD players made in China 
accounted for about 20%-25% in the relevant market and most of them were exported to 
European countries and the US.54 The DVD products from China have the features of high 
output, high quality and low price compared to the like products in other markets. 
Accordingly, Chinese DVD manufacturers stood out soon among all the competitors. 
However, Chinese undertakings did not own those essential technologies in manufacturing 
DVD products. So when the main Chinese DVD manufacturers posed a threat to the 
dominant position of foreign producers, the latter began to take advantage of their patent 
rights to impose pressure on the Chinese companies.  
In June of 1999, the DVD 6C Patent Pool issued a statement of “DVD Patent Pool 
Licensing” to the world stating that the DVD 6C owned the essential patented technologies 
to produce DVD products and that all the DVD producers around the world would be 
required to pay royalties to DVD 6C.55 In November 2000, the DVD 6C Patent Pool put 
forward a motivated plan of patent licensing and began to negotiate patent royalties with 
Chinese DVD manufacturers (most of which were represented by the China Audio 
Industry Association). However, in January 2002, the negotiations broke down and 3864 
DVD players exported to the United Kingdom by Shenzhen Pudi Corporation were seized 
by the local customs. 56  Furthermore, the German customs also seized DVD players 
exported by Huizhou Desai Corporation in February 2002.57  These two events forced 
Chinese DVD manufacturers to face seriously patent licensing problems. In March 2002, 
                                                          
52 ‘The DVD Case Related to Intellectual Property Rights’ (DVD 知识产权案) China.com.cn (23rd June 
2003) <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/wtobg2003/351820.htm> accessed 17 April 2018. 
53 Ying Zhan and Xuezhong Zhu, ‘Intellectual Property Right Abuses in the Patent Licensing of Technology 
Standards from Developed Countries to Developing Countries: A Study of Some Typical Cases from China’ 
(2007) 10 (3/4) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 187-200, 192.  
54 Chifeng Han, ‘Legal Considerations About the abuse of Intellectual Property Rights in the DVD Case’ (对
DVD 事件中知识产权滥用的法律思考) (2005) 3 Studies in Law and Business 66-75, 66.  
55 DVD 6C was a patent pool consisting of Hitachi Consumer Electronics Co., Ltd., JVC KENWOOD 
Corporation, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Panasonic Corporation, Toshiba Corporation and Time Warner, 
each of which ‘contributed one or more of its patents related to DVD technology to the pool to form a 
collection of patents ‘essential’ to DVD production’.—Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law and Intellectual 
Property Rights: Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press 2011) 317. 
56 ‘The Dispute of DVD Patent Royalties: the Shame of Chinese Manufacturing Industry’ (DVD 专利费之争：
中国制造业的蒙羞) Sina Finance (31st May 2007) 






the DVD 6C Patent Pool issued the last warning that with the failure of the negotiations, all 
DVD producers in China had to enter an agreement with the DVD 6C Patent Pool with 
regard to patent royalties or they would be sued for infringing patent rights.58 At that time, 
the patent royalties required by the DVD 6C Patent Pool were 20 dollars per DVD, which 
made up more than half of the total profit gained by Chinese enterprises—200 RMB.59 
However, in April 2002, after repeated negotiations, the China Audio Industry Association 
finally reached an agreement with the DVD 6C, 3C (Philips, Sony Corporation, Pioneer 
Corporation and LG Electronics) and other patent pools. It was agreed that the total 
average patent royalties per exported DVD player paid by the Chinese manufactures would 
be about 19.6 dollars including 4 dollars for the 6C, 5 dollars for the 3C, 2 dollars for the 
1C (Thomson), 4 dollars for MPEG-LA (a packager of patent pools) and about 1.5 dollars 
for Dolby.60  
At this stage, the dispute with respect to the patent royalties of DVD players seemed to 
come to an end, however, this was just a beginning. Normally, it is legal and reasonable for 
patent owners to charge some fees for the use of their patents. Nevertheless, the average 
patent royalties in this case accounted for almost 40% of the production costs of each DVD 
player, which was well beyond the international customary level of 5%. 61  The price 
experienced a continued decline but the patent royalties were not reduced. 62  Such 
excessively high patent royalties did hit the DVD industry in China so heavily that many 
DVD manufacturers were bankrupt or left the DVD market as a result of the poor profits or 
debts. In addition, the DVD 6C and 3C patent pools charged patent royalties from Chinese 
manufacturers on the basis of nearly 3,000 invention patents. However, only 10% of these 
were the essential technologies to produce DVD players.63 Most of the patents on the basis 
of which royalties were calculated had expired or not been granted patent rights in China 
or invalid or unnecessary. Such patent licensing agreements could amount to tying or 
bundling if the licensees were forced to accept the one-stop package licence. Although 
many DVD producers such as two large Chinese enterprises Changhong and Jiangkui had 
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tried to negotiate with the members of the DVD 6C Patent Pool to request independent 
licensing from them, they were refused unreasonably.  
Therefore, in 2005, two Chinese DVD makers, Wuxi Multimedia Ltd and Wuxi Orient 
Power Technology Ltd, brought an action against the DVD 3C Patent Pool in the Southern 
District Court of California in the US. The allegations of the plaintiffs were that the DVD 
3C Patent Pool abused their patent rights in patent licensing in order to restrict or exclude 
competition in the relevant market by requiring excessively high patent royalties, illegally 
tying and bundling in package licensing and refusing to license without justifiable 
reasons.64 They claimed that these practices breached the rules prescribed in the Sherman 
Act and other US antitrust laws. Unfortunately, the claims of the two Chinese producers 
were rejected by the court for lack of evidence. This result really let all the Chinese 
manufacturers down. It was estimated that the loss suffered by the Chinese manufacturers 
in terms of the patent royalties to produce DVD players was about 20 billion RMB and the 
DVD industry had been damaged heavily. 65  Many DVD manufacturers had financial 
deficits and went bankrupt or turned to other industries. There was also a sharp decrease in 
the output and in the exportation of DVD players made in China. What is worse is that the 
detrimental effects of the DVD case had also been extended to other production industries, 
such as digital cameras, televisions, motorbikes and so on.66 
Although patent pools are designed to remove obstacles to obtaining patent licence, to 
reduce patent royalties and to contribute to the benefits of customers, they also have the 
potential to create anti-competitive barriers. For example, patent pools might restrict or 
eliminate competition in the market through exercising patent rights, such as charging 
excessively high patent royalties, tying or bundling or refusing to license without 
justifiable reasons. Normally, the patentees of the patent pool are required to license their 
patents fair, reasonable and non-discrimination (FRAND) terms and potential licensees 
should be able to obtain independent licences from the members of the patent pool. 
However, in practice, as demonstrated by the DVD case, the obligations for the patent 
holders of patent pools seem to be meaningless and ignored. In general, the possession of 
patent rights and the dominant position themselves do not give rise to anti-competitive 
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effects. However, when the rights are abused, especially in respect of technology standards, 
technical barriers to limit competition will be established and anti-competitive effects will 
emerge. Faced with the anti-competitive practices in the exercise of patent rights, 
developed countries such as the US and the EU have applied antitrust law to these 
practices. In addition, a very similar case has also arisen in Taiwan where the CD-R 
producers filed an antitrust lawsuit against the CD-R Patent Pool alleging unfair trade 
practices and Taiwan’s Fair Trade Commission supported most allegations.67 
2.3.2 Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Huawei Technologies, Co.  
Another influential case that must be considered concerns a foreign company who 
attempted to use its patent rights to exclude Chinese company from the relevant market. 
This is the case of Cisco Systems Incorporation (Cisco) which was brought against Huawei 
Incorporation (Huawei).  
In January 2003, one of the world’s largest network and telecom equipment producer 
Cisco instituted legal proceedings in the Eastern District Court of Texas in the US against 
China’s largest telecom equipment manufacturer Huawei and its two wholly owned 
subsidiaries. 68 Cisco accused Huawei of infringing its intellectual property rights. Cisco 
claimed that the Quidway product of Huawei was copied from the source code of Cisco’s 
Internetwork Operation System (IOS), duplicated some other Cisco’s copyrighted 
documentations and infringed several Cisco’s patent rights.69 However, Huawei defended 
that it did not infringe Cisco’s patent rights or copyrights and alleged that the real purpose 
of this lawsuit raised by Cisco was to exclude Huawei from the market and keep its 
dominant or monopolistic position in the market.70  Finally, in October 2003, the two 
companies agreed to stop the action for a process of independent review. Then in July 
2004, Cisco and Huawei came to an agreement and the legal proceedings were terminated 
by the court.  
In this case, Huawei claimed that it had not infringed any intellectual property right of 
Cisco, though Huawei admitted that in order to satisfy the requirements of a customer, it 
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had provided the equipment with the proprietary protocol of Cisco which was the main 
reason for this lawsuit. ‘Proprietary protocol is a non-standard communication format and 
language developed by a single enterprise or organization.’ 71  The Cisco’s proprietary 
protocols could be regarded as a kind of de facto standards for router products. To some 
extent, with the de facto standards, Cisco enjoyed a dominant position in the market.72 In 
order to keep its market power, Cisco reserved its rights and refused to license. Despite the 
later international standard of the Internet Engineering Task Force, the proprietary 
protocols of Cisco were still of great importance and had great influence on the relevant 
market. Consequently, other manufacturers had to leave the market without a licence from 
Cisco or take the risk of infringing Cisco’s intellectual property rights. Thus, most 
competitors were kept out of the market and resulted in the monopolistic position of Cisco.  
2.3.3 Sichuan Dexian Technology Co., Ltd. v. Shanghai Suoguang 
Electronics Co., Ltd. and Sony Corporation 
In 2004, Sichuan Dexian Technology Co., Ltd. (Dexian) initiated litigation against 
Shanghai Suoguang Electronics Co., Ltd. and Sony Corporation (collectively called Sony 
here) to No.1 Intermediate People’s Court of Shanghai Municipality. Due to the refusal of 
Sony to accept the summons, the litigation was delayed and the first evidence exchange 
only happened at the beginning of 2006. Dexian claimed that Sony had abused its 
dominant position in the market by bundling its patented technology—Infolithium to its 
products, which resulted in unfair competition and violated Articles 2 and 12 of China’s 
Law against Unfair Competition.73 Dexian requested that Sony should stop applying the 
patented technology Infolithium when it manufactured digital videos (DV), digital cameras 
and the lithium battery for these digital products.74 
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According to the SAIC investigation, transnational companies had dominant positions in 
many product markets, including the DVs and digital cameras.75 At that time, the market 
for DVs and digital cameras had a classic oligopolistic structure and there was enough 
evidence to show that Sony had enjoyed a dominant position in this field.76 In fact, the 
dominant position and the legal monopoly provided by the intellectual property rights 
themselves did not have detrimental effects on the competition. However, in this case, 
Sony was accused of abusing its patented technology Infolithium to set up an exclusively 
dependent relationship between its DVs and digital cameras and its lithium battery. Within 
this exclusively dependent relationship, the DVs and digital cameras produced by Sony 
could only be compatible with Sony’s own lithium battery and the lithium battery from 
other manufacturers could not be compatible with Sony’s digital products. The digital 
products and the lithium battery should constitute two separate markets. However, Sony 
had used its patented technology Infolithium to exclude the lithium battery of other 
manufacturers from the battery market. The behaviour of Sony might be regarded as a kind 
of bundling, however, it was a little different from normal bundling conduct. Sony did not 
bundle its lithium battery to its digital products directly, but achieved its purpose through 
establishing an exclusively dependent relationship between its digital products and its 
lithium battery. In this situation, if customers buy the DVs or digital cameras of Sony, they 
will have no choice but to buy the lithium battery of Sony. With this advantage, the price 
of the lithium battery of Sony was 2 or 3 times higher than that of other producers.77 To 
some extent, this seriously limited the competition in the lithium battery market, especially 
when Sony enjoyed a dominant position in the relevant product market.  
Nevertheless, Sony argued that the reason to apply the patented technology Infolithium 
was that they had received a large number of complaints from customers of accidents with 
imitated batteries. For the safety of customers, Sony chose to use the patented technology 
Infolithium to encourage customers to buy the lithium battery from Sony. The response of 
Sony caused significant doubts. It was believed that the method adopted by Sony to 
safeguard the safety of customers was not the only way to achieve the objective and there 
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were other potential and effective ways that could be resorted to which were less 
harmful. 78  Moreover, China was the only country where the patented technology 
Infolithium was applied. Sony did not have the right to restrict or even eliminate 
competition in the relevant market by exercising its patent rights in an anti-competitive 
manner. 
This case was considered as the first case in China concerning the anti-competitive 
practices in the exercise of patent rights.79  The case also provided an opportunity for 
Chinese companies to fight against the monopoly of transnational giants. It seems that 
Sony’s exercise of its patented technology to force customers to use the lithium battery of 
Sony could probably constitute an abuse of a dominant position and keep other competitors 
out of the battery market. Without an anti-monopoly law, Dexian had to rely on China’s 
Law against Unfair Competition. However, Article 2 of Law against Unfair Competition 
was too general to be taken as a legal basis for a judgment. The resort to the Law against 
Unfair Competition in this case seemed to lack certainty and efficiency.80 As a result, 
Dexian found it impossible to find appropriate legal support for its allegation. The case 
ended with the failure of Dexian. The Court concluded that the plaintiff could not 
demonstrate that the defendant had conducted the alleged unfair competitive practices.81 
The unanswered question is whether the result would have been totally different if the 
AML in China had applied? 
2.3.4 Comments 
In summary, these cases discussed above all illustrate the urgent necessity for China to 
apply its own AML to anti-competitive practices in the exercise of intellectual property 
rights, especially patent rights which are more monopolistic than others. With the 
completion and improvement of the protection of the Patent Law in China, patent owners 
have obtained more protection for their patents. However, at the same time the 
inappropriate exercise of patent rights have become more serious, which has impeded the 
development of Chinese industry and enterprises. In some situations, it can raise serious 
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competition concerns. The DVD patent royalties case is a good example. For the first time, 
the relevant competition authorities were forced to face the problem and think of solutions 
to address it. Normally, the nature of a patent right determines that the right owner can 
enjoy certain exclusivities. The patent rights obtained legally should be respected and 
protected in order to promote innovation. However, the protection of patent rights is a 
double-edged sword since excessive protection may facilitate the abuse of the rights and 
lead to anti-competitive effects. If patent rights are used to restrict or eliminate competition, 
it will absolutely go beyond the scope of patent protection and should be prohibited. 
Before the adoption of the Anti-monopoly Law, there were indeed some rules available to 
control the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights.82 However, private law remedies are 
not as effective as public ones in regulating such conduct. Although the Law against Unfair 
Competition belongs to the category of public law, it only regulates tying or bundling and 
certainty and efficiency are limited. What is more, these rules are spread over different 
laws and regulations and they mainly consist of general principles. It is difficult for judges 
in practice to take decisions on the basis of these regulations or laws which are categorised 
as ‘soft law’.83 Besides, the scope of the rules is limited to specific areas, so their influence 
is also limited.84 In terms of Patent Law, despite having the possibility of a compulsory 
licence as a remedy for the abuse of patent rights, the word ‘abuse’ had not been formally 
adopted by Chinese laws until the 2008 Anti-monopoly Law. As a consequence, no rules 
showed the relation between compulsory licensing and monopolistic practices before 2008. 
Compulsory licensing was not connected to anti-competitive practices in the exercise of 
patent rights. In addition, the thresholds to apply compulsory licensing are too high to be 
satisfied in practice. Until now, there have been no compulsory licences being issued in 
any case in China. Therefore, before the enacting of the Anti-monopoly Law, Chinese 
companies had not had effective tools to protect their legitimate rights. Mostly, they were 
in a passive position and were easily exploited. It was quite difficult for Chinese 
manufacturers to bring an anti-monopoly action in China against competition concerns 
caused by the exercise of IPRs, especially patent rights. For example, in Cisco Systems, Inc. 
v. Huawei Technologies, Co., Huawei could have raised an anti-monopoly lawsuit alleging 
that Cisco’s refusal to license the de facto standard was an abuse of a dominant position 
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and impeded competition. However, there were no appropriate Chinese regulations or laws 
governing the anti-competitive exercise of intellectual property rights at that time. 
Although some market operators stood up and fought against the industry giants, they had 
to go abroad to file a lawsuit, as for example in the DVD case. The process was difficult 
and expensive with unpredictable results. Moreover, the experience of the EU and US has 
shown that competition/antitrust laws have played a rather important role in regulating the 
anti-competitive exercise of intellectual property rights.85 Therefore, it is really necessary 
and urgent for China to apply its own AML to anti-competitive practices in the exercise of 
patent rights and keep a good balance between the protection and control of patent rights. 
2.4 Conclusion 
In the fast-paced modern society, the ownership of a patent has become a strategic leverage 
for some undertakings to compete on the market. With patent rights, competitors may 
obtain an advantageous or even a dominant position in the relevant market. In essence, the 
dominance itself does not violate anti-monopoly law. Anti-monopoly law can only be 
applied to the exercise of patent rights in some exceptional cases. Patent law is no longer 
incompatible with anti-monopoly law. Although there are some inevitable conflicts 
between them, their ultimate objectives are the same which are to encourage innovation, 
protect competition and improve consumer welfare. Their relationship is complementary 
and dialectical not completely contrary. Therefore, if patent rights are exercised beyond 
their scope in an anti-competitive manner which causes detrimental influence on the 
effective competition, it will be appropriate and necessary for anti-monopoly law to be 
applied. 
Since China joined the WTO in 2001, the protection for patent owners in China has been 
improved to a higher level. However, China is still a developing country who has to import 
advanced technologies from developed countries. In this context, some transnational 
companies took advantage of their patent rights to distort competition in Chinese markets 
before 2008, which resulted in adverse effects on the development of relevant industries in 
China. Although there had been some rules available to be applied to the anti-competitive 
conduct in the exercise of intellectual property rights before the promulgation of China’s 
Anti-monopoly Law, they are separated in different laws or regulations and not effective in 
practice.  
                                                          





China finally promulgated its AML in 2008 with high expectations. However, it was not 
the end of the matter but the beginning of the long journey. There is only one general 
article in China’s AML that concerns the abuse of intellectual property rights.86 Further 
guidelines to apply the AML to the regulation of abuses of patent rights are in great need. 
Without the further explanations, the general principle stated in Article 55 will either 
become a mere inapplicable formality or give rise to confusion owing to different 
standards of enforcement.87 Despite the SAIC Provisions coming into effect since 1 August 
2015 to guide the application of AML to abuses of Intellectual property rights, there are 
still a huge number of problems left.88 In addition, the effects are unpredictable because 
there has not been any case applying the rules of the SAIC Provisions. Only a few anti-
monopoly cases/investigations in relation to the exercise of intellectual property rights 
have been raised since the adoption of the AML. This does not seem normal and Jie Yang, 
an official of the SAIC, said that the reason for this was likely to be that most companies 
do not realize the existence of abuses of intellectual property rights.89 Therefore, in the 
following chapter, the ineffectiveness of the applicable legislation will be examined. In 
order to improve the predictability and certainty of the application of the AML in the 
exercise of IPRs, especially patent rights, it is also necessary to adopt integrated effective 
and specific guidelines to facilitate the competition enforcement in China.  
 
                                                          
86 The AML, Article 55, ‘[t]his law is not applicable to undertakings who exercise their intellectual property 
rights in accordance with the laws and administrative regulations on intellectual property rights; however, 
this Law shall be applicable to the undertakings who eliminate or restrict market competition by abusing their 
intellectual property rights.’ 
87 The analysis of Article 55 of China’s AML will be undertaken in Chapter 3, Section 3.3. 
88 See detailed discussion in Chapter 5. 
89 Dandong Han (ed), ‘No Anti-monopoly Case concerning IPRs in China’ (中国尚无一起知产反垄断案) 
Legal Daily (Beijing, 16th August 2012) <http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2012-





 Chinese Legislation Applicable to Anti-Competitive 
Practices of Patent Owners  
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 has discussed the relationship between patent law and anti-monopoly law to 
provide a theoretical basis for the application of an anti-monopoly law to control the anti-
competitive exercise of patent rights. Then, the analysis of some influential cases taking 
place in China before 2008 has shown the necessity and urgency for China to adopt its own 
anti-monopoly law to regulate such conduct. In order to reinforce the appropriateness and 
necessity to apply an anti-monopoly law, this chapter will examine the ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency of the applicable legal rules in China.  
Generally, prohibiting the abuse1 of a right is a legal rule or principle in the context of 
modern law. As private rights confer exclusivity, intellectual property rights (IPRs) have 
the potential risk of being exercised in an abusive manner,2 especially patent rights. With 
the globalization of the economy, tariff barriers and general non-tariff barriers to trade 
have been substantially removed but technological barriers are rising considerably. Patent 
rights have played a significant role in a competitive market and in the economy of a State. 
Due to the special nature and characteristics of patent rights,3 their exercise by patent 
owners can easily be considered anti-competitive. The anti-competitive exercise of patent 
rights may not only impede the dispersal of technologies but also may distort competition 
in the market. Therefore, it is essential to manage effectively the abusive exercise of patent 
rights and protect market competition. This is evident in the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). For instance, it is stated in TRIPs that ‘the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, 
to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
                                                          
1 For the purpose of the thesis, the term ‘abuse’ can also be used as the meaning of ‘misuse’ or ‘inappropriate 
use’ in a general manner. The expression ‘abuse of intellectual property rights’ used in the thesis includes but 
is not limited to all the possible anti-competitive exercise of IPRs, which is so especially in some Chinese 
legal measures, unless otherwise specified that it refers to the abuse of a dominant position. 
2 Sheng Qiao and Xuxiang Tao, ‘A Lawyer’s Consideration of the Ban on Abuse of Intellectual Property 
Rights in China’ (我国限制知识产权滥用的法律思考) (2015) 01 Modern Law Science 112, 115. 





obligations.’4 At the same time, TRIPs confers on its Members the right to take appropriate 
measures to prevent the abusive exercise of IPRs which have adverse effects on 
international trade or on the transfer of technology.5  
As a developing country, China has suffered for many years from the consequences of 
anti-competitive practices of patentees in exercising patent rights. China lacked a complete 
Anti-monopoly Law and still lacks a specific and effective anti-monopoly system to focus 
on the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights by patent owners. It is true that there are 
some rules adopted before 2008 which are applicable to the anti-competitive practices of 
patent owners when exercising their patent rights, most of which are still in effect. They 
are scattered in various laws or regulations and seemed not to have controlled such 
behaviour effectively and consistently. 6  In this context, they should and have to be 
prohibited by the Anti-monopoly Law. In 2008, China’s Anti-monopoly Law (AML) 
finally came into effect and for the first time the relationship between the protection of 
intellectual property rights and anti-monopoly enforcement is delineated in Article 55. 
Nevertheless, the general rule in Article 55 is not effective by itself and relevant guidance 
or explanations are required.  
In this chapter, pre 2008 legislation that is applicable to the anti-competitive practices of 
owners of patent rights and the 2008 AML will be examined and analysed, and their effects 
will also be summarized in the relevant section. 
3.2 Pre-2008 Relevant Chinese Laws7  
There were seven laws or regulations adopted before 2008 in China that could be applied 
to anti-competitive practices of patentees in exercising their patent rights, namely the 
Constitution, General Principles of the Civil Law, Patent Law, Contract Law, Regulations 
on Administration of Import and Export of Technologies, Foreign Trade Law and Law 
against Unfair Competition. They range from a basic law of a state, the Constitution, to 
                                                          
4 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), Article 7. 
5 TRIPs, Article 8 ‘appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to 
practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.’ 
6 This has also been shown in Chapter 2, Section 2.3. 
7 For the purpose of this section to show the legal situation in China before 2008, the rules of the laws 
discussed in this section are the ones that were adopted before 2008, though some of them have been revised 
and amended after 2008. For the sake of certainty and clarity, the author will make some explanations in the 





several laws or administrative regulations focusing on specific areas. None of them 
however concentrates specifically on dealing with anti-competitive issues. Moreover, these 
applicable rules are found in different laws or policies lack of certainties or predictabilities. 
Therefore, in this section, the rules applicable to the control of anti-competitive practices 
of patent owners in the exercise of patent rights, adopted before the 2008 AML, will be set 
out and examined. Then, the deficiencies and problems that exist in these pre-2008 rules 
will be identified and discussed. 
3.2.1 The 1982 Constitution8 and the 1986 General Principles of the Civil 
Law9 
Under the 1982 Constitution, Article 51 expressly states that individual rights are 
subordinate to the interest of the state and the public and their exercise shall not infringe 
other citizens’ legal rights.10 Similarly, this kind of principle is also emphasized in Article 
7 of the General Principles of the Civil Law.11 In addition, the principles of voluntariness, 
fairness, making compensation for equal value, honesty and credibility is confirmed in 
Article 4 of the General Principles of the Civil Law.12  
Moreover, Article 58 prescribed several types of civil activities that shall be null and void. 
Two of them may be applicable to the anti-competitive practices of patent owners, namely 
the activities ‘that performed through malicious collusion are detrimental to the interest of 
the state, a collective or a third party’ as well as those civil activities breaching the law or 
the public interest.13  
The rules specified above demonstrate the negative attitude of Chinese legislators to abuses 
of general rights. As civil rights, the exercise of patent rights comes within the scope of 
these rules. In the absence of clear and specific rules to regulate the anti-competitive 
                                                          
8 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国宪法), it has been revised twice separately 
in 2004 and 2018 since its adoption in 1982. 
9 General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国民法通则), it has been 
revised in 2009 since its adoption in 1986. 
Although ‘principles’ is the word used in the English translation of this law, this is China’s Civil Law which 
is a code or statute and not just principles. 
10 The Constitution, Article 51. The amendment in 2018 did not touch this article and Article 51 is kept and 
remains effective. 
11 General Principles of Civil Law (1986 version), Article 7. The main meaning of this article is kept in the 
2009 version but the word ‘undermine state economic plans’ was removed. 
12 ibid, Article 4. This article was not amended in the 2009 version. 
13 ibid (1986 version), Article 58.1(4) and (5). 





exercise of patent rights before 2008, these civil rules seemed to have some effects. 
However, the prohibition of abuses of civil rights aims at maintaining a balance between 
the private interest and the general public interest; to some extent, the principled rules in 
the Constitution and the Civil Law are only applied to compensate for the deficiencies or 
the blank of the laws in certain situations.14 These rules are general and abstract. As a 
consequence, they seem to be impractical and ineffective in controlling abuses of patent 
rights which have an adverse impact on competition.15 For instance, these principled rules 
do not explain what activities can be regarded as abuses of patent rights, what provisions 
shall be considered as restrictive terms in patent licensing agreements or what legal 
remedies are available. Furthermore, it is hard to apply the principled rules directly in 
practice as main legal bases.16 This is particularly so where the average level of expertise 
of Chinese judges is not very high and the discretionary power of Chinese judges is 
seriously restricted.17 The only situation where they may be applied is where all other 
relevant substantive rules have failed to address the abuses. However, even so, litigants 
usually have no confidence in pleading civil principles as a legal basis when alleging that 
abuses of patent rights are likely to eliminate or restrict competition. This is clearly 
illustrated below the DVD case and the case between Cisco and Huawei mentioned in the 
previous chapter.18  Therefore, the principled rules of the Constitution and the Civil Law 
are not able to address effectively the anti-competitive problems caused by abuses of 
patent rights.  
There are also specific laws which are relevant to the pre-2008 situation. These are the 
1984 Patent Law, the 1999 Contract Law, the 2001 Regulations on Administration of 
Import and Export of Technologies, the 1994 Foreign Trade Law and the 1993 Law against 
Unfair Competition. The relevant provisions of each one of these laws will be considered 
below.                         
                                                          
14 Xianlin Wang, ‘The Abuse of IPRs and Its Legal Management’ (知识产权滥用及其法律规制) (2004) 03 
Law Science 107, 109.  
15 Yao Ma, ‘The Regulation of the Restrictions on Competition in Patent Licensing by Anti-monopoly Law’ 
(专利许可中限制竞争的反垄断规制) (Master thesis, Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences 2012) 19. 
16 Wang, ‘The Abuse of IPRs and Its Legal Management’ (n 14) 109.  
17 Qiao and Tao (n 2) 116. 





3.2.2 The 1984 Patent Law (2008 Revision)19 
The purpose of the Patent Law is not only to protect the legitimate rights and interests of 
the owners but also to encourage the development of technologies and to promote the 
progress of society. Patent Law grants a competent inventor a patent right and provides 
protection for that legal right. At the same time, Patent Law itself also tries to regulate the 
exercise of patent rights by the owners where the rights might be abused. Although China’s 
Patent Law does not clearly explain the concept of ‘abuses of patent rights’, it lays down 
some binding rules that require the patent owners to exercise their patent rights properly in 
a defined range. In this section, not all the restrictive rules will be considered. The main 
focus will be on the rules that are applicable to regulate the anti-competitive practices in 
exercising patent rights.  
Like Patent Laws in many other countries, China’s Patent Law imposes limitations on the 
duration, the scope, the object and some other aspects of patent rights.20 After the protected 
period, the invention will be available for the benefit of society. Any claim beyond the 
protected scope of patent rights shall not be protected by the Patent Law. Furthermore, 
Chapter V of the Patent Law also stipulates the situation of termination and invalidation of 
patents to ensure a normal and correct exercise of patent rights.21 In fact, the aforesaid 
limitations to some extent focus on the existence and the scope of a patent right. For the 
control of the exercise of patent rights, the following rules seem to play an important role. 
Article 69 of the Patent Law sets out several exceptions that shall be exempted from being 
deemed as an infringement of a patent right. One of the exceptions is the rule of priority. It 
means that if identical products have existed or identical processes have been used or 
preparations are ready for the making or using before the application date, the continuous 
conduct of carrying out these activities within their original scope should not infringe the 
patent right.22 Normally, the first applicant filling an application will be granted the patent 
and will enjoy the patent right. However, sometimes others may have already made use of 
the invention independently before the application date. If the patent owner seeks to restrict 
the original use of the prior user on the basis of the later granted patent right, the action of 
the patent owner may violate the principle of fairness. Hence, the priority rule to some 
                                                          
19 Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国专利法（2008 修订本）). 
20 ibid, e.g. Articles 2 (object), 42 (duration), 59 (scope).  
21 ibid, Chapter V: Articles 42-47. 





extent keeps a balance between the interest of prior users and that of the patent owners. It 
avoids excessive unfairness. The rule restricts the exercise of patent rights but ensures a 
patent is used to its best and encourages technology innovation.  
According to Article 69 (1) of China’s Patent Law, a patent owner will lose the exclusive 
control of patented products or products directly made through a patented process once 
they are legally sold and placed on the market for the first time.23 This rule is called the 
exhaustion of rights. The rule aims to facilitate the free movement of patented products 
within the market. Once the patented products are placed in circulation, the original patent 
owner is not able to intervene in the resale or in the reuse of them by the new owner. This 
requirement can avoid the negative effects caused by the undue exercise of patent rights on 
the free movement of patented products or on the dissemination of technologies. 
In addition, owners of patent rights cannot allege infringement on patent rights if the 
products or processes protected by the patents are used for temporarily passing through, 
scientific research or administrative examination and approval.24 
The exclusivity of patent rights ownership is not absolute and in some circumstances, it 
should be limited. The most powerful rule to be applied to an abuse of patent rights in the 
Patent Law is the compulsory licensing system set out in Chapter VI (Articles 48-58). 
Under the compulsory licensing system, the relevant authorities are permitted to license the 
patent right to the eligible applicant without the agreement of the patent owner but in 
accordance with the legal process. Given a compulsory licence, the licensee should pay 
reasonable royalties to the patent owner. Compulsory licences can be imposed in several 
limited situations.  In particular, the amendment of the Patent Law in 2008 establishes a 
relationship with China’s 2008 AML that a compulsory licence can be issued in order to 
eliminate or alleviate anti-competitive effects in situations where the exercise of the patent 
rights is determined as illegal monopolistic conduct. 25  Moreover, the Measures for 
Compulsory Licence for Patent Exploitation (2012)26 and Chapter V of the Detailed Rules 
                                                          
23 ibid, Article 69 (1).  
24 ibid, Article 69 (3)-(5). 
25 ibid, Article 48 (2). 
For the purpose of the thesis, ‘monopolistic behaviour/conduct/practices’ cover all anti-competitive 
behaviour in the EU and antitrust behaviour in the US. This has been chosen because this is the term which is 
commonly used in Chinese literature.  





for the Implementation of the Patent Law (2010 Revision)27 lay down specific rules and 
processes to further facilitate the issue of compulsory licence. The 2008 amendment gives 
a signal that Chinese Patent Law no longer focuses only on the protection of patent rights. 
It is trying to keep a balance between the interest of patentees and that of the public.  
However, the current rules concerning the compulsory licensing are too general to provide 
exact and precise guidance.28 It lacks the detailed implementation rules that can be applied 
precisely in practice. For instance, the rules of Measures for Compulsory Licence for 
Patent Exploitation (2012) mainly concentrate on the procedural issues and only Article 5 
seems to be the extension of Article 48 of the Patent Law. Nevertheless, this ‘extension’ 
just repeats what Article 48 stipulates and does not include meaningful explanations or 
guidance on the situations in which the exercise of patent rights will go beyond the 
protection of Patent Law and shall be determined as an illegal monopoly prohibited by the 
AML. Despite the establishment of the relationship between compulsory licensing and 
monopolistic behaviour, it is still not clear how the Patent Law and the AML can 
interact/influence with each other. Chapter V of the Detailed Rules for the Implementation 
of the Patent Law examines nothing about the compulsory licensing for anti-competitive 
practices, either. Moreover, the threshold for compulsory licensing is too high and the 
conditions and requirements are too strict.29 As a consequence, it seems difficult to apply 
the compulsory licensing system to remedy the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. 
No compulsory licence has been issued in China until now. Additionally, there is no 
effective punishment system in the Patent Law so that the Patent Law cannot provide 
enough deterrent effects to prohibit anti-competitive practices in exercising patent rights. 
In other words, the cost of exercising patent rights anti-competitively and violating the 
Patent Law is much lower than the ‘benefits’ achieved. Besides, the Patent Law does not 
include specific rules to prohibit the restrictive terms in patent licensing agreements nor 
sets out relevant interpretations; what is more, it does not take into account the detrimental 
effects brought by the restrictive terms on competition.30 Therefore, Patent Law itself may 
not be able to control effectively complicated abuses of patent rights, particularly those that 
                                                          
27 Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Patent Law (2010 Revision) (专利法实施细则（2010 修
订）). 
28 Wanlin Wang, ‘Anti-monopoly Regulation on the Abuse of Patent Rights’ (试论专利权滥用的反垄断法
规制) (Master thesis, China University of Political Science And Law 2011) 35. 
29 ibid. 





may eliminate or restrict competition, though it does have some effects on controlling the 
general exercise of patent rights.                                                                                               
3.2.3 The 1999 Contract Law31 
One of the most important ways to exercise a patent right is to issue a licence to allow 
others to manufacture and use the invention. This is also where most of the anti-
competitive practices of patent owners take place. A patent is normally licensed through a 
written contract, so the rules in the Contract Law play a role in the control of anti-
competitive practices by patent owners in exploiting their patent rights. In China’s 
Contract Law, the rules of Chapter XVIII on Technology Contracts are applicable to the 
licensing of patent rights. It is stated that technology contracts should contribute to the 
development of science and technology and at the same time should advance the 
conversion, application and dispersal of scientific and technological results.32 Distorting 
competition in the technology market by technology contracts is strictly forbidden by the 
Contract Law. Article 343 emphasizes the principle that the scope of the exercise of a 
patent can be set out in the technology transfer contract but the scope must neither restrict 
competition nor the development of technology. 33  Article 329 of the Contract Law 
generally articulates the invalidation of the technology contract that aims to monopolize 
technology illegally, block the advancement of technology or commit a breach of others’ 
technological achievements.34 Article 329 protects the normal competition order in the 
technology market. However, Article 329 is too general and is hard to be applied in 
practice. It does not identify under what circumstances the patent licensing contract may 
block the technological progress and distort competition. As a result, the Supreme People’s 
Court of China adopted the Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court concerning Some 
Issues on Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Disputes over Technology 
Contracts in 2004 (the 2004 Interpretation).35 Six circumstances are listed that shall be 
determined as ‘illegally monopolizing technology and impairing technological progress’ in 
accordance with Article 329 of the Contract Law, namely, restricting improvements to the 
original technology made by the licensees or demanding unfair grant-back clauses, limiting 
                                                          
31 Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国合同法).   
32 ibid, Article 323. 
33 ibid, Article 343. 
34 ibid, Article 329. 
35 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court concerning Some Issues on Application of Law for the Trial 






the transactions with others, obstructing the exploitation of the concerned technology by 
licensees in a normal manner, unreasonably tying-in, imposing unreasonable conditions, 
and imposing non-challenging clauses.36  
Articles 323, 329 and 343 of the Contract Law are generally applicable to abuses of patent 
rights that have adverse effects on competition in transferring or licensing technologies. To 
some extent, the provisions make a contribution to regulating the exercise of patent rights. 
However, they are principled rules that only clarify the general legislative and enforcement 
objectives. Although Article 10 of the 2004 Interpretation37 provides some supplementary 
explanations to the meaning of Article 329 of the Contract Law, both Article 329 and the 
2004 Interpretation have dealt with the problems from the perspective of the validation of 
the concerned licensing contracts not from the perspective of prohibiting anti-competitive 
practices. As a consequence, the rules in the Contract Law and the 2004 Interpretation 
resolve some competition concerns in respect of patent licensing in form but not in nature. 
In addition, the scope of the restrictive clauses listed in the 2004 Interpretation is very 
limited, which may not cover the complicated anti-competitive practices in patent licensing. 
For example, there are no rules concerning excessive pricing, discriminatory treatment or 
unjustifiable refusal to license, which are all common clauses in patent licences that may 
block the advancement of technology and distort the competition in the technology market. 
Moreover, Contract Law is also a civil measure so that it lacks a deterrent and effective 
punishment mechanism to guarantee its proper observance. 
3.2.4 The 2001 Regulations on Administration of Import and Export of 
Technologies38 
In accordance with Article 29 of the Regulations on Administration of Import and Export 
of Technologies (the Regulations), seven types of restrictive clauses are prohibited in a 
technology import contract. They are: unreasonable tying; requiring royalties from invalid 
patents; impeding licensees from making improvements to the licensed technology or from 
using the improved technology; limiting transactions with others; imposing unnecessary 
and unjustifiable conditions; restricting the quantity, types or price of the concerned 
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38 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of Import and Export of Technologies 
(技术进出口管理条例) (Regulations), the Regulations was revised in 2011 but there was no substantive 





products; and restricting export channels.39 Although Article 29 to some extent is contrary 
to the principle ‘freedom of contract’, it is of great importance to prevent the licensor from 
exercising their patent rights anti-competitively. It can be seen that most of the prohibited 
restrictive clauses in Article 29 have also been included in the 2004 Interpretation of the 
Supreme People's Court concerning Some Issues on Application of Law for the Trial of 
Cases on Disputes over Technology Contracts. Thus, there is something of an overlap 
between these two documents. However, Article 29 is only applicable to contracts 
importing technologies from territories outside of China. It means that the prohibition in 
Article 29 does not apply to the situation in which technologies are transferred within the 
territory of China. In addition, Article 17 of the Regulations provides that a contract 
registration system shall be applied for the technology that may be freely imported.40 
Pursuant to the contract registration system, only procedural issues will be implemented.41 
Authorities are not required to examine the technology itself or whether restricted clauses 
prohibited by Article 29 are included in an importing contract. Within this system, the only 
thing that licensors and licensees need to do is to complete the procedural registration. 
Accordingly, a blank space is left in the process of examining technology import contracts. 
The contracts with restrictive clauses are likely to escape from the prohibition of the 
Regulations. Besides, Article 29 does not provide punishment to the licensors who impose 
restrictive clauses in technology import contracts and, therefore, has no deterrent effects on 
potential violators. Neither does Article 29 clarify the validity of such technology import 
contracts. These deficiencies give rise to impracticability and ineffectiveness of Article 29. 
3.2.5 The 1994 Foreign Trade Law (2004 Revision)42 
China’s Foreign Trade Law was revised in 2004 and the previous version incorporates the 
rules concerning the protection of foreign trade-related aspects of IPRs. However, the 
newly added chapter in 2004 not only emphasizes the importance of protecting the foreign 
trade-related IPRs but also stresses the significance of regulating the inappropriate 
exploitation of these intellectual property rights. In accordance with Article 30 of the 
Foreign Trade Law, three types of behaviour are prohibited in licensing agreements which 
                                                          
39 ibid, Article 29. 
40 Regulations (n 38), Article 17. 
41 Hongju Xu, ‘Under the IPRs Integration, the lags and improvements of the Specifications on the 
Technology Transfer in China’ (知识产权一体化下我国技术转移规范的滞后和改进) 2011 (01) Journal of 
International Economic Law 162, 177. 
42 Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Revision) (中华人民共和国对外贸易法（修
订）) (Foreign Trade Law), this law was revised again in 2016 but only concerned the second paragraph of 





have detrimental effects on fair competition in foreign trade. Article 30 prohibits the IPRs 
owners from impeding licensees from challenging the validity of the IPRs, requiring 
packaging licensing against the willingness of licensees and including exclusive grant-back 
terms.43 Additionally, Articles 32 and 33 respectively prescribe a ban on the monopolistic 
conduct and on unfair competition behaviour in foreign trade activities, which impair the 
order of foreign trade. 44  Since it was revised in 2004, the Foreign Trade Law has 
transferred some of its attention from the protection of IPRs to the control of the anti-
competitive practices in exploiting IPRs. The Revision aimed to keep a balance between 
private and public interests. Actually, these rules respond to the prohibition on the abuses 
of IPRs in the international measure, TRIPs.45  
However, the scope of the Foreign Trade Law is limited to the field of foreign trade and 
the protection of foreign-trade-related aspects of IPRs.46 In other words, the rules in the 
Foreign Trade Law are not applicable to the anti-competitive practices in the exercise of 
patent rights undertaken in domestic trade activities. Moreover, the scope of Article 30 is 
limited to the listed three prohibited restrictive practices. For other anti-competitive 
practices in the exercise of patent rights such as the abuse of a dominant position, 
unjustifiable tying-in or imposing unreasonable conditions, the legal effects of the Foreign 
Trade Law seems unpredictable. In addition, though Article 32 shows the negative attitude 
to monopolistic conduct, it does not explain what ‘monopolistic conduct’ means. At the 
time when Article 32 was introduced, China did not have an anti-monopoly law, so before 
2008 this rule existed only in theory. Furthermore, Articles 30, 32 and 33 all state that the 
department for foreign trade under the State Council shall adopt necessary measures to 
remove the adverse effects, however, no one knows what can be considered as ‘necessary’ 
and there is no explanation to date. In particular, the terms ‘necessary measures’ and ‘the 
laws and administrative regulations against monopoly’ appear together in Article 32 but 
the relationship between them is considerably uncertain.47 Are they referring to the same 
                                                          
43 ibid, Article 30. 
44 ibid, Article 32, ‘In foreign trade activities, monopolistic behaviour in violation of the provisions of the 
laws and administrative regulations against monopoly is not allowed. […]’  
Article 33, ‘In foreign trade activities, no one may engage in unfair competition, such as selling commodities 
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practising commercial bribery. […]’ 
45 Xin Yan, ‘Discussion on the Regulation of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights by the Anti-monopoly 
Law—from the case between Cisco and Huawei’ (论知识产权滥用的反垄断法规制--“由思科诉华为案谈
起”) (Master thesis, China University of Political Science And Law 2004) 43. 
46 Foreign Trade Law (2004 Revision), Article 2. 
47 Liping Chen, ‘Legal Regulation on Patent Abuse’ (论专利权滥用行为的法律规制) 2005 20 (2) Legal 





legal documents? If not, which one should be given priority? The same situation arises in 
Article 33, in which ‘necessary measures’ and ‘the laws and administrative regulations 
against unfair competition’ appear together. Therefore, the rules in the Foreign Trade Law 
seem difficult to be applied to regulate the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights 
effectively.  
3.2.6 The 1993 Law against Unfair Competition48  
Article 2 of the Law against Unfair Competition firstly emphasizes the principles of 
voluntariness, equality, fairness, honesty, credibility and business ethics.49 Then, Articles 6, 
12 and 1550 respectively prohibited the monopolistic operation, unjustifiable tying and 
collusion in bidding contracts which undermine fair competition. Although these rules 
were not specifically set out to regulate the exercise of IPRs that had anti-competitive 
effects, they were applicable to illegal behaviour related to the exercise of all IPRs,51 
especially Article 12 concerning tying. Other articles of this law mainly concentrate on 
preventing unfair means adopted during the competition and on the infringement of trade 
secrets. Most of them seemed not to engage in punishing anti-competitive exercise of IPRs 
but to protect the legitimate interests of the owners of IPRs.52 Before the adoption of the 
AML, the Law against Unfair Competition had been regarded as the last resort weapon for 
the victims of the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights.53 This is because that, as a 
public law, it has the characteristic of ‘mandatory’. It seems more powerful in comparison 
with the civil rules mentioned above. In particular, the relevant authority is entitled to 
investigate on their own initiative the illegal practices prohibited by the Law against Unfair 
Competition. While, in terms of the other laws or regulations mentioned above, mostly, 
undertakings or persons concerned have to lodge a complaint and apply for judicial 
remedies themselves. 
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However, the Law against Unfair Competition did not work effectively in the area of anti-
competitive practices in the exercise of patent rights.54 Again, the only applicable three 
articles were quite general and their scope was limited. Only the conduct of unjustifiably 
tying was clearly identified to be illegal in Article 12. Nothing was stated concerning the 
other popular anti-competitive practices in exercising patent rights. Furthermore, the Law 
against Unfair Competition cannot impose enough deterrent effects on the potential 
violators as a public law should have done. It is merely a basic economic law to secure fair 
competition in the market and to protect basic legitimate rights of undertakings and 
consumers. In regulating the anti-competitive practices of patent owners in exercising their 
patent rights, the Law against Unfair Competition seemed to make little contribution. In 
addition, the adoption of the 2008 AML had given rise to some overlaps and inconsistent 
standards on similar issues between these two laws. In order to resolve the relevant 
confusion, provide certainties and increase significantly the penalties to adapt to the 
current economic environment, the Law against Unfair competition was revised in 2017. 
What had been prescribed in Articles 6, 12 and 15 were removed from the current effective 
Law against Unfair Competition. 
3.2.7 Summary 
In summary, the protection of patent rights in China was fully developed and improved to 
an international level after China joined the WTO in 2001.55 However, the effective control 
over anti-competitive practices of patent owners when exploiting their patent rights did not 
raise enough attention in the pre-2008 laws and regulations. Although there are some rules 
applicable to such anti-competitive practices in the pre-2008 legislation, the deficiencies in 
themselves undermined their effective application and updates and improvements were 
significantly needed. 56  On one hand, these rules are scattered in different laws or 
regulations, and there was not a complete and integrated system established to cope with 
the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights before 2008. In fact, each of these laws or 
regulations has its own objectives and functions. None of them is designed to focus 
specifically on adjusting competition order or ever regulating the exercise of patent rights 
that may distort competition in the market. In other words, none of them can control the 
anti-competitive exploitation of patent rights from the perspective of competition 
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enforcement. This seemed not to be consistent with international practice. On the other 
hand, most of the relevant rules mentioned above are general and principled ones. They are 
neither clear nor detailed. As a consequence, the vagueness resulted in their 
impracticability. No specific interpretations were available before 2008 to provide 
guidance as to under what circumstances the exercise of patent rights shall be determined 
as anti-competitive and shall be prohibited under these principles. Without clear and 
explicit interpretations, some undertakings or individuals may have no idea that they are 
suffering damage as a result of the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. Even the term 
‘abuse’ had not appeared in the laws or regulations before 2008. Despite some detailed 
provisions like those in the Regulations on Administration of Import and Export of 
Technologies, they are only applicable to foreign trade activities.  
In addition, most of the aforesaid rules and articles are in the category of private laws or 
regulations, so they are not as powerful as public laws like the AML. Within civil rules, 
only civil compensation can be sought for damages caused by anti-competitive practices in 
the exercise of patent rights. However, for anti-competitive effects or damages on the 
relevant market, no punitive and mandatory measures are provided under the civil laws or 
regulations. This may lead to the result that the cost of infringing the laws is much less 
than the illegal profits gained. Accordingly, the low cost results in a lack of deterrent 
influence on the potential violators. Although the Law against Unfair Competition and the 
Foreign Trade can be attributed to the category of public law or have characteristics of 
public law, the scope of their application was rather limited, just for tying and foreign trade 
activities. Moreover, the prescribed remedies in these two laws are full of uncertainties. 
For instance, the Foreign Trade Law states that ‘necessary measures’ shall be taken to 
regulate the anti-competitive practices, but what the necessary measures should be is not 
identified explicitly. Despite compulsory licensing in the Patent Law being available to 
regulate abuses of patent rights that have detrimental effects on competition, it has not to 
date been activated in any situation, probably owing to its ambiguity and strictness. The 
control over the exercise of patent rights by the Patent Law has not satisfied the needs of 
the society. Furthermore, before 2008 there was no authority that was specifically 
responsible for investigating and managing anti-competitive behaviour. In spite of some 
relevant departments or organizations having such authorization, they seemed not to have 
the expertise in this complicated field, especially when it was related to the exercise of 





anti-monopoly investigation on their own initiative before 2008. The victims had to lodge a 
complaint by themselves before a competent court.57  
Therefore, the pre-2008 legislation in China was not effective or practical to regulate the 
exploitation of patent rights that may eliminate or restrict competition.58  
3.3 2008 China’s Anti-Monopoly Law59 
After a long time of preparation and full of expectations from various domains, the AML 
of China was finally adopted on 30th August 2007 and came into effect on 1st August 2008. 
In June 2008, Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy60 (the Outline) was 
adopted. It fully states the objective of the intellectual property strategy and provides 
guidance on the improvement of the intellectual property system, on the creation of 
intellectual property, and on the application, protection and management of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs). At the same time, it points out the fact in its preface that there have 
been some cases concerning the anti-competitive exploitation of IPRs. 61  Then, the 
prevention of the abusive exercise of IPRs is seriously emphasized in the important points 
of the strategy. Paragraph 14 of the Outline provides programmatic guidance on the 
methods and objectives of regulating the anti-competitive exercise of IPRs. Relevant laws 
and regulations are to be drafted to define the scope of IPRs, prohibit abuses of IPRs and 
protect the market order of fair competition and the legitimate public interest. 62 
Accordingly, the prevention of the anti-competitive practices in the exercise of IPRs is 
formally set out as a goal in the intellectual property strategy. 
The application of an anti-monopoly law to anti-competitive practices in the exercise of 
IPRs, especially patent rights, follows the preferred international tool. The successful 
enforcement experience of the EU and US in this respect is strong evidence of its 
appropriateness. However, during formulating the AML, there appeared different voices in 
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the field of IP-related monopolistic conduct. On one hand, it was suggested that the AML 
should not intervene the exercise of IPRs or should just clarify that IPRs fall outside its 
application scope; on the other hand, it was advised that detailed and strict anti-monopoly 
rules should be made to control the exercise of IPRs.63 In the 2008 AML, Article 55 finally 
states that ‘[t]his law is not applicable to undertakings who exercise their intellectual 
property rights in accordance with the laws and administrative regulations on intellectual 
property rights; however, this Law shall be applicable to the undertakings who eliminate or 
restrict market competition by abusing their intellectual property rights.’64 The insertion of 
Article 55 indicates that China not only sets up its own anti-monopoly system but also 
establishes the principle that the abusive exercise of IPRs with anti-competitive effects 
shall fall within the scope of the AML.65  It provides a legal basis for anti-monopoly 
enforcement authorities (AMEAs) to deal with the anti-competitive practices of patent 
owners in exercising their patent rights. It is also for the first time that the expression 
‘abuse of IPRs’ is adopted in a formal law. 66  Therefore, Article 55 has become a 
meaningful step in the process of regulating abuses of patent rights that may eliminate or 
restrict competition.  
Though Article 55 shows the full respect of the AML to the protection of IPRs that the 
proper exercise will be exempted from its application, it also clearly expresses the negative 
attitude of China to the exercise of patent rights that may eliminate or restrict competition. 
However, only Article 55 is about the exercise of IPRs in the AML and it is made up of 
two general sentences. It does not provide guidance on how to apply the AML to the 
management of anti-competitive practices of IPRs owners in exploiting IPRs, especially 
patent rights. Neither does it explain the meaning of ‘abuses of IPRs’ within the scope of 
Article 55. It is not clear in what circumstances the exploitation of IPRs should be 
determined as anti-competitive and should be prohibited by the AML. The lack of further 
guidance or interpretations may result in different understandings of Article 55 in 
academia.67 It can be questioned whether it is only the abusive exercise of IPRs beyond the 
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protection of intellectual property laws that should be controlled by the AML.68 Min Zhang 
believes that it is inappropriate to make a conclusion from Article 55 that the legal exercise 
of IPRs within the protection of intellectual property laws is an absolute exception to the 
application of the AML or the anti-monopoly enforcement concerning IPRs should apply 
special principles. 69  In the case between Huawei and InterDigital, the behaviour of 
InterDigital charging excessive royalty fees and seeking an injunction on Huawei was legal 
under a patent law, while it was finally determined as an abuse of a dominant position by 
the AML.70 It can be seen that there is a problem in the application of the first sentence of 
Article 55.71 Consequently, Article 55 seems not to be applied effectively and explicitly to 
the IP-related anti-competitive practices.  
In fact, it is reasonable to establish only a general principle concerning the anti-competitive 
exercise of IPRs in the AML. 72  This is because the anti-competitive practices in the 
exploitation of IPRs are very complicated and they could not be addressed fully by the 
AML itself. It is necessary for AMEAs in China to draw up detailed guidelines to further 
explain Article 55 and facilitate its application in practice. These guidelines should be 
updated regularly in accordance with different circumstances in different periods. However, 
to date, only the SAIC published the Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse of 
Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict Competition in April 2015, which is 
merely applicable to non-price related monopolistic behaviour.73 The draft of the relevant 
guidelines is still under review without a specific publish date. Since the AML came into 
effect in 2008, litigation concerning the exercise of patent rights that has anti-competitive 
effects have seldom been initiated. This seems not because there are no such abusive 
practices distorting competition in China’s markets but mainly because there are no clear 
instructions available either for parties to institute proceedings or for anti-monopoly 
authorities to apply Article 55 of the AML in their investigations. In some situations, the 
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victims even do not realize that their legitimate rights have already been violated by the 
owners of IPRs. 74  Therefore, it is essential and urgent to provide guidance on the 
application of Article 55. In Chapter 4, two noticeable cases will be introduced to show the 
manner in which Chinese AMEAs and courts, without clear guidance, deal with the anti-
competitive practices undertaken by patent owners when exercising their patent rights. 
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 Case Studies: Huawei vs. InterDigital and Qualcomm 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 3 discussed the ineffectiveness of China’s pre-2008 legal rules to regulate the anti-
competitive exercise of patent rights. Despite the promulgation of China’s 2008 Anti-
monopoly Law (AML), there is only one general article concerning the exercise of 
intellectual property rights. For lack of clear instructions and guidance, it cannot be applied 
appropriately in practice. Within China’s legal circumstances analysed in Chapter 3, two 
influential cases concerning the anti-competitive conduct in the exercise of patent rights 
have been concluded since 2008.  
One of them concerns the dispute between Huawei and InterDigital, which is regarded as 
the first anti-monopoly case addressed by a Chinese court on standard essential patents1 
and the first case in the world determining the licence rate of SEP portfolio under the Fair, 
Reasonable and Non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms;2  the other one is the Qualcomm 
investigation undertaken by NDRC, which imposed the highest fine in the history of anti-
monopoly enforcement in China. In both cases, SEPs play a considerably important role in 
analysing and determining the relevant issues. According to the definition from the 
International Standardization Organization, ‘a standard is a document established by 
consensus and approved by a recognized body that provides for common and repeated use 
rules, guidelines or characteristics or their results, aimed at the achievement of the 
optimum degree of order in a given context.’ 3  Some standards may incorporate 
technologies, some of which might be patented technologies, especially in the domain of 
wireless communication. The patents that must be applied and cannot be designed around 
when implementing certain standard are called standard essential patents (SEPs).4 Once a 
patent is included into a technical standard and becomes a SEP, the exclusivity of a patent 
and the block effects of a standard can lead to the uniqueness and irreplaceability of a 
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SEP.5 Undertakings who would like to implement the relevant technical standard will have 
to obtain the licences of all the SEPs in this standard and they are not able to design around. 
The main body of this chapter will be divided into two sections and these two important 
cases will be separately examined in detail. 
4.2 Huawei vs. InterDigital 
4.2.1 Factual Background 
In October 2013, the Guangdong Higher People’s Court rendered two final judgments to 
affirm the decisions of the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court. On one hand, it was 
affirmed that InterDigital abused its dominant position in the relevant market violating 
China’s AML and the company was ordered to pay Huawei a compensation of 20 million 
RMB for its economic losses.6 On the other hand, the appellate court set down a royalty 
rate of 0.019% under the FRAND terms for InterDigital to license its portfolio of 2G, 3G 
and 4G SEPs to Huawei.7 
Huawei is a China-based leading global provider of information and communications 
technology solutions. Huawei produces telecom network equipment, IT products and 
solutions, and smart devices. InterDigital Inc. is a US wireless technologies developer, who 
is in possession of a number of SEPs and SEP applications under the 2G, 3G and 4G8 
wireless communication standards in many countries including China and the US. 
However, InterDigital does not engage in substantive production activities and its main 
revenues are from patent royalty fees. If Huawei manufactures products that comply with 
the relevant telecommunication standards, it will have to obtain a licence of InterDigital’s 
SEPs. Since 2008, Huawei and InterDigital had conducted several negotiations over 
royalties for the patents concerned, but no agreement had been reached.  
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Nevertheless, in July 2011, when the two companies were still negotiating, InterDigital 
suddenly lodged infringement litigation against Huawei in the Delaware District Court in 
the US; at the same time, InterDigital also made an application to the International Trade 
Commission of the US (ITC) to start a 337 investigation9 against Huawei,10 claiming that 
Huawei had infringed its seven patents and requesting Huawei to stop exporting its 
infringing products into the US.11 Then, the battle between Huawei and InterDigital started. 
In December 2011, Huawei initiated two parallel proceedings against InterDigital before 
the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court. In the case concerning an abuse of a dominant 
market position, Huawei sued three defendants: InterDigital Technology Corporation, 
InterDigital Communications, Inc. and InterDigital, Inc (hereinafter referred as 
InterDigital). Huawei claimed that InterDigital had abused its dominant position in the 
licensing market of 3G wireless communication SEPs by charging excessive and 
discriminatory royalty fees, bundling, imposing unreasonable conditions and refusing to 
license. Huawei requested the court to prohibit the defendants’ monopolistic practices12 
and asked for a compensation of 20 million RMB by joint liabilities. In February 2013, the 
Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court supported most of Huawei’s claims and ordered 
InterDigital to cease its monopolistic behaviour and pay Huawei 20 million RMB in 
damages.13 
In the case concerning the SEP royalty fees, Huawei sued InterDigital Communications, 
Inc, InterDigital Technology Corporation, InterDigital Patent Holdings Inc. and IPR 
Licensing Inc. (hereinafter referred as InterDigital) and alleged that InterDigital had 
breached its obligation of FRAND terms in deciding the level of the patent royalty fees. 
Huawei requested the court to determine the royalty rate or range for InterDigital to license 
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its SEPs and SEP applications of 2G, 3G and 4G standards in China. Then, in the first 
instance, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court in February 2013 held that InterDigital 
had not observed the FRAND terms in deciding the level of the royalty fees and set down a 
royalty rate of 0.019%.14 
Both Huawei and InterDigital questioned the decision on the abuse of a dominant position 
and appealed to the Guangdong Higher People’s Court. In addition, InterDigital was not 
satisfied with the first instance judgment on the SEP royalty rate and appealed. Finally, the 
Guangdong Higher People’s Court affirmed the two judgments delivered by the Shenzhen 
Intermediate People’s Court and dismissed the appeals.15 
After the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court rendered the first instance judgments in 
February 2013, the ITC in June 2013 made an initial determination in the investigation 
against Huawei that there was no infringement of the patents and several rights of three of 
the patents concerned were found invalid.16 InterDigital disagreed with this judgment and 
sought review by the ITC.17 Again, the ITC finally determined to affirm its initial decision 
in December 2013, two months after the final judgments of the Guangdong Higher 
People’s Court. Then, Huawei and InterDigital entered into a reconciliation agreement in 
January 2014.18 
In addition, Huawei reported to the NDRC in May 2013 that InterDigital had abused its 
dominant position in the relevant market by charging excessive and discriminatory royalty 
fees. Then, the NDRC initiated an anti-monopoly investigation against InterDigital in June 
2013. However, in May 2014, the NDRC announced that it had accepted the commitments 
made by InterDigital concerning its SEP licensing practices and suspended the anti-
monopoly investigation of InterDigital.19 
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The dispute between Huawei and InterDigital is considered as the first anti-monopoly 
litigation concerning the SEPs considered by a Chinese court.20 It is also the first case in 
the world in which a specific royalty rate was settled under the FRAND terms by a court.21 
The judgments over the disputes between Huawei and InterDigital are milestones in the 
history of China’s anti-monopoly enforcement, especially in the field of regulating the 
anti-competitive practices in the exercise of patent rights. The judgment clarified how to 
define the relevant market for SEPs in determining the abuse of a dominant position. It also 
provided a precedent for Chinese courts to determine a FRAND royalty rate. ‘[A] decision 
made in one jurisdiction on the F/RAND licen[c]e terms of a peculiar SEP will exert a 
substantial influence on the F/RAND licen[c]e terms of the said SEP in other 
jurisdictions.’22 Accordingly, the two judgments of the Chinese courts can have important 
effects on enforcement in other jurisdictions. The following section will focus on analysing 
the contentious issues raised in these two cases.  
4.2.2 Analysis 
4.2.2.1 The Case concerning InterDigital’s Abuse of a Dominant Position23 
One of the three prohibited monopolistic conduct in China’s AML is the abuse of a 
dominant position in the relevant market. In this case, Huawei accused InterDigital of 
abusing its dominant position in the licensing market of 3G SEPs by charging excessive 
and discriminatory royalty fees, imposing unreasonable conditions, bundling and refusing 
to license. The controversial points in this case are: (a) how to define the relevant market 
concerned; (b) whether InterDigital had a dominant position in the relevant market; (c) if 
the dominance of InterDigital was confirmed, whether its alleged abusive conduct existed 
and how to determine the corresponding legal responsibilities.24  
(a) The Definition of the Relevant Market 
Before determining whether InterDigital had abused its dominant position in the relevant 
market, the first step is to reasonably and scientifically define the relevant market. This is 
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also the most controversial issue, especially the relevant product market. At the beginning 
of the case, it was asserted by Huawei that the relevant product market was the combined 
licensing market of the 3G SEPs owned by InterDigital; the relevant geographic market 
was the SEPs licensing markets in both China and the US. 25  Both the Shenzhen 
Intermediate People’s Court and the Guangdong Higher People’s Court confirmed that 
each SEP licensing market within the 3G wireless communication standards (WCDMA, 
CDMA2000 and TD-SCDMA) constituted a separate relevant product market. The 
judgment established a precedent on how to define a relevant product market concerning 
SEPs, which provides experience for the later Qualcomm investigation and also makes up 
for the lack of clarification of a technology market in China’s AML.26 In fact, this kind of 
definition of the relevant technology/product market has already been confirmed in Google 
v. Motorola Mobility.27 The EU Commission has concluded that ‘each SEP constitutes a 
separate relevant technology market on its own.’ 28  The way in which Chinese courts 
defined the relevant market for SEPs licensing followed a popular international model. 
Huawei and InterDigital are both the members of the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI). InterdDigital has declared that it possesses a number of SEPs 
and patent applications of 2G, 3G and 4G standards in the field of wireless communication 
technologies, including those in the US and equivalent ones in the same patent family in 
China.29 There is no doubt about the fact that the InterDigital’s SEPs declared before ETSI 
are essential for Chinese standard implementers to comply with the technical standards for 
mobile terminals and equipment in the field of telecommunication in China.30 Therefore, 
InterDigital possesses the SEPs in the 3G wireless communication standard. 
Article 12 of China’s AML and Articles 3-7 of Guide of the Anti-monopoly Commission 
of the State Council for the Definition of the Relevant Market enumerate some main 
factors that should be taken into account in defining the relevant market, such as the 
demand substitution, supply substitution and so on. 31  As it was stated in Google v. 
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Motorola Mobility, ‘the specificity of SEPs is that they have to be implemented in order to 
comply with a standard and thus cannot be designed around, i.e. there is by definition no 
alternative or substitute for each such patent.’ 32  If Huawei wants to manufacture the 
products complying with the 3G wireless communication standard, each SEP under this 
standard is necessary for Huawei. The refusal to license any SEP will definitely give rise to 
Huawei’s failure to make standard-satisfied products and will exclude Huawei from the 
competition in the targeted market. In the area of wireless communication, the process of 
setting up a standard is a process to eliminate competition.33 In other words, once a patent 
is chosen as a SEP, it will become unique and irreplaceable and there is little competition 
among similar technologies. In addition, there is no evidence to show that there is any 
substitute technology owned by others except InterDigital available for Huawei to 
manufacture satisfied products and equipment. Accordingly, InterDigital is the only 
supplier of the SEPs concerned. Furthermore, it was impossible for Huawei to transfer 
from one wireless communication standard into another one at that stage. This is because a 
great number of resources had been devoted and the costs to transfer were considerably 
high. The potential risks for the transfer were also not predictable. Moreover, 2G, 3G and 
4G standards are technical upgrading. Each SEP under these standards is unique and 
irreplaceable. The technologies under 2G and 4G should not be attributed to substitute 
technologies for 3G standard. This view was supported in Samsung-Enforcement of UMTS 
standard essential patents that ‘(i) UMTS, which is the standard for 3G mobile 
telecommunication technology in the EEA, cannot be substituted by mobile standards of 
other generations, such as GSM (2G technology) or LTE (4G technology); (ii) UMTS 
cannot be substituted by other 3G standards’ and ‘(iii) UMTS cannot be implemented 
without having access to each of Samsung’s UMTS SEPs reading on the UMTS 
standard.’34 In this case, Huawei has no choice but to get the combined licence of the 
relevant SEPs of the 3G wireless communication standard from InterDigital. Therefore, it 
is reasonable and justifiable to conclude that each SEP licensing market under the 3G 
wireless communication standard constitutes a separate relevant product market.  
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However, InterDigital did not agree with the definition of the relevant product market and 
claimed that according to the specificity of SEPs, it was not able to produce qualified 
terminal products only with the SEPs owned by InterDigital.35 In the view of InterDigital, 
it took the terminal products covered by 3G standard as the relevant products. Nevertheless, 
the assertion of InterDigital was not reliable. It is true that InterDigital did not possess all 
of the SEPs under 3G standard, but the lack of any SEP owned by InterDigital will 
definitely result in the failure to manufacture standard-satisfied products. Additionally, the 
dispute was between Huawei and InterDigital concerning the SEPs licensing and the 
demander is Huawei; it was not proper to regard terminal consumers as the demander and 
involve terminal products in defining the relevant market.36 The analysis approach adopted 
by the Court in defining the relevant product market in this case is clear and scientific.37 
Each SEP licensing market under the 3G wireless communication standard constitutes a 
separate relevant product market. 
(b) The Determination of a Dominant Position                        
In terms of determining the dominant position of InterDigital in the relevant market, 
several factors that must be taken into account are set out in Articles 18 and 19 of China’s 
AML, such as the market shares, the power to control the market, the financial and 
technical conditions, to what extent other undertakings depend on the undertaking 
concerned, the difficulty of market entrance and so on.38 Due to the exclusivity of a patent, 
especially a SEP, it is impossible for other undertakings to develop the same or similar 
SEPs at issue in a short time.39 As a result, InterDigital is the only supplier for its SEPs and 
the uniqueness and irreplaceability of SEPs determine that InterDigital enjoys the full 
market shares in each SEP licensing market. In addition in determining the dominance of 
the undertaking concerned in the market, countervailing power of the buyers works as a 
negative factor. The consideration of countervailing power in this case is regarded as a 
great complement or interpretation of Article 18 of China’s AML.40 However, InterDigital 
itself does not engage in substantive production activities and its revenue is mainly from 
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the royalties of patent licensing.41 InterDigital does not need to rely on the cross licensing 
of others’ SEPs. Accordingly, there is no countervailing power from other undertakings to 
InterDigital in its SEPs licensing. That means InterDigital has the power to control the 
relevant market and it is significantly difficult for others to enter into the market. The 
dominance of InterDigital in the relevant market cannot be effectively restricted. Therefore, 
InterDigital has fulfilled all the requirements of a dominant position and the Court finally 
determined that InterDigital had a dominant position in the relevant market concerned.  
(c) Abuses of Dominance and Corresponding Legal Responsibilities  
With respect to the abuse of a dominant position by InterDigital, the Shenzhen 
Intermediate People’s Court (the Court) supported most of Huawei’s claims and the 
Guangdong Higher People’s Court later affirmed the judgment. The rule of reason 
approach was adopted in examining and judging whether InterDigital had abused its 
dominance. First, InterDigital did not follow the FRAND rules and charged excessive and 
discriminatory royalties. The Court compared the licensing conditions in which 
InterDigital licensed its SEPs concerned to Apple and Samsung, with those offered to 
Huawei in the negotiations. The royalty rate offered for Huawei was nearly one hundred 
times that for Apple and around ten times that for Samsung.42 In the ultimatum from 
InterDigital to Huawei, InterDigital charged a royalty rate of 2% based on Huawei’s sale 
amount from 2009 to 2016; while, the profit rate of general industrial product was only 
around 3%.43 If Huawei agreed to this royalty rate, InterDigital, one of all the licensors, 
would take most of Huawei’s profits. To defend, InterDigital asserted that it was not 
reasonable to compare the royalty fees calculated in different methods and they were 
incomparable.44 InterDigital claimed that the royalty fees for Apple and Samsung were 
charged by a lump sum payment; while those for Huawei were calculated by a royalty rate. 
However, InterDigital refused to provide the relevant patent licensing contracts to the 
Court; neither did InterDigital inform the Court of the patent royalty rate charged to other 
companies. Therefore, it seems justifiable that the Court confirmed InterDigital’s abuse of 
dominance by charging excessive and discriminatory royalty fees on the basis of the 
evidence and information available. In addition, InterDigital required free grant-back of all 
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of Huawei’s patents, which is a further way to increase the royalty fees.45 Moreover, the 
Court supported Huawei’s allegation that InterDigital abused its dominance by bundling 
SEPs with non-SEPs unreasonably. In fact, the bundling in accordance with the 
commercial practice is usually permitted by laws; however, if the bundling does not create 
enough efficiency to make up for the harms it brings, this kind of bundling will be 
determined as illegal.46 In this case, no justifiable reasons are found to support the bundling 
by InterDigital; on the contrary it was verified that the bundling by InterDigital was against 
the willingness of Huawei.  
However, the Court dismissed Huawei’s other claims. The Court did not rule that the 
litigations raised by InterDigital in the US should be regarded as a refusal to license; but it 
should be considered as a way to force Huawei to accept the excessive patent licensing 
terms. Generally, seeking injunctions is a part of exercising IPRs and itself cannot 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position, but in exceptional circumstances it can be taken 
as abusive conduct.47 If a standard is generally and widely implemented in one industry, 
the owners of SEPs will have a greater chance of becoming dominant in the relevant 
market and the SEPs will be important for public interest. At this time, if there is no 
restriction on the seeking of injunctions for SEPs, there will be a possibility that the right 
to seek injunctions will be used as a tool by patent owners to force potential licensees to 
accept unjustifiable licensing fees.48 However, if there are too many restrictions or there is 
a prohibition on seeking injunctions for SEPs, there will be a possibility that the legal 
interests of the patent owners will be damaged by potential licensees.49 Accordingly, the 
seeking and implementation of injunctions in the field of SEPs licensing has become a 
contentious issue in the anti-monopoly enforcement.50 China’s AML does not regard the 
seeking of injunctions by an IPR owner as an abuse of dominance. In this case, the Court 
concluded that the seeking of injunctions by InterDigital in the US was seemingly the 
exercise of legal rights but actually a way to force Huawei to accept unreasonable licensing 
terms and conditions, which did not follow the FRAND rules.51 The Court did not clearly 
refer the unjustifiable seeking injunctions as an abuse of dominance but generally 
concluded that it was not proper conduct and should be prohibited. Although this judgment 
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followed the international practice in the light of seeking injunctions for SEPs, it leaves 
confusion as to in what circumstances the seeking of injunctions cannot be regarded as a 
legitimate exercise of IPRs and should constitute an abuse of dominance. In addition, the 
preconditions for patent owners to seek injunctions for their SEPs and the preconditions for 
potential licensees to raise objections to the seeking of injunctions are not clarified. The 
lack of interpretation and instructions as to how to seek and implement injunctions for 
SEPs will result in an unbalanced relationship between IPRs protection and competition. 
Therefore, clear guidance is necessary for the seeking and enforcement of injunctions on 
SEPs by dominant owners.52  
Then, the Court confirmed that InterDigital’s package licensing of its SEPs of 2G, 3G and 
4G globally is an international acceptable practice. Finally, the Guangdong Higher 
People’s Court affirmed that InterDigital had abused its dominant position in the relevant 
market by charging excessive and discriminatory royalties and unreasonable bundling, and, 
therefore, the conduct violated China’s AML. InterDigital was ordered to cease all of its 
monopolistic conduct and to pay Huawei a compensation of 20 million RMB.   
4.2.2.2 The Case concerning the SEP Royalty Fees53 
In this case, the two most controversial issues are whether the FRAND rules could be 
directly invoked and applied by Chinese courts in their judgments and whether the royalty 
rate of 0.019% settled under FRAND rules is reasonable.  
According to the Interim Provisions on the Administration of National Standards Involving 
Patents adopted by the Standardization Administration of China and the State Intellectual 
Property Office, the licensing declarations committed on the patents concerned in an 
international standard of ISO or IEC will be equally applicable to the national standard set 
on the basis of the international standard.54 Accordingly, the first controversial issue seems 
not to be a problem any more. 
For the other controversial issue, what are the FRAND rules, how they are explained in the 
IPR policy of relevant standard organizations and why it was determined that InterDigital 
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had breached the obligations under the FRAND rules will not be discussed in detail. What 
will be emphasized in this section is the method adopted by the Chinese courts in fixing the 
royalty rate under the FRAND rules. There are four factors that should be taken into 
account when determining the royalty rate: (a) the profits gained from exploiting the patent 
concerned or similar patents and its ratio in the sale profits of relevant products; (b) the 
contribution made by the patentee is from the innovative technology and the patentee is 
only allowed to benefit from the patent rights but not from the advantage of the standard; 
(c) standard implementers shall only be liable to pay for SEPs but not for non-SEPs; (d) the 
royalty fees should not exceed a limited proportion of the product profits and should be 
reasonably distributed among all the patentees concerned. 55  Technologies, capital, 
personnel and many other factors all contribute to the profits of the relevant products. It is 
not only the SEPs themselves that make the product successful. Accordingly, the first 
element set a maximum for the patent royalty fees, which should not exceed what they 
have earned. Even between different patentees, their contribution is different owing to their 
respective patents. In addition, it was established that licensors should not obtain extra fees 
or income from the advantages of involving their patents into a standard and they should 
only benefit from the patent itself. However, a technical product in reality may involve 
hundreds of standards and one standard may contain thousands of SEPs; and, there is little 
practical experience in evaluating the quality and the contribution of each SEP.56 Therefore, 
the Court realized that these factors were helpful in analysing whether the patent licensing 
was fair and reasonable; but it was idealized to fix the patent royalty fees on the basis of 
them.57  
In this situation, the Court mainly focused on comparing the royalty fees in which 
InterDigital licensed its SEPs to other undertakings, to see whether InterDigital observed 
the non-discriminatory principle under the FRAND rules and then to fix the reasonable 
royalty rate for Huawei. As a member of relevant standardization organizations, 
InterDigital is obliged to license its SEPs in accordance with the FRAND rules. However, 
different potential licensees are in different situations, so the FRAND rules do not mean 
that all the licensing royalty rates or conditions are completely the same.58 If the licensees 
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are in similar conditions, their patent royalty rates should be generally similar.59 Then, the 
Court concluded the patent royalty rate of 0.019% for Huawei through comparing with the 
royalty fees for Apple and Samsung. It is true that the calculating methods of royalty fees 
for the compared undertakings were different, but in the lack of relevant information about 
the royalty fees and rates offered by InterDigital, this was the only choice for the Court to 
determine the reasonable royalty rate in accordance with the FRAND rules for the dispute. 
Although the details on how to determine the final royalty rate of 0.019% were not 
disclosed, from the method it adopted, the result seems reasonable.  
This case not only confirms the application of the FRAND rules by the Chinese courts but 
also provides a model for the later disputes concerning the SEP royalty fees, especially in 
the anti-monopoly enforcement. However, there is another problem waiting to be resolved. 
If InterDigital did not license its SEPs to other undertakings and there was no reference 
model to compare the royal fees with, how would the Court fix the royalty fees or rate for 
Huawei under the FRAND rules?60 Maybe there are some doubts about whether the Court 
should intervene in the determination of a royalty rate between parties and to what extent 
this can restrict the freedom to make a contract. This problem will be discussed and 
answered in Section 9.3.3 of Chapter 9. 
4.2.3 Summary of Huawei vs. InterDigital 
To sum up, the two cases are considered as a milestone in the history of China’s anti-
monopoly enforcement concerning the exercise of patent rights. They coped with the 
difficult challenges in the intersection of patent protection and anti-monopoly enforcement, 
especially concerning the complicated SEPs. One of the judgments makes it clear how to 
define a relevant product market when it concerns the licensing of SEPs. This provides the 
basis for the later Qualcomm investigation. The other judgment provides a meaningful 
method to determine the reasonable royalty fees under the FRAND rules. However, there 
are some new problems arising. For example, whether the concept of technology market in 
patent licensing should be clearly elaborated in future guidelines? As a patentee, 
InterDigital has the right under the Patent Law to charge royalty fees for its SEPs and to 
seek injunctions to prevent its SEPs from being infringed, which should generally be 
exempted from the application of the AML. However, in this case the seeking of 
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injunctions was determined as an improper activity and should be prohibited. Owing to the 
specificity of SEPs, in some countries, the seeking of injunctions for SEPs is even regarded 
as an abuse of a dominant position violating competition rules.61 While, different countries 
establish different preconditions for the seeking of injunctions for SEPs. Further 
explanations and guidance are needed to clarify under what circumstances the seeking of 
injunctions on SEPs is consistent with the Patent Law, and in what circumstances it is an 
abuse of dominance where potential licensees can raise objections to it.62 Another problem 
that must be taken into account is how to fix a reasonable royalty rate under the FRAND 
rules for a SEP dispute. Although this case has established a model and provided some 
experience for future cases, it is still unclear how to set the royalty rate in the lack of a 
reference model to compare with.  In addition, how to put into practice the four factors 
raised by the Court in determining the reasonable royalty rate under the FRAND rules is 
also a problem waiting to be resolved.63 Therefore, further guidelines should be provided 
to ensure the predictability and certainty in the anti-monopoly enforcement. 
4.3 The Qualcomm Investigation 
On 10th February 2015, NDRC published the result of the investigation into the activities 
of Qualcomm Incorporated (Qualcomm), a US chipmaker. NDRC concluded that 
Qualcomm had abused its dominant market position by seeking to eliminate competitors 
and restrict competition. 
Qualcomm was ordered to stop the infringement of China’s AML. A fine of 6.088 billion 
Chinese Yuan Renminbi (RMB) ($975 million) was imposed. This amounts to 8% of 
Qualcomm’s 2013 revenue in China.64 The fine imposed on Qualcomm is the highest in 
the history of China’s anti-monopoly enforcement. In the NDRC’s Administrative 
Sanction Decision (the Decision), it was confirmed that Qualcomm had a dominant 
position in two broad markets, namely, the market for licensing CDMA, WCDMA and 
LTE wireless communication standard essential patents (SEPs) and the market for 
baseband chips. Qualcomm was found to have abused its dominance by charging 
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excessively high royalty fees, bundling SEPs with non-SEPs with no justifiable reasons 
and imposing unreasonable conditions on baseband chips sale.65 After the NDRC closed 
this anti-monopoly investigation and published the result, Qualcomm immediately 
announced its agreement to pay the fine and simultaneously announced that it would not 
appeal.66 In addition, Qualcomm disclosed an abstract of its rectification plan which made 
some changes to its business activities in China in order to comply with the requirements 
of the Decision. As a result, a case which lasted nearly 15 months was brought to an end 
without an appeal to a court. 
Since the anti-monopoly investigation against Qualcomm was launched in 2013, it has 
attracted a lot of attention, not only within China. The Qualcomm Decision is a landmark 
case not just for its record fine in China’s anti-monopoly enforcement history but also for 
its far-reaching and profound influence on the control of the abuse67 of patent rights in 
China by the AML. The application of an anti-monopoly law to abuses of patent rights that 
eliminate or restrict market competition is a complicated and difficult domain. Even for the 
EU and US who have much experience in this field, it is still problematic. So is it for China, 
whose AML is only 10 years old and who has less experience in competition enforcement 
in this field. Qualcomm had been investigated in many countries and China took the lead in 
finding the conduct of Qualcomm to be unlawful. Therefore, to some extent it can provide 
some guidance and experience for other antitrust authorities. In particular, the investigation 
of Qualcomm has posed a challenge to NDRC in balancing the protection of patent rights 
and the prevention of their abuse. There is no doubt that patent rights should be protected 
properly, even though, to some extent the protection amounts to a legal monopoly. 
However, excessive protection of patents rights may result in an abuse which will 
eliminate or limit market competition, impede innovation and finally impair consumer 
welfare. Therefore, it is necessary to make full use of an anti-monopoly law to regulate and 
eliminate the anti-competitive practices of patent owners when they exploit their patent 
rights. The conflict and co-ordination between the Patent law and the AML have been 
sharply reflected in the Qualcomm investigation and it provided China’s AMEAs with 
                                                          
65 ibid. 
66 ‘Qualcomm and China’s National Development and Reform Commission Reach Resolution - NDRC 
Accepts Qualcomm’s Rectification Plan - - Qualcomm Raises Midpoints of Fiscal 2015 Revenue and Non-
GAAP EPS Guidance -’ (Rectification Plan), available at 
<http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/QCOM/3864235320x0x808060/382E59E5-B9AA-4D59-ABFF-
BDFB9AB8F1E9/Qualcomm_and_China_NDRC_Resolution_final.pdf> accessed 13 May 2018.  
67 For the purpose of the thesis, the term ‘abuse’ can also be used as the meaning of ‘misuse’ or 
‘inappropriate use’ in a general manner. The expression ‘abuse of intellectual property rights’ used in this 
thesis includes but is not limited to all the possible anti-competitive exercise of IPRs, which is so especially 





valuable enforcement experience in this field. This important anti-monopoly investigation 
has also gained commendation, though some ambiguities and deficiencies remain. The 
Qualcomm investigation is just the first step and a beginning for China’s AMEAs to 
exercise control over the abuse of patent rights which undermines market competition. No 
doubt, more efforts and further measures will have to be adopted in the future. The result 
of the Qualcomm investigation not only shows China’s determination to deal with 
monopolistic practices but also depicts the development and progress of China’s anti-
monopoly enforcement. The details of the Qualcomm investigation will be examined and 
analysed in the following section. 
4.3.1 Factual Background  
Qualcomm founded in 1985 is a US-based wireless communication technology company, 
which is now a giant in both patent licensing and chip manufacture. It is the largest chip 
supplier for wireless communication terminal devices in the world. 68  In addition, the 
importance of the patents owned by Qualcomm determines the high reliance of almost all 
the mobile phone manufacturers on Qualcomm’s patent licensing. In particular, in the field 
of CDMA, WCDMA and LTE cellular standards, Qualcomm owns the SEPs that are 
imperative for all wireless communication terminal devices to enter into and connect with 
the network. It is argued that Qualcomm is a company whose major profit model is 
charging patent royalty fees.69 In 2013 fiscal year, nearly 70% of Qualcomm’s net profits 
were from patent licensing and this is a unique business model worldwide.70 Qualcomm 
charged its patent royalty fees on the basis of the net selling price of a device with a royalty 
rate of up to 5%, which was known in the industry as the ‘Qualcomm Tax’.71 In addition, 
Qualcomm bundled the sales of baseband chips with patent licensing, which meant that if 
manufacturers wanted to buy the necessary chips, they would have to first be on the patent 
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licensing list.72 The business model of Qualcomm has been subjected to significant doubts 
and criticism in many countries and regions. In the EU, Qualcomm was accused in 2005 of 
charging monopolistic high prices but the investigation was closed in 2009 on account of 
the withdrawal of the complaint by the complainant.73 In Japan, in 2009, Qualcomm was 
alleged to abuse its dominant market position and the Fair Trade Commission ordered 
Qualcomm to rectify its practices within limited time.74 In Korea, the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission found also in 2009 that Qualcomm charged discriminatory royalties and 
imposed a fine of $208 million.75 Antitrust investigations of the activities of Qualcomm 
and litigation concerning the exercise of their IPRs have never stopped. This time, the 
company was accused of abusing its dominant position to eliminate and restrict market 
competition in China. 
In 2009, there were two American companies complaining about Qualcomm’s 
monopolistic practices.76 From then on, more and more complaints from both Chinese and 
foreign enterprises emerged. On 25th November 2013, it was stated that NDRC had 
initiated inspections to the offices of Qualcomm in Beijing and Shanghai and obtained 
relevant documents and information. 77  At the same time, the NDRC issued a notice 
addressed to relevant mobile phone manufacturers and chip makers from home and abroad 
to seek for their co-operation with the investigation. On 19th February 2014, the NDRC 
made an official announcement that on the basis of the complaints from the industry 
association and relevant undertakings about the alleged monopolistic and other anti-
competitive practices of Qualcomm, an anti-monopoly investigation had been initiated.78 
In May 2014, on a second ‘visit’, the CEO of Qualcomm presented to the NDRC a 
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document claiming that the company was ‘not guilty.’79 In August 2014, the monopolistic 
facts of Qualcomm were confirmed by the NDRC and then Qualcomm sought rectification 
of the problems in order to reach a final resolution.80 However, on 10th February 2015, the 
NDRC announced its Decision, finding Qualcomm abused its dominant position to 
eliminate and restrict competition. The highest fine in the history of China’s anti-monopoly 
enforcement was then imposed on Qualcomm. The official sanction Decision was 
published later on 2nd March 2015.81  
4.3.2 Analysis in the Qualcomm Decision 
Basically, the Decision was divided into three parts. The first part demonstrates the 
dominance of Qualcomm in the relevant SEPs licensing market and in the relevant 
baseband chip market; the second part illustrates the abusive practices of Qualcomm in this 
case; and the last part elaborates the basis of the Decision. 
4.3.2.1 The Dominance in the Relevant Market 
In the first part, the NDRC respectively illustrated the dominant position of Qualcomm in 
the markets for CDMA, WCDMA and LTE wireless communication SEPs licensing and in 
the market for CDMA, WCDMA and LTE wireless communication terminal baseband 
chip. There are four detailed main reasons for the uniqueness and irreplaceability of the 
wireless SEPs, which demonstrate Qualcomm’s dominance in the wireless SEPs licensing 
market. First, each SEP licensing market constitutes a separate relevant product market in 
this case and Qualcomm enjoyed 100% market shares in each SEP licensing market.82 As 
Qualcomm possessed a great number of SEPs within CDMA, WCDMA and LTE wireless 
communication technical standards, Qualcomm enjoyed 100% market shares in the 
combined SEPs licensing market. 83  There was no competition in that market, so 
Qualcomm held a dominant position in the relevant market according to Article 19 of 
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China’s AML. 84  Second, Qualcomm had strong power to control the wireless SEPs 
licensing markets; third, wireless communication terminal manufacturers were highly 
dependent on the licence of Qualcomm’s wireless SEPs package; and fourth, it was found 
that it was difficult for other undertakings to enter into the relevant market.85  
There were also justifications to explain why Qualcomm was dominant in CDMA, 
WCDMA and LTE baseband chip markets. First, Qualcomm’s market shares in each 
baseband chip market mentioned above were respectively 93.1% (CDMA), 53.9% 
(WCDMA), and 96% (LTE), all exceeding 50% and raising a presumption of dominance 
within Article 19 of China’s AML; next, it was examined in detail in the NDRC’s Decision 
that Qualcomm was able to control each relevant baseband chip market; third, due to its 
various advantages and market shares, the baseband chips of Qualcomm attracted high 
reliance of main wireless communication terminal manufacturers; and finally, there were 
rigid and difficult barriers for potential undertakings to enter into the baseband chip market 
concerned.86  
As a consequence, as prescribed by Article 18 of the AML, Qualcomm was found to be 
dominant in both SEPs licensing market and the baseband chip market.  
4.3.2.2 The Abuses of a Dominant Position 
In the second part of the Decision, the market conduct by which Qualcomm abused its 
dominant market position was set forth and individually demonstrated. It was established 
that Qualcomm abused its dominance in the wireless SEPs licensing market by charging 
unfair high royalty fees.87 For example, licensees had to pay for Qualcomm’s expired 
wireless SEPs. Additionally, they were required to grant back their own non-SEPs for free 
and Qualcomm did not deduct the corresponding value of the patents owned by licensees 
from the required royalty fees. The value of the patents of these licensees was ignored by 
Qualcomm.88 Generally, it is not illegal for licensors to seek for the grant-back of the 
patents owned by licensees, but it is not the reason to obtain free grant-back in all 
circumstances.89  The royalty-free granting back can raise detrimental influence on the 
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motivation of licensees to innovate, and impede the research and development in the 
wireless communication field. From this aspect, fair competition was eliminated or 
restricted.90 More importantly, the patent royalty fees charged by Qualcomm were on the 
basis of the wholesale net selling price of terminal devices.91 In other words, licensees 
were not only charged royalties on the SEPs but also on other parts of the wireless 
communication terminal devices, which were not within the scope of the SEPs. As a 
consequence, the excessively high royalty fees increased the costs of wireless 
communication terminal devices and finally impaired the consumer welfare.92 
In addition, it was confirmed that Qualcomm abused its dominance by bundling SEPs with 
non-SEPs without reasonable and justifiable reasons.93 Qualcomm did not measure what 
the bundled non-SEPs meant to licensees and just unilaterally offered a package licensing. 
In order to hide what they were doing, Qualcomm did not provide licensees with a patent 
list. There is no doubt that this unreasonable bundling inevitably threatened the 
competition in the non-SEPs licensing market.94  
Moreover, the NDRC ascertained that Qualcomm abused its dominant position in the 
baseband chip market in order to eliminate and restrict competition by imposing 
unreasonable conditions on baseband chip sales.95 For instance, Qualcomm established 
preconditions for licensees to buy their necessary baseband chips that signing the patent 
licensing agreement with unreasonable constraints and waiving the legal right to challenge 
the agreement.  
Therefore, as identified by Article 17 of China’s AML, the aforesaid practices by 
Qualcomm constituted the abuses of its dominance in the relevant markets. 
4.3.2.3 The Basis of the Decision 
In the third part, the Decision set out the justifications of the punishment on the basis of 
Articles 47 and 49 of the AML. On one hand, Qualcomm was ordered to cease the abusive 
practices in the relevant markets: to present the patent list to licensees and not to charge 











Chinese wireless communication terminal manufacturers for the expired patents, not to 
force licensees to grant back their non-SEPs or relevant patents without justifiable 
payments, not to charge excessively high royalties on the wireless communication terminal 
devices used in China and not to base the wireless SEPs royalty fees on the wholesale net 
selling price of terminal devices, not to bundle SEPs with non-SEPs without justifiable 
reasons, and not to impose unreasonable conditions on the sales of baseband chips.96 On 
the other hand, taking into account of the related elements, the NDRC imposed a fine of 8% 
of Qualcomm’s sales in China in 2013, which amounted to 6.088 billion RMB, the highest 
fine in the history of Chinese anti-monopoly enforcement. 
4.3.3 Comment 
4.3.3.1 Positive Effects of the Qualcomm Investigation 
As the first case dealt with by China’s AMEAs concerning an abuse of IPRs, the 
Qualcomm investigation has brought about a substantial number of positive consequences. 
First, the influence of the Qualcomm investigation has extended to other jurisdictions. As a 
giant in the wireless communication area, Qualcomm owned a number of significant IPRs 
and its business model has already raised complaints in many countries and regions.97 
However, whether the behaviour of Qualcomm amounts to illegal monopolistic conduct 
and damages the market competition is not easy to be established. As a result, many anti-
monopoly investigations involving Qualcomm had no final result. But now, the Chinese 
Decision imposing an administrative penalty on Qualcomm will to some extent play a 
guidance role. After the start of the anti-monopoly investigation to Qualcomm by the 
NDRC, both the EU and Korea declared that the investigation of Qualcomm’s conduct 
would be launched again98 and in fact Qualcomm was later investigated by competition 
authorities in the US,99 Korea100 and EU.101 
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Additionally, the Qualcomm Decision has made an important step in the development of 
China’s AML in prohibiting anti-competitive practices of patent owners in exercising their 
patent rights. In the era of knowledge-driven economy, IPRs are playing an important role, 
especially in the field of high technology like wireless communication technology. In this 
context, patent owners are likely to abuse their legal ‘monopoly’ of their patent rights to set 
up technical barriers to eliminate and restrict market competition.102 However, national 
patent laws themselves cannot solve the problem perfectly and the application of an anti-
monopoly law has become a popular practice to cope with these challenges. This is 
important for China in particular, as it is still a developing country. Currently, China has 
low innovation ability and has to import most advanced technologies from developed 
countries, which makes it necessary for China to effectively regulate the anti-competitive 
behaviour of the patent licensors like those transnational companies by the AML. 103 
China’s AML was adopted in 2008, which is nearly one century later than that of the US. 
Although China has begun to pay more attention to anti-monopoly investigations since 
2013 and many industries have been investigated and punished, the anti-monopoly 
enforcement in the exercise of IPRs has been seldom because this is a considerably 
contentious and complicated area.104 Moreover, there is only one article in China’s AML 
that mentions the anti-competitive exercise of intellectual property rights, and it is very 
general in nature.105 As a consequence, the Qualcomm Decision shows the attitude of 
Chinese AMEAs that a balance should be maintained between the protection of IPRs and 
the anti-monopoly enforcement in the exercise of IPRs. The NDRC faced a number of 
sophisticated and difficult problems when they dealt with the Qualcomm investigation, 
many of which they had never met before. The progress made by China’s AMEAs is 
obvious and dramatic. The Qualcomm investigation has made up for the shortage of 
Chinese decisions in this area and has opened a new chapter. The Decision published by 
the NDRC is the longest one with more than 10,000 words.106 This contributed to the 
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improvement of transparency and certainty of China’s anti-monopoly enforcement. The 
Qualcomm investigation is so meaningful in China’s anti-monopoly enforcement history 
that as a precedent it can provide experience and make a contribution to future cases. 
4.3.3.2 Deficiencies and Ambiguities of the Qualcomm Investigation 
Although the conclusion of the Qualcomm investigation has displayed improvements and 
progress made by China’s AMEAs, there are still deficiencies and ambiguities left. The 
fine imposed by the NDRC seemed to be too high at nearly one billion dollars. However, it 
is only a drop in the ocean for such a giant undertaking operating in the SEPs licensing 
market and in the baseband chip market.107 It probably does not impose enough deterrent 
effects on Qualcomm. According to Article 47 of China’s AML, the undertaking abusing 
its dominance in the relevant market shall be ordered to cease its monopolistic conduct; its 
unlawful gains shall be confiscated and a fine shall be imposed by the relevant anti-
monopoly enforcement authority.108 In the NDRC Decision, Qualcomm was imposed on a 
fine of 8% of its 2013 revenue in China but its unlawful gains from the monopolistic 
conduct were not confiscated. No further official explanations were published to elaborate 
why the unlawful gains were not confiscated. Moreover, the NDRC did not base the fine 
on the sales of Qualcomm all around the world but only on the sales amount in China, 
which did not take the same practice as the EU. In this situation, the NDRC seemed not to 
make full use of the AML to impose enough deterrent influence on both Qualcomm and 
the other potential violators. 
In addition, the NDRC Decision stated that Qualcomm was prohibited from taking the 
wholesale net selling price of the devices as the basis to charge a high royalty rate for the 
wireless SEPs.109 In order to meet the requirements of the Decision, Qualcomm promised 
in its brief rectification plan that ‘[f]or licenses of Qualcomm’s 3G and 4G essential 
Chinese patents for branded devices sold for use in China, Qualcomm will charge royalties 
of 5% for 3G devices (including multimode 3G/4G devices) and 3.5% for 4G devices 
(including 3-mode LTE-TDD devices) that do not implement CDMA or WCDMA, in each 
case using a royalty base of 65% of the net selling price of the device.’110 On its face, the 
rectification plan seemed to satisfy the NDRC order. However, it did not make any change 
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to the original charging model of Qualcomm. Charging patent royalty fees on the basis of 
the wholesale selling price of the devices means that not only the chip itself but also the 
other parts of the devices that have nothing to do with the patents being licensed will all be 
taken as a part of the basic amount. This charging method obviously violated the FRAND 
rules and unreasonably expands the basic amount of patent royalty fees.111 For instance, if 
two mobile phones adopted the same baseband chips from Qualcomm, one of which was 
decorated with some expensive diamonds and labelled a high selling price, then the two 
mobile phones with the same chips would be charged different royalties under the current 
charging model of Qualcomm. However, when it comes to the Qualcomm rectification 
plan, it only reduced the basic amount of patent royalty fees to 65% but it did not aim to 
modify the unfair charging model. This is more like a discount. The rectification plan did 
not change the actual charging model, so the wireless communication terminal devices 
manufacturers would still have to pay royalties for the other parts of devices, not only for 
the chip. Actually, the most ideal charging model would be that the chip makers pay for the 
patents to Qualcomm and then the mobile phone manufacturers buy the chips directly from 
the chip makers without paying royalties to Qualcomm.112 This model would considerably 
reduce the patent licensing fees, because in this situation the basic amount just focuses on 
the chip and patents concerned, excluding other non-patented parts of the devices. In fact, 
as stated by Xiaoye Wang, who is one of the experts of the State Council’s Anti-monopoly 
Commission and participated in the last drafts of the Decision, the earlier version of the 
Decision adopted the smallest patent unit for sale as the charging basis; however, in the 
final version this idea was dropped and no specific solution to this problem is provided in 
detail. 113  Besides, the Decision emphasized that Qualcomm was forbidden to force 
licensees to agree to unreasonable and unfair terms as a precondition to sell baseband chips 
to them.114 However, this order did not lead to any amendment to the core business model 
‘chip + patent licensing’.115 If the wireless communication terminal devices manufactures 
want to purchase the chips, they would still have to seek for the licences of the relevant 
patents by Qualcomm first. Therefore, potential risks are not substantially removed that 
licensees are still likely to be charged excessively high by Qualcomm for the patents. 
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Although the Decision did not completely overturn the original patent licensing charging 
model, it has made important progress in influencing the model. 
Moreover, the ban imposed by the NDRC on forcing licensees to grant back their non-
SEPs without paying reasonable royalties has both a positive and a negative impact on the 
Chinese mobile phone manufacture industry. On one hand, the ban will bring benefits to 
those manufacturers owning a number of patents. In recent years, Chinese telecoms 
equipment companies like Huawei and ZTE Corporation have accumulated a number of 
core patents in the field of the wireless communication.116 Before the Decision was issued, 
the value of the patents owned by Chinese companies was usually paid little attention.117 
The Chinese companies were compelled to grant back their patents for free and were 
prohibited to initiate litigation to protect their own patents under the agreement with 
Qualcomm.118 However, the Decision brought them a hope and encouraged the research 
and development of those undertakings owning important patents. The Decision will 
facilitate Chinese undertakings to gain a bargaining position when negotiating a licensing 
agreement with Qualcomm and may significantly reduce their manufacture costs through 
cross licensing.119 Although the future is bright and promising, there appears to be another 
problematic issue —whether the relevant royalty fees should be decided by the NDRC or 
be negotiated between undertakings themselves. Normally, what the government can and 
should do is to supervise the market and ensure that it operates competitively. Only in the 
situation where there is no agreement achieved, the relevant governmental organization or 
courts should intervene by request. This issue will be discussed fully in Section 9.3.3 of 
Chapter 9.  
On the other hand, for those small companies with few patents, the ban on the free grant-
back seems to be a nightmare. The ban will deprive those small undertakings with few 
patents of the sharing umbrella of Qualcomm and this means they will not be able to use 
the patents of other companies for free any more. 120  Accordingly, the costs of their 
products will increase considerably and the price advantage will no longer exist. This 
seems to be a serious attack to their development but it is the result of normal competition. 
From this point, an earth-shaking change will take place to the structure of Chinese mobile 
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phone manufacture industry.121 The answer to how these small companies can survive in 
this battle seems to be intellectual property rights. Therefore, in order to strengthen the 
competing power, Chinese companies have to improve their own ability and develop 
innovative technologies, though this will take a lot of time and money. 
Another ambiguity that must be considered is that Qualcomm did not put its entire 
rectification plan in public and this may lead to uncertainty and confusion for potential 
licensees. To satisfy the requirements of the NDRC Decision, Qualcomm handed in a 
rectification plan to the NDRC, and it was then accepted. However, in Qualcomm’s 
announcement to the public, the rectification plan was very brief and only included a few 
paragraphs. The reason was given as to why the complete plan was not released. 
Qualcomm stated that the full rectification plan was available, but the NDRC said that it 
was Qualcomm itself who required keeping the rectification plan a secret.122 The failure to 
make the Qualcomm rectification plan full public will bring uncertainties to potential 
licensees. For example, they will have no knowledge of specific terms of the plan so that 
they cannot identify whether the agreement they have made with Qualcomm is consistent 
with the rectification plan and the NDRC Decision.123 Therefore, there is a great need and 
necessity for the NDRC to supervise Qualcomm’s enforcement of the Decision. 
An additional factor that should be taken into account is whether the NDRC was the right 
authority to investigate Qualcomm’s conduct. There are three AMEAs in China, namely 
NDRC (price-related monopolistic conduct), SAIC (non-price related anti-competitive 
practices) and MOFCOM (merger control).124 The Qualcomm investigation involved both 
price monopoly and the abuse of a dominant position in the market, especially the latter 
one. From the duties and responsibilities of the three Chinese authorities, it seems that both 
the NDRC and the SAIC should have the power to investigate Qualcomm, but there is no 
evidence that the SAIC was involved in the case. Why the NDRC but not the SAIC? It is 
not clear that how the investigation and duties are allocated if one case falls within the 
scope of more than one of the three authorities. In addition, the SAIC published the 
Provisions on Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Exclude and Restrict 
Competition (Provisions) on 7 April 2015. If this case had happened after the adoption of 
the Provisions, would the enforcement authority be different? Or could the rules in the 
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Provisions be applied to the monopolistic conduct of Qualcomm in this case? There is still 
much uncertainty in the allocation of the responsibilities between China’s three AMEAs125 
and relevant guidelines or instructions are in great need.126 
4.3.4 Summary  
As a milestone, the Qualcomm investigation presented the new goal of China’s anti-
monopoly enforcement—the prohibition of the anti-competitive exercise of IPRs. This 
case has made a record in China’s anti-monopoly enforcement history, not only for that it 
has been the highest fine imposed by an AMEA but also for its meaning for anti-monopoly 
enforcement. It shows a signal that an important step has been made by China to apply its 
AML to regulate the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights, from a general provision to 
a specific application and from knowledge on paper to enforcement in practice. The efforts 
made by China’s AMEAs can be seen. At the same time, the attitude of China is expressed 
clearly that the protection of IPRs and the prevention of their anti-competitive exercise are 
both of great importance. In spite of the improvements and the progress, there are still a 
number of deficiencies and ambiguities left that will bring uncertainty and confusion, such 
as how to impose enough deterrent effects on the potential violators, the settlement of the 
SEPs royalty fees under the FRAND rules and the allocation of the responsibilities 
between the three AMEAs. With the adoption by the SAIC of the Provisions on 
Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Exclude and Restrict Competition, 
the abuse of IPRs will be supervised and managed more carefully and rigorously. However, 
the contentious issues as to the application of the Provisions have appeared. 127   The 
Provisions will be fully examined in Chapter 5. China is still a novice in the field of 
competition enforcement, especially in controlling the anti-competitive exercise of IPRs, 
and has much to learn. No matter how well the law prohibits the anti-competitive practices 
of patent owners in exercising their patent rights, the most effective way to resolve the 
passive situation in China is to enhance innovation and get rid of the reliance on the 
advanced technologies of foreign undertakings. 
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 The 2015 SAIC Provisions on the Prohibition of the 
Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict 
Competition 
5.1 Introduction 
Case studies in Chapter 4 showed both the achievements and ineffectiveness of China’s 
anti-monopoly enforcement in the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. It also showed 
the necessity to adopt clear guidance to facilitate the implementation of Article 55 of 
China’s Anti-monopoly Law (AML)1 to cope effectively with the complicated IP-related 
anti-competitive practices. The next step is to examine how China proceeded with the anti-
monopoly guidelines on IPRs and what kind of guidance has been adopted. 
 The State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) in 2009 commenced work 
on drafting guidelines on prohibiting the abuse2 of intellectual property rights (IPRs) that 
eliminates or restricts competition. This was carried out by the SAIC on behalf of the Anti-
monopoly Commission of China’s State Council (AMC) which is the organization above 
the three anti-monopoly enforcement authorities (AMEAs) aiming to coordinate anti-
monopoly work and is conferred by the AML with the power to formulate and adopt anti-
monopoly guidelines.3  
The interface between the protection of IPRs and the anti-monopoly enforcement is a 
sensitive and complicated area. China’s AML has been in effect for a very short period of 
time, and it does not have much enforcement experience in the IP-related area. It seemed to 
be too early or without enough preparation, to promulgate systematic and sound guidelines 
on prohibiting the abuse of IPRs that may eliminate or restrict competition at that time.4 
However, there is indeed a need for a regulation or some specific rules to be adopted to 
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facilitate the application of Article 55 to control the anti-competitive practices of patent 
owners in exercising their patent rights. As a result, the SAIC decided to change the 
original plan of drafting the overall IP-related anti-monopoly guidelines (non-binding) on 
behalf of the AMC and decided to adopt its own guidance first. The SAIC, therefore, 
adopted the regulation in accordance with its own responsibilities on 7 April 2015, which 
is known as Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to 
Eliminate or Restrict Competition (Provisions) and came into effect on 1 August 2015.5 
The Provisions are regarded as the first legal measure in China that clarifies and facilitates 
the application of the AML to the abuse of IPRs that may eliminate or restrict competition. 
The promulgation of such rules or provisions had been expected for quite a long time. The 
SAIC Provisions to a great extent elaborates the principle laid down in Article 55 of 
China’s AML. Most importantly, the Provisions make it clear that the abusive exercise of 
IPRs shall not be necessarily regarded as a violation of the AML; neither is it definitely 
equal to an abuse of a dominant position. Only if the conduct eliminates or restricts 
competition will it be regulated by the AML. In addition, the Provisions clarify that the 
exercise of IPRs to eliminate or restrict competition is not new or separate monopolistic 
conduct6 and it should be treated as the exercise of IPRs to carry out monopolistic conduct, 
such as monopoly agreements or abuse of a dominant market position. At the same time, 
the Provisions play a positive role in providing certainty to the enforcement of SAIC in 
investigating IP-related anti-competitive practices, and in providing predictability of the 
AML to undertakings owning substantial IPRs.  
Although greater certainty has been provided by the SAIC Provisions, it is inevitable that 
some important issues and relationships remain unclear. The SAIC Provisions are only 
concerned with non-price related anti-competitive behaviour related to the exercise of IPRs 
and are followed only by the SAIC itself. The SAIC Provisions are not binding on any 
other AMEA such as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) or the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). This means that both the price-related anti-
competitive conduct and the concentration of undertakings involving IPRs do not fall 
within the scope of the SAIC Provisions. At the same time, neither the NDRC nor the 
MOFCOM has adopted their own specific regulation to manage the IP-related anti-
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competitive conduct. Therefore, in order to keep consistent enforcement in this 
complicated field and provide clear guidance, the overall IP-related anti-monopoly 
guidelines are put on the schedule again by the AMC. The AMC entrusted the three 
AMEAs (namely SAIC, NDRC and MOFCOM) and the State Intellectual Property Office 
(the SIPO) to draft respectively the anti-monopoly guidelines on the exercise of IPRs with 
anti-competitive effects; and the AMC will finally adopt and publish the integrated 
guidelines in this field. SAIC and NDRC had drafted and released two sets of anti-
monopoly IPRs guidelines for public comment on 5 February 2016 (the SAIC draft IPRs 
guidelines)7 and on 31 December 2015 (the NDRC draft IPRs guidelines).8 Then, in March 
2017, the AMC published unified draft IPRs guidelines for public comment (the AMC 
draft IPRs guidelines).9 However, the AMC has not yet adopted any integrated IP-related 
anti-monopoly guidelines. This is to say that at the moment the SAIC Provisions are the 
only rules specifically focusing on IP-related anti-competitive behaviour, with no idea of 
their effects on the future enforcement of the newly established independent SAMR. 
In this chapter, the SAIC Provisions will be analysed in detail; while, the draft anti-
monopoly guidelines on the abuse of IPRs with anti-competitive influence will only be 
briefly mentioned owing to its non-promulgation. Totally, there are 19 articles laid down in 
the Provisions, two of which concerns the promulgation authority and the starting date of 
the Provisions. The remaining 17 articles can be roughly divided into 7 parts, namely the 
aims and scope (Articles 1-3), the prohibition on monopolistic agreements concerning the 
exercise of IPRs and the safe harbour (Articles 4-5), the prohibition on the abuse of a 
dominant position related to the exploitation of IPRs (Articles 6-11), the rule managing the 
anti-competitive behaviour of a patent pool (Article 12), the rule governing the anti-
competitive exercise of IPRs concerning the setting and implementing of a standard 
(Article 13), the procedures and approaches in analysing IP-related anti-competitive 
practices (Articles 14-16) and the punishment for the violation of the Provisions (Article 
17). Finally, a summary of this chapter will be put forward.    
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5.2 Aims and Scope 
The aims of the SAIC Provisions are to protect fair competition in the market and to 
encourage innovation as described in Article 1.10 
Then, Article 2 of the Provisions clarifies the relationship between the protection of IPRs 
and the anti-monopoly enforcement that they have common goals to promote competition 
and innovation, to advance economic efficiency and to protect consumer welfare and 
public interests.11 It is believed that they achieve the same goals through different ways.12 
As a result, Article 2 is treated as an official acknowledgement of the complementary 
relationship between the protection of IPRs and the prohibition on IP-related anti-
competitive behaviour. 
In addition, what has been stated in Article 55 of the AML is emphasized again in 
Paragraph 2, Article 2 of the SAIC Provisions. Since Article 55 of the AML is a general 
and declarative principle, it is not appropriate to be applied directly to specific cases. 
Without detailed guidance, it had led to a lot of queries and doubts as to what kind of 
exploitation of IPRs shall be considered as ‘the abuse of IPRs’ within the scope of Article 
55 and how to treat such ‘abuse of IPRs’ under the AML.13  Different countries with 
different legal systems in different periods may have different understandings of ‘the abuse 
of IPRs’ in accordance with their own circumstances.14 Accordingly, SAIC, within its 
enforcement power, provides an official definition in Article 3 of the Provisions that 
‘[a]buse of intellectual property rights to eliminate or restrict competition in the Provisions 
refers to the exercises of intellectual property rights by an undertaking to engage in 
monopolistic conducts, such as monopoly agreements or abuse of a dominant market 
position, which are in violation of the Antimonopoly Law (except for price monopolistic 
conducts).’15 It is stated that even if the abuse of IPRs can be regarded as a monopolistic 
act within the scope of Article 55, it shall not be treated as a separate fourth kind of 
monopolistic act besides the monopoly agreement, the abuse of a dominant position and 
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the anti-competitive concentration of undertakings.16 It may be presumed to constitute each 
of the three kinds of monopolistic conduct identified above respectively or constitute 
several of them at the same time.17 According to Article 3 of the Provisions, an abuse of 
IPRs should not be treated as a monopolistic practice within the AML in all circumstances; 
only the abuse that may eliminate or restrict competition shall be prohibited. Other kinds of 
abuse of IPRs may violate relevant intellectual property laws and shall be regulated within 
that scope. Moreover, the abuse of IPRs with anti-competitive effects does not equal 
precisely an abuse of dominance under the AML, because it has the possibility of 
constituting the other two kinds of monopolistic acts such as monopoly agreements or anti-
competitive concentration of undertakings.18 
However, the Provisions are formulated by the SAIC within its responsibilities, so they are 
only applicable to non-price related anti-competitive monopoly agreements and non-price 
related abuse of dominance involving the exercise of IPRs. This limitation seemed to result 
in confusion and uncertainty in the anti-monopoly enforcement by the three AMEAs.19 As 
NDRC and MOFCOM are not obliged to observe the SAIC Provisions, worries arise on 
the potential differentiated enforcement standards. At times, the monopolistic behaviour of 
one undertaking may fall within the responsibilities of both NDRC and SAIC. In this 
context, if it is the NDRC that is in charge of the anti-monopoly investigation, there will be 
a potential risk that the undertaking concerned may be treated differently as it will be in the 
investigation controlled by the SAIC.20  It is unclear whether NDRC will analyze such 
cases generally under the rules of the AML or it will choose not to intervene as a result of 
the special rules in the SAIC Provisions. The result is hard to be predicted. Moreover, as 
the merger of the anti-monopoly responsibilities into a single and independent SAMR, 
there is no idea of to what extent the SAIC Provisions will work. 
Furthermore, the concept of ‘the relevant technology market’ is set out at the end of Article 
3 of the Provisions. The insertion of a definition ‘the relevant technology market’ means 
that there is a full consideration of the special features of IPRs. In investigating IP-related 
anti-competitive practices, the adoption of a relevant technology market sometimes shows 
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the competitive significance in the market much better than that of the relevant product 
market does.21 For example, the SAIC is launching an anti-monopoly investigation on an 
alleged abuse of a dominant position by Microsoft in China and the determination of its 
dominance in the relevant market has become a contentious issue. Because of the high 
piracy rate of Microsoft’s Windows operating system and its Office software in the 
Chinese market, the market share of Microsoft’s legitimate products cannot precisely 
reflect its real dominance in the relevant market.22 However, if the operating system of 
Microsoft is defined as a separate technology market, Microsoft will be determined to have 
a dominant position.23 The definition of a relevant technology market can substantially 
reflect the situation in analysing the IP-related behaviour and will significantly reduce the 
controversy. In the dispute between Huawei and InterDigital, 24 InterDigital had doubted 
the definition of the relevant market that each SEP constituted a separate relevant product 
market. If this case had taken place after the adoption of the SAIC Provisions and had been 
investigated by the SAIC, Article 3 of the Provisions would have been the legal basis.  
Another controversial concept in defining the relevant market is ‘the innovation market’ 
(referring to the research and development market), which has been adopted in the 1995 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property by the U.S. Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.25 In the previous draft provisions of the SAIC, 
the concept of ‘the innovation market’ was mentioned but it was finally removed from the 
June 2014 Draft.26 This was mainly for the reason that controversy exists in the definition 
of and the approach to presume ‘the innovation market’ all around the world; and it is 
believed that this concept mostly appears in merger control cases.27 At the current stage of 
the anti-monopoly enforcement in China, the definition of innovation market cannot be 
explained well or function well. Therefore, the SAIC did not adopt it in the final version of 
the Provisions.  
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5.3 The Safe Harbour Rule 
Article 15 of the AML provides general exemptions to Articles 13 and 14 which prohibit 
monopoly agreements, and the preconditions of the exemptions listed in this article are 
from the perspective of the purpose of the concluded agreements. 28  Article 4 of the 
Provisions confirms the applicability of Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the AML to the 
monopoly agreements arising from the exercise of IPRs. Then, Article 5 of the Provisions 
sets up a ‘safe harbour’. Under the safe harbour, the agreements may not fall within the 
scope of Article 13.1.6 or Article 14.3 of the AML if one of the following circumstances 
where an undertaking exercise its IPRs is satisfied (except the case where contrary 
evidence is available to prove that the agreement concerned is restrictive and anti-
competitive): (1) the combined market shares of the competing undertakings in the relevant 
market which is affected by the act do not exceed 20%, or at least four other 
independently-controlled substitutable technologies in the relevant market may be 
available at reasonable costs; or (2) neither the market shares of the undertaking nor that of 
the trading counterpart in the relevant market respectively exceed 30%, or at least two 
other independently-controlled substitutable technologies in the relevant market may be 
available at reasonable costs.29 It should be noted that the fulfilment of the thresholds will 
lead to the application of an exemption; however, this does not mean that an agreement 
above the thresholds will be presumed to infringe the AML or to be unable to satisfy the 
terms of Article 15 of the AML on an individual basis. This is the first time for the safe 
harbour rule to appear in Chinese anti-monopoly measures. On one hand, it improves 
considerably the certainty and predictability of the implementation of the AML in IP-
related area; on the other hand, it will facilitate the anti-monopoly enforcement and 
promote the enforcement efficiency by SAIC in practice.  
The establishment of the safe harbour rule to some extent demonstrates that during the 
enforcement, the SAIC will analyse the influence of the IPRs agreements on competition in 
accordance with the rule of reason but not the per se rule.30 The safe harbour rule also 
transfers the burden of proof from the undertakings concerned to the SAIC itself, which 
relieves the business operators.31 Within Article 15 of the AML, the burden of proof is on 
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the undertaking concerned to show that it satisfies Article 15 and shall be exempted. In the 
light of the safe harbour rule of Article 5 of the SAIC Provisions, it is the SAIC that must 
provide convincing evidence to demonstrate the anti-competitive effects of the IPRs 
agreement to block the exemption even if the market share or the substitutable technology 
thresholds are satisfied.    
5.3.1 The Scope of the Safe Harbour Rule 
The safe harbour in the SAIC Provisions is not applicable to the monopoly agreements 
obviously listed in Article 13.1.1-13.1.5 and Article 14.1-14.2 of the AML, which concern 
fixing price, restricting product amount, dividing the market, boycotting, maintaining 
resale price, and restricting the minimum resale price. The application scope of Article 5 of 
the Provisions is limited only to ‘other monopoly agreements confirmed by the anti-
monopoly authorities’. The limited scope of Article 5 of the Provisions invisibly 
differentiates the monopoly agreements with hard-core restrictions from other types of 
agreements which can apply the safe harbour rule, though the term ‘hard-core restrictions’ 
has not been formally adopted in Chinese legislation.32 Then, a problem arises. Until now, 
neither SAIC nor NDRC has determined an agreement as ‘other monopoly agreements 
confirmed by the anti-monopoly authorities’ in their published decisions. There is no 
guidance on what other monopoly agreements shall be like. This leaves flexibility for the 
enforcement by the AMEAs, but leaves unpredictability for the undertakings in the market. 
In this situation, whether the safe harbour rule can be effectively and successfully applied 
is a matter for future investigations.  
5.3.2 Substantial Differences between the SAIC Provisions and the Draft 
IPRs Guidelines in Applying the Safe Harbour Rule 
The safe harbour rule in Article 5 of the Provisions is an example to show how China 
develops its own anti-monopoly rules by learning from best global practices.33 Article 5 of 
the Provisions combines the market share thresholds used in the EU Commission 
Regulation 316/201434 and the approach on the substitutable technology used in the US 
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1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property.35 However, substantial 
differences exist in the thresholds of applying the safe harbour rule between the SAIC draft 
guidelines on IPRs36 and the NDRC draft guidelines on IPRs.37  
In the SAIC draft guidelines on IPRs, it maintains the market share thresholds and the 
substitutable technology thresholds of the safe harbour rule in Article 5 of its current 
Provisions; while, the NDRC draft IPRs guidelines do not involve the substitutable 
technology thresholds and simultaneously chose lower market share thresholds than those 
in the SAIC Provisions. This difference led to the controversy as to which thresholds 
would be finally adopted in the integrated guidelines by the AMC. Whether the AMC will 
adopt both the market share and the substitutable technology thresholds as the SAIC does 
or it will only adopt the market share thresholds, has become a contentious issue. In 
addition, whether the lower market share thresholds in the NDRC draft IPRs guidelines 
will be used in the final integrated guidelines or the ones adopted in the SAIC Provisions, 
is also full of controversy.  
It is submitted that that the Chinese market is a large and complicated one and the adoption 
of both the market share threshold and the substitutable technology threshold to apply the 
safe harbour rule will reflect accurately the competitive significance in the relevant 
Chinese market. In addition, the application of the safe harbour rule means that certain 
anti-competitive effects arising from the concluded agreements will be exempted from the 
AML. Thus, the application of the safe harbour rule should be limited by strict conditions. 
However, too strict conditions may put the exemption rules in a decorative position 
without practical effects. As a result, an appropriate balance needs to be kept. The 
European Commission has rich enforcement experience in this aspect. The market share 
thresholds to apply exemptions adopted in the EU Commission Regulation 316/2014 have 
been in place for a long time and have been proven to function well. The SAIC Provisions 
has adopted the same market share thresholds as the EU Commission Regulation 316/2014 
does. In order to reduce the detrimental effects on the market competition to the lowest 
level and to make the safe harbour rule practical, a higher market share threshold to apply 
the safe harbour rule as that in the SAIC Provisions should be adopted in the final 
integrated guidelines by the AMC.  
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Currently, the AMC involved both the market share threshold and the substitutable 
technologies threshold in its latest 2017 draft IPRs guidelines. The AMC maintains the 
same market share thresholds (less than 20% for competing undertakings and respectively 
less than 30% for each non-competing undertaking) as the SAIC.38 However, different 
from the SAIC, the AMC drafted a general substitutable technology threshold of at least 
four independently-controlled substitutable technologies in the market owned by other 
undertakings, no matter whether the undertakings concerned are competitors or not.39 In 
addition, the AMC draft IPRs guidelines followed the US Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property to require that the substitutable technology threshold 
should be only applicable if the market share data is unavailable or cannot accurately 
indicate the competitive significance of undertakings.40 Nevertheless, this premise is not 
required by Article 5 of the SAIC Provisions and this means that there is a greater scope 
for the application of the safe harbour rule in the SAIC Provisions. It is still waiting to be 
answered whether this wider scope will work effectively under the circumstances in China 
and whether the final integrated anti-monopoly guidelines adopted by the AMC will 
maintain what it has drafted in the 2017 AMC draft IPRs guidelines. If the different 
substitutable technology threshold were adopted in the final integrated guidelines, there 
would be a conflict between the safe harbour thresholds in the SAIC Provisions and the 
final guidelines. It means a problem of the compatibility of these two anti-monopoly 
measures with different standards will arise.41 Moreover, there are no clear interpretations 
to guide the AMEAs to calculate the market shares of the undertakings concerned to apply 
the safe harbour of the SAIC Provisions. If specific calculating approaches are clearly 
adopted in future legal measures just as has been done in the EU Commission Regulation 
316/2014 and its relevant guidelines, enforcement efficiency of the anti-monopoly 
authorities will be improved substantially. 
5.4 The Prohibition on the Abuse of A Dominant Position 
5.4.1 The Relationship between Dominance and the Possession of IPRs 
Another breakthrough made in the SAIC Provisions is Article 6 which elaborates on the 
relationship between the possession of IPRs and dominance. It is emphasized that the 
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possession of IPRs by undertakings is merely one element to be considered in establishing 
a dominant position; it shall be not presumed that the undertaking is dominant in the 
relevant market solely because of its ownership of IPRs.42 This article has been challenged 
by those who hold the view that IP owners should be presumed to be dominant in the 
relevant market and the burden should be imposed on them to show otherwise.43 However, 
this argument cannot be agreed in this thesis. The method mentioned above is too strict for 
IPRs owners, which will discourage innovation. Excessive antitrust enforcement is no 
longer appropriate in the current knowledge-based society. Indeed, it has been abolished in 
the US since 1980s. It is not sensible for China to follow an approach that has already been 
demonstrated to be harmful. Accordingly, what Article 6 stipulates complies with 
international practice and should be supported. It is believed that Article 6 provides a 
defence for standard essential patent holders and the burden of proof on dominance will be 
borne by the SAIC.44 There is no doubt that the ownership of IPRs is a key and important 
element that must be taken into account in determining whether the undertaking concerned 
is dominant in the relevant market. However, intellectual property rights should be treated 
in the same way as other property rights and should not be discriminatorily treated as a 
result of its legal exclusivity. 
5.4.2 The Abuse of Dominance by Refusing to License an IPR 
In accordance with Article 17 of the AML (the prohibition on dominant undertakings from 
abusing their dominant market position), Articles 7-11 of the SAIC Provisions respectively 
prohibit the abuse of dominance when exploiting IPRs by refusing to license, by limiting 
transactions, by tying and bundling, by imposing unreasonable conditions, and by applying 
differential treatment. The SAIC Provisions do not incorporate rules on the price-related 
abuse of dominance such as unfair pricing and predatory price which fall within the 
enforcement scope of the NDRC. Within the responsibilities of the SAIC, Articles 7-11 
identify specific circumstances under which the exercise of IPRs shall be determined as an 
abuse of a dominant position. Among these rules, Article 7of the SAIC Provisions, the 
prohibition on the abuse of dominance by refusing to license when undertakings exercise 
their IPRs, is the most controversial. When the draft SAIC Provisions were soliciting 
public comment, some foreign governments and the representatives of undertakings 
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strongly recommended dropping this rule because it might deprive IPR owners of the 
substance of their exclusive rights and significantly discourage innovation.45  However, 
Article 17 of the AML clearly states that an abuse of dominance by refusing to deal shall 
be prohibited. And the refusal to license an IPR is one manifestation of refusal to deal, 
which has the possibility of violating the AML. As a result, it has been kept in the SAIC 
Provisions but its application is limited to exceptional circumstances.  
In order to encourage innovation and promote research and development, intellectual 
property laws usually confer exclusive rights on IPR owners to allow them to exercise their 
IPRs freely subject to the legal scope. The refusal to license is a way in which the IPR 
owners exploit freely their exclusive rights. Indeed, even undertakings with no IPRs or 
dominance are free to choose their counterparts in one transaction. The mere unilateral and 
non-discriminatory or unconditional refusal to license an IPR itself generally does not 
constitute a violation of the AML. Even if the undertaking has a dominant position in the 
market, the AML does not oblige it to license its IPRs in return for royalties. If the AMEAs 
compelled undertakings to make a deal, it might undermine their willingness to invest and 
innovate.46 Therefore, only in exceptional circumstances will the refusal to license an IPR 
by a dominant undertaking be considered as an abuse violating the AML.  
Article 7 of the SAIC Provisions adopts the ‘essential facility’ as the exceptional condition, 
which is consistent with the approach adopted in the EU competition law. This is the first 
time for a Chinese AMEA to take the essential facility rule into account. Within this rule, 
the dominant IPR owner has an obligation to license its IPRs to other undertakings, 
provided that such IPRs constitute an essential facility. Then, the question arises as to what 
conditions should be satisfied in establishing an essential facility. Article 7 of the 
Provisions prescribes that an undertaking with a dominant position in the market, without 
justifiable reasons, shall be prohibited from refusing to license its IPRs to other business 
operators on reasonable conditions for the purpose of eliminating or restricting competition, 
if the IPRs concerned are essential facilities for manufacturing and business operating 
activities; in determining the aforesaid behaviour, all the following factors should be taken 
into account: (1) the IPRs concerned cannot be reasonably substituted in the relevant 
market and are essential for other undertakings to compete in the relevant market; (2) the 
refusal to license the IPRs concerned will have negative effects on the competition or on 
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innovation in the relevant market, and will impair consumers or public interests; and (3) 
the licence of the IPRs concerned will not unjustifiably undermine the interests of the 
dominant licensor.47  
However, the US seems to be sceptical of the essential facility rule and the US antitrust 
law has never justified the application of the essential facility rule to IPRs.48 It is even 
stated that if the essential facility rule were jettisoned and the general rule of refusal to deal 
were adjusted a little bit to fill any gap, the antitrust world would be better improved.49 It is 
believed by the US Supreme Court that even dominant undertakings may have the right to 
choose with whom they would like to deal and it should be very cautious in identifying 
exceptions.50 The Trinko decision of the Supreme Court placed rigorous limitations on 
future essential facility claims and ‘not many essential facility claims will survive these 
severe requirements’.51 In addition, the US Supreme Court held that the obligation to share 
assets may not comply with the purpose of the antitrust laws.52  On one hand, forced 
sharing will require price administration by the court to avoid the monopoly charges by the 
owner of the essential facility, which will turn the court into a kind of regulatory agency.53 
On the other hand, forced sharing will discourage other competitors or potential 
competitors to invest and develop alternative sources of supply, which is not consistent 
with the general antitrust goals.54 Therefore, it can be seen that the US antitrust authorities 
and courts are very cautious in supervising and regulating the refusal to deal. In particular, 
it is still a considerably contentious issue in the US as to how to deal with the refusal to 
license an IPR by a dominant undertaking from the view of the antitrust enforcement.  
The EU seems to hold a different view from the US. The essential facility rule is 
recognized in the EU competition law but has been applied very strictly in practice. 
Paragraphs 75-90 of the Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities in 
detail construe the approach and criteria in dealing with the refusal to supply, as well as the 
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refusal to license IPRs. 55  The Commission will regard the refusal as an enforcement 
priority if the following three conditions are satisfied: ‘(a) the refusal relates to a product or 
service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively on a downstream 
market; (b) the refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the 
downstream market; and (c) the refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm.’56 On one hand, 
the European Court of Justice kept a strict and conventional attitude in Renault57 and in 
Volvo v. Erik Veng.58 It is ruled that the refusal to license itself generally cannot constitute 
an abuse of a dominant position.59 This is for the reason that the enforced duty to grant a 
licence to third parties may impair the substance of the exclusive rights conferred by 
intellectual property laws.60 On the other hand, once the exceptional circumstances are 
satisfied, the application of Article 102 TFEU will impose an obligation to license on the 
relevant dominant undertaking. In considering the exceptional circumstances, the essential 
facility rule is applied to the IPRs. For instance, in both the Magill case61 and the IMS 
Health v NDC Health,62 the copyrights concerned were found essential for undertakings to 
develop a new product in the secondary market with a potential consumer demand; and the 
refusal to license these copyrights by the dominant undertakings in these two cases would 
exclude all the effective competition in the downstream market and damage consumer 
interests. Additionally, in the Microsoft case, the Court concluded that the necessary 
interoperability information should be available to the market on reasonable conditions 
because the interoperability information concerned is indispensable to be able to compete 
effectively on the downstream market.63 The refusal to license such information would 
eliminate all the effective competition in the secondary market.64 Moreover, the refusal 
might result in the restriction on technical development and give rise to detrimental effects 
on consumer interests. The cases addressed by the EU authorities as to the refusal to 
license an IPR by a dominant undertaking demonstrate the applicability and possibility of 
the essential facility rule in determining the exceptional circumstances to impose 
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compulsory licence on a dominant undertaking. However, it is also emphasized that 
cautious and strict requirements are needed in applying the essential facility rule to the 
refusal to license IPRs. 
Taking into account China’s own economic and legal circumstances, Article 7 of the SAIC 
Provisions adopts very similar approaches as the EU in coping with the abuse of 
dominance by refusing to license an IPR. Compared with the conditions listed in the 
Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities, 65  the standards for 
‘essential facility’ established in Article 7 of the Provisions seem to be more specific. They 
try to reduce the detrimental influence on licensors as much as possible that unreasonable 
harm caused by the forced sharing on the IPR owners is proscribed. However, Article 7 of 
the Provisions does not clearly articulate the application of the compulsory licensing in the 
Patent Law to the abuse of dominance by refusing to license. In this situation, the relevant 
parties have to first obtain an anti-monopoly decision of such abuse of dominance and then 
apply to a court for compulsory licensing by themselves (only if the IPR concerned is a 
patent). More convenience and certainty will be brought if the relevant anti-monopoly 
authorities can clearly state the relationship between the determination of the abuse of 
dominance by refusing to license and the application of compulsory licensing in their 
future integrated guidelines.  
In spite of many concerns on the adoption of the essential facility rule in the SAIC 
Provisions, the Chinese AMEAs are trying to adopt the best way or approach in 
accordance with the practical circumstances in China. Until now, there has not been a case 
settled in China on the abuse of dominance by refusing to license IPRs within the scope of 
Article 7 of the Provisions. It is submitted that the enforcement experience of the EU in 
this area should be taken as the basis and reference for China’s future anti-monopoly 
enforcement.  
5.4.3 The Abuse of Dominance by Imposing Unreasonable Conditions 
Article 17.5 of the AML generally prohibits the abuse of dominance by imposing 
unreasonable conditions on transactions. However, it does not construe what conditions or 
terms shall be determined as unreasonable within the scope of the AML, which leaves 
confusion in its application in practice. Article 10 of the SAIC Provisions to some extent 
                                                          





alleviates this confusion. It prohibits five specific unreasonable conditions in exercising 
IPRs by a dominant undertaking, namely requiring the exclusive grant-back of the 
improved technology, non-challenge to the validity of the IPRs, restricting the use of 
competing products or technologies without infringing the IPRs concerned after the expiry 
of the licensing agreement, continuing to exercise expired or invalid IPRs, and impeding 
the counterparties from dealing with third parties.66 Article 10 of the SAIC Provisions 
provides clear guidance to the anti-monopoly enforcement of the SAIC in determining the 
unreasonable conditions imposed by a dominant undertaking when exercising IPRs.  
However, in previous practice, most of the investigations concerning an abuse of 
dominance by imposing unreasonable conditions were handled by NDRC, such as the 
Qualcomm investigation discussed in Chapter 4. Even if the abuse of dominance is non-
price related, NDRC can exercise its enforcement power over the case as long as some of 
the investigated issues are falling within its responsibilities. Obviously, NDRC will not 
directly apply the rules of the SAIC and to what extent the SAIC Provisions can influence 
the enforcement of NDRC is hard to be seen. In this context, it is likely to obtain different 
enforcement results for similar conduct. For example, the dominant licensor is clearly 
prohibited from requiring the licensees to exclusively grant back their improved 
technology without justifiable reasons in the context of the SAIC Provisions; however, 
NDRC may not absolutely regard the exclusive grant-back requirement as an abuse of 
dominance violating the AML if considering the factors such as whether the dominant 
licensor obtained the exclusive grant-back on reasonable conditions, the importance of the 
improved technology on the relevant market, whether the incentives of the licensees to 
further innovate were substantially undermined and so on.  
Technically speaking, Article 10 of the Provisions forbids all kinds of exclusively granting 
back agreements without justifiable reasons, involving those both gratuitous and non-
gratuitous. Then, the confusion arises as to whether the grant-back term with reasonable 
compensation can be regarded as a justifiable condition to exclude such agreements from 
the application of Article 10.1of the SAIC Provisions. Though the reasonable 
compensation to some extent makes the exclusive grant-back term justifiable, within the 
meaning of Article 10 of the SAIC Provisions it currently seems not to be a decisive 
element. It is submitted that whether the exclusive grant-back term should be determined 
                                                          





as unjustifiable and be prohibited should be analysed on the basis of the rule of reason and 
take all the relevant elements into account.  
5.5 Patent Pool 
The beginning of Article 12 of the SAIC Provisions confirms the applicability of the 
prohibition in Articles 13 and 14 as well as the exemption in Article 15 of the AML to 
monopoly agreements among members of a patent pool.67 In addition, Article 12 of the 
SAIC Provisions identifies specific behaviour as constituting an abuse of dominance by the 
management organisation of a patent pool with a dominant position, namely restricting its 
members from licensing as an independent licensor outside the patent pool, restricting its 
members or licensees from developing competing technologies independently or jointly 
with third parties, requiring exclusive grant-back of the improved or developed technology, 
prohibiting licensees from challenging the validity of the patents in the pool, applying 
discriminatory treatment to its members or licensees who are on an equal footing and other 
kinds of abuse of dominance determined by the SAIC.68 This article provides certainty and 
predictability to both the patent pool itself and its members. At the same time, it provides 
some useful guidance on the enforcement of the SAIC in dealing with investigations 
concerning the abuse of dominance by a patent pool. These prohibitions are laid down 
pursuant to the duties of the SAIC, so they are all about non-price related behaviour. 
However, one of the most popular abusive behaviour of a patent pool is excessive pricing, 
such as happened in the DVD 6C case discussed in Chapter 2. In this situation, the current 
SAIC Provisions have nothing to do with the excessive pricing by a dominant patent pool.  
Compared to the practices of the US and the EU in supervising the behaviour of a patent 
pool, the SAIC Provisions establishes the control from the perspective of prohibitive 
conduct; while the US and the EU aim to provide guidance on what kind of conduct can be 
exempted from examination.69 This shows the different regulatory idea between different 
enforcement authorities in different countries. There seems not to be a best approach for all 
the countries as each country will have its own different circumstances; each country 
should adopt the most appropriate approach to meet its needs.   
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5.6 Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) 
SEPs have become a contentious issue in the global antitrust enforcement in recent years. 
The combination of a standard and a patent on one hand makes great contribution to the 
consumer and public interests, but on the other hand may give rise to serious anti-
competitive problems. Article 13 of the SAIC Provisions deals with the anti-competitive 
issues appearing in the process of setting and implementing standards and two kinds of 
typical anti-competitive practices are identified in Article 13.2 of the SAIC Provisions. 
Under Article 13.2, dominant undertakings, without justifiable reasons, are prohibited from 
engaging in the following actions that eliminate or restrict competition during the process 
of setting and implementing standards: (1) when participating in the standard setting 
process, deliberately not disclosing their rights information to the standard setting 
organization or expressly waiving their rights but claiming them against the implementers 
of the standards after its patent has been involved in the standard; or (2) after their patents 
become SEPs, violating the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) rules to 
engage in any conduct that eliminates or restricts competition, such as refusing to license, 
bundling or imposing other unreasonable trading conditions.70 Article 13.3 of the SAIC 
Provisions explains that a SEP is the indispensable patent to implement the standard 
concerned.71 In fact, Article 13 seeks to reduce patent ambushes which are caused by the 
failure to disclose rights information and by false promises in setting and formulating a 
standard; at the same time, it prohibits patentees from abusing their dominance obtained 
from the involvement of their patents into a standard.  
However, the wording in this article leaves some concerns as to its practical application. It 
can be seen that the dominance of the undertaking concerned is a premise for the 
application of Article 13 to relevant anti-competitive actions. This means that, Article 13 
will have no legal effect on the deliberate failure to disclose or the false promises to 
eliminate or restrict competition by a non-dominant participant in the process of 
formulating a standard, but who later becomes dominant in the relevant market because its 
patent has been adopted by the standard setting organisation.72 In this context, the non-
disclosure by the non-dominant patent owner in the standard setting process will fall 
outside of the scope of the AML even if the owner later becomes dominant. In most cases, 
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a patent owner may not have a strong market power before the patent is incorporated into a 
standard. However, the incorporation of the patent into a standard may significantly 
increase the owner’s market power.73 Article 13 does not consider the market power that 
results from a patent becoming a SEP. Bu (2016) argues that the scope of Article 13 should 
not be limited only to dominant undertakings but should also extend its scope to those non-
dominant undertakings who later become dominant as a consequence of the inclusion of 
their patents into a standard.74 
In addition, concerns are raised in the vague expression of FRAND rules in Article 13.2.2 
of the Provisions.75 The insertion of ‘FRAND rules’ here, without specific instructions, 
develops the confusion as to whether the anti-competitive practices by a dominant SEP 
owner, such as the refusal to license, tying-in or imposing other unreasonable conditions, 
should be examined under the general anti-monopoly analysis approach or under the 
unclear ‘FRAND rules’. 76  The Provisions neither explain what FRAND rules are nor 
clarify the relationship between the FRAND rules and competition rules. When it comes to 
SEPs and the FRAND rules, one of the most controversial issues that must be considered is 
whether the seeking of injunctions for SEPs should be regarded as an abuse of a dominant 
position and be prohibited by the AML. Since the abuse of the rights to seek injunctions 
for SEPs may have serious negative effects on competition, 77  China’s AMEAs have 
already paid attention to this field in their early anti-monopoly enforcement.78 However, it 
is difficult to keep a balance between the protection of a legal exercise of patent rights and 
the protection of fair competition. Until now, there has not been any rule adopted to 
regulate the seeking of injunctions by SEP owners from the perspective of anti-monopoly 
enforcement. Even the latest SAIC Provisions do not touch this problematic area. 
Therefore, it is necessary to make efforts to propose effective solutions to resolve the 
competition concerns caused by the injunctive relief by SEP owners and facilitate the anti-
monopoly enforcement in this area.79 
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5.7 Analysis Approach 
Articles 14-16 list the analysis approach and the factors that should be taken into account 
when the SAIC and its provincial counterparts examine the anti-competitive exercise of 
IPRs. These rules provide certainty and clear guidance on the anti-monopoly enforcement 
by the SAIC. 
5.8 Punishment  
Article 17 lays down the punishment by the SAIC to non-price related monopoly 
agreements and abuse of dominance when exercising IPRs, which is consistent with those 
in the AML. The maximum fine on the undertaking concerned is 10% of the sales achieved 
in the previous year. However, there is no clear guidance on the scope of the sales achieved 
in the previous year in either the AML or in the SAIC Provisions.80 Whether it refers to the 
global sales or the sales in a specific geography is also not identified. The Chinese AMEAs 
usually limit the sales achieved into a relevant geographic market in practice. For example, 
in the Qualcomm investigation81 the NDRC calculated the fine on the basis of the sales in 
China. Nevertheless, limiting the sales into a specific geography when calculating fines 
does not have enough deterrent effects on the giant companies like Qualcomm. 82 
Accordingly, it is submitted that Chinese AMEAs should adopt the international practice, 
like what has been done in the EU, to calculate the relevant fines on the basis of the global 
turnover.  
5.9 Conclusion  
The SAIC has devoted quite a lot of resources and time to developing specific rules to 
facilitate the anti-monopoly enforcement in the abuse of IPRs that may eliminate or restrict 
competition. The promulgation of the SAIC Provisions provides certainty and guidance to 
both the AMEAs and the undertakings owning IPRs. It is the first legal regulation in China 
dealing with the complicated and sensitive interface between the anti-monopoly 
enforcement and the protection of IPRs. The rules in the SAIC Provisions are greatly 
consistent with the international practices and simultaneously take into account of the 
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specific circumstances in China. It is acknowledged that the SAIC Provisions are a 
milestone in the development of the anti-monopoly enforcement in China.  
However, the adoption of the SAIC Provisions is the beginning but not the end of China’s 
anti-monopoly enforcement in respect of the abuse of IPRs. There is still uncertainty and 
confusion left in this contentious area. One of the most serious concerns is on the scope of 
the SAIC Provisions. All the rules in the SAIC Provisions are only applicable to non-price 
related monopoly agreements or non-price related abuse of dominance when undertakings 
exercise their IPRs. This is because the SAIC Provisions were established within the 
responsibilities of the SAIC itself. The problem then arises as to what effects the SAIC 
Provisions will have on the enforcement of the other two AMEAs, especially that of the 
NDRC. In terms of the refusal to license IPRs that eliminate or restrict competition, the 
Provisions do not set up a clear connection with the application of compulsory licensing in 
Patent Law. In addition, the SAIC Provisions do not provide any guidance on the 
conditions in which the seeking of injunctions by a dominant SEP owner will be 
determined as an abuse of dominance violating the AML. It is of great importance to keep 
a balance between the protection of IPRs and free competition when coping with this 
challenge. Moreover, the relationship between the SAIC Provisions and the future 
integrated IP-related anti-monopoly guidelines is another concern. There is no idea of 
whether the Provisions will be abolished or to what extent it can influence the enforcement 
of the newly established single and independent anti-monopoly enforcement authority—
SAMR. Whatever the situation is, the SAIC Provisions provide a good basis for the further 
integrated guidelines which will be adopted by the AMC. The final integrated IPRs 
guidelines should maintain the effective and meaningful rules established in the SAIC 
Provisions and provide specific guidance to those contentious and unresolved problems.83 
After analysing the relevant legal measures, the thesis will come to the functioning of 
China’s AMEAs in Chapter 6. 
                                                          




 Chinese Anti-monopoly Enforcement Authorities 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 has examined the only legal measure that is available to facilitate the application 
of China’s Anti-monopoly Law (AML) to the anti-competitive practices in the exercise of 
intellectual property rights. Although the SAIC Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse 
of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict Competition provide some guidance, 
the uncertainty and deficiencies of the Provisions hinder the effective application of the 
AML. In addition to detailed and clear guidelines, whether China’s AML can be 
effectively applied and achieve its original objectives depends on whether there is effective 
and efficient competition enforcement. In this chapter, China’s anti-monopoly enforcement 
structure will be discussed. 
China has adopted a two-level and tripartite administrative enforcement structure of its 
AML. On the surface, the boundaries and responsibilities are clearly defined by the 
enforcement powers of each of the three anti-monopoly enforcement authorities (AMEAs). 
However, the two-level and tripartite administrative enforcement structure inevitably 
results in conflicts and uncertainties amongst the AMEAs. The tripartite enforcement 
system leads to overlapping powers, different enforcement rules, low level of efficiency, 
insufficient specialized staff and even a lack of authority and independence. In addition, 
some relevant sectoral regulators under the State Council are empowered by various 
existing sectoral regulations to investigate anti-competitive practices falling within their 
scope. As a result, ambiguities and conflicts may also arise between the three AMEAs and 
the relevant sectoral regulators. Furthermore, the relationship between public enforcement 
and private enforcement is another serious problem waiting to be resolved. All of these 
indicate the ineffectiveness and inefficiency in enforcing China’s AML. 
The problems raised by the multi-authority are likely to be particularly harmful in the 
competition enforcement in the exercise of patent rights. Licensing agreements normally 
clarify the ways to exploit patent rights, the scope of the licence, the duration and other 
basic obligations. In order to protect the interests of the licensor and/or the licensee, some 
constraints are likely to be included in the licensing agreements, such as market sharing, 
restricting production, fixing prices and exclusive grant-back. These restrictions may be 
found to be anti-competitive in certain circumstances and such patent licensing agreements 




may trigger the responsibilities of more than one AMEA by involving both pricing and 
non-pricing issues. In addition, the specificity and complexity of competition enforcement 
in the exercise of patent rights will impose higher requirements on the relevant AMEA and 
aggravate the multi-authority problems. 
In the legislative process of adopting China’s AML, the advocacy to establish a single and 
independent high-level AMEA was not successful, and the multi-authority enforcement 
model has been maintained. This model is not a reasonable allocation of enforcement 
powers; neither is it useful in providing checks and balances between each AMEA. The 
two-level and tripartite enforcement structure is a compromise driven by political and 
economic factors. However, it has to be admitted that the two-level and tripartite 
enforcement system took into account the practicability at that time and made sure that the 
AML can be applied instantly.1 It was believed to be the best way within the context and 
circumstances of China at that time.2 
However, the multiple-authority model comes to an end and an independent single AMEA 
is finally established in 2018. On 13 March 2018, the Institutional Reform Plan of the State 
Council (the Plan) was submitted to the first session of the 13th National People’s Congress 
for deliberation and was formally passed on 17th March 2018. 3  In this Plan, a State 
Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) is newly set up to discharge the 
responsibilities of comprehensive market supervision and management, market entity 
registration, market order maintenance, anti-monopoly enforcement, etc. 4  The State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, and the China Food and Drug Administration will 
be dismantled and all their functions and responsibilities will be fully transferred to the 
SAMR. In addition, the anti-monopoly duties of the NDRC and MOFCOM will be 
divested and transferred to the SAMR. That is to say, the SAMR will become the only 
AMEA in China to deal with competition issues after the institutional reform. The anti-
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monopoly duties and functions of the three AMEAs will all be combined into a single 
centralised authority—SAMR.5 The Anti-monopoly Commission will be maintained but its 
work will now be done by the SAMR.  
The establishment of the SAMR can to a great extent resolve the problems caused by the 
multi-authority model in the anti-monopoly enforcement. However, there are still some 
serious issues which can impair the effective application of the AML, especially when the 
alleged anti-competitive conduct concerns the exercise of patent rights. The problems 
caused by the tripartite enforcement system can be regarded as a part of the basic reasons 
for the ineffective and not fully developed anti-monopoly enforcement in the area of IPRs. 
They are also an important part of the development of China’s anti-monopoly enforcement 
since 2008. In addition, the way in which the SAMR will discharge its anti-monopoly 
duties have not been published, such as the internal institution structure, the make-up of the 
relevant staff, the allocation of resources and the transition period. There may also need to 
be some amendments or revisions to the current legal rules. It will take time before the 
SAMR formally comes into operation. Therefore, the analysis and criticisms of the 
multiple-authority model in this thesis are still relevant and important in providing 
effective solutions to address competition issues in the exercise of IPRs. 
This chapter is primarily descriptive of the AMEAs’ general jurisdiction which applies to 
alleged anti-competitive practices in all fields of economic activities. Therefore, it is 
relevant also for the exercise of patent rights. Likewise, the problems facing the 
competition authorities arise in almost all industries and are not unique to matters related to 
the exercise of patent rights. As a consequence, much of the analysis and examination in 
the chapter is undertaken in a general manner, but it is necessary to provide this description 
given its relevance to the exercise of patent rights which is the focus of the thesis.  
This chapter will be divided into three main parts. The first part Section 6.2 will describe 
and introduce the two-level and tripartite enforcement framework in China; then, in 
Section 6.3, the problems that exist in China’s anti-monopoly enforcement system will be 
examined and analysed. Section 6.4 will conclude the chapter by identifying the problems 
which will be resolved by the establishment of the SAMR and the challenges that remain 
in respect of the anti-monopoly enforcement in the IP-related area. 
                                                          




6.2 The Institutional Framework of Chinese Anti-monopoly Enforcement 
During the legislative process of adopting China’s AML, the institutional framework of the 
anti-monopoly enforcement mechanism was the most contentious issue and the one most 
heavily debated.6 Different schools have different ideologies. The mainstream thinking led 
by academics Xiaoye Wang7 and Xianlin Wang8 was to establish a single and independent 
AMEA which was perceived practically and politically impossible at that time and was 
denied. As a result, China adopted a two-level and tripartite administrative enforcement 
structure. The arrangement maintained the pre-existing multi-authority enforcement model 
but a few changes were made. At the first level, a high-level consultative and coordinating 
organisation—the Anti-monopoly Commission (AMC) was created by China’s State 
Council in accordance with Article 9 of the AML. At the second level, the duties of 
implementing China’s AML are discharged by the three AMEAs, namely the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). 
The competition enforcement of China’s AML can be classified into public enforcement 
and private enforcement. The responsibilities for public enforcement are mainly born by 
the three AMEAs. In addition, some relevant sectoral regulations contain some 
competition-related articles and authorize the relevant sectoral regulators to investigate the 
anti-competitive practices within their authorities. However, the relevant sectoral 
regulators are not perceived as AMEAs according to the AML. The people’s courts are 
also empowered to hear private enforcement litigation.  
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6.2.1 The Institutional Arrangements for Public Enforcement 
 
Articles 9 and 10 of China’s AML confirm the basic administrative enforcement model of 
two levels—the AMC and the AMEAs.  
According to Article 9, the AMC’s responsibilities are limited to policy and guidance 
issues which include: ‘(1) studying and drafting policies on competition; (2) organizing 
investigation and assessment of competition on the market as a whole and publishing 
assessment reports; (3) formulating and releasing anti-monopoly guidelines; (4) 
coordinating administrative enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law; and (5) other duties 
as prescribed by the State Council.’9 Technically, the AMC can play a role of coordinator 
when overlapping powers or unclear boundaries arise in the enforcement work of the 
AMEAs. However, a high-level consultative and coordinating organisation, AMC does not 
have the power to engage in concrete competition enforcement. Although the AMC was 
created in accordance with the AML, it does not have a separate office. The office of the 
AMC is located within the Anti-monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM and its daily work is 
carried out by MOFCOM. 10  The AMC is headed by China’s Vice Premier and it is 
composed of the senior officials from 16 relevant ministries of the State Council, such as 
the NDRC, the SAIC, the MOFCOM, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry 
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and Information Technology.11 In addition, an advisory group of experts was set up by the 
AMC to provide consultative proposals. 
Article 10 of the AML articulates that the AMEAs at the national level are specified by 
China’s State Council. Where a need arises, the specified AMEAs can delegate their duties 
to the corresponding authorities at a provincial level to implement the AML.12 The State 
Council then confirmed that NDRC, SAIC and MOFCOM have parallel powers in 
competition enforcement. The boundaries of the enforcement powers of each of the three 
AMEAs are determined on the basis of the nature of the specific anti-competitive 
behaviour. NDRC is responsible for price-related anti-competitive behaviour, such as 
price-related restrictive agreements, price-related abuse of dominance and price-related 
administrative monopoly. 13  It is the Bureau of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly 
within the NDRC that specifically focuses on the anti-monopoly work.14 Pursuant to the 
NDRC Regulations on the Administrative Procedures for Law Enforcement against Price 
Fixing, NDRC generally authorizes the corresponding price control departments at 
provincial level to be responsible for the prohibition of price-related anti-competitive 
behaviour occurring within their respective administrative territories.15 SAIC is in charge 
of non-price-related anti-competitive practices such as non-price-related restrictive 
agreements, non-price-related abuse of dominance and non-price-related abuse of 
administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition.16 Within the SAIC, the Anti-
monopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau is set up to deal with anti-
competitive issues that fall within the scope of the SAIC.17 The SAIC Provisions on the 
Procedures for the Administrative Departments for Industry and Commerce to Investigate 
and Handle Cases of Monopolization Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Market Position 
further state that the SAIC may empower its provincial departments to investigate the anti-
competitive conduct that occurs or mainly occurs within their administrative regions.18 
However, the manner in which the SAIC delegates its enforcement power to provincial 
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departments is a little different from that of the NDRC. The NDRC authorizes generally, 
while the SAIC delegates on a case-by-case basis. Another AMEA is MOFCOM which 
alone is responsible for examining the concentration of undertakings in accordance with 
China’s AML. 19  It is the Anti-monopoly Bureau within the MOFCOM that is solely 
responsible for the competition enforcement activity.20 MOFCOM does not authorize local 
departments to investigate or handle merger control issues.  
Moreover, the AML confirms the right of parties to challenge the decisions of the three 
AMEAs. If the undertaking concerned is not satisfied with the decision made by 
MOFCOM and wish to challenge it, it must first apply for administrative review (this is a 
prerequisite of raising an administrative action against the MOFCOM decision); then if the 
party still disagrees with the result of an administrative review, it can initiate 
administrative litigation with a competent people’s court.21 If the undertaking concerned 
disagrees with the decisions taken by NDRC or by SAIC, it can choose either to apply for 
administrative review or to file an administrative appeal against their decisions (if the party 
first choose administrative review and is dissatisfied with the result, it can then still bring 
an administrative appeal against the decisions taken by NDRC or SAIC).22 
Prior to the 2008 AML, there had been some competition-related rules provided in the 
relevant sectoral regulations or measures to control anti-competitive practices and most of 
them are still in effect even after the AML was adopted. As a result, in addition to the three 
AMEAs specified by the State Council, some relevant sectoral regulators can enjoy 
concurrent enforcement jurisdiction if the anti-competitive behaviour concerns their 
respective sectors. However, China’s AML does not explain the relationship between the 
AMEAs and the relevant sectoral regulators in terms of competition enforcement powers. 
Neither are the relevant sectoral regulators perceived as AMEAs according to laws or 
regulations.  Therefore, it is still confusing as to which agency will be in charge of the anti-
competitive conduct that falls within the responsibilities of both an AMEA and a sectoral 
regulator.  
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6.2.2 The Institutional Arrangements for Private Enforcement 
 
The other way to implement China’s AML is by private enforcement. Article 50 of China’s 
AML confirms that the undertakings that engage in anti-competitive conduct which has 
caused losses to others shall bear the corresponding civil liability.23 In 2012, the Supreme 
People’s Court published the Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of 
Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Arising from Monopolistic Conduct (the Supreme 
People’s Court Provisions).24 The document further elaborates, inter alias, the standing of 
plaintiffs in civil anti-monopoly cases, the relevant burden of proof, and the statute of 
limitations. The document provides guidance to the parties who suffer losses caused by 
anti-competitive behaviour on how to bring an action for civil damages. Moreover, the 
Supreme People’s Court Provisions confirm the jurisdiction of the relevant Intermediate 
People’s Courts for the first instance litigation in civil anti-monopoly cases. These cases 
are usually complex and have an important impact, some of which concern intellectual 
property rights (IPRs). As a result, these anti-monopoly cases are assigned to the IP 
tribunals within the relevant Intermediate People’s Courts.25   
The AML itself does not specify the nature of the AMEAs but confers this power on the 
State Council. It is the State Council that later confirmed the status of the NDRC, the SAIC 
and the MOFCOM as AMEAs.26  The current anti-monopoly enforcement structure, to 
some extent, contributes to the efficiency and quality of China’s competition enforcement 
work. The tripartite enforcement system may create a degree of competition between 
different AMEAs, which can promote incentives for each AMEA to be efficient in their 
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enforcement procedures and benefit the public.27 The three AMEAs influence each other 
and reinforce their competition enforcement work. For example, the active role played by 
the MOFCOM in merger control review puts pressure on the other two AMEAs. 28 
Furthermore, since 2013, the SAIC began to publish its anti-monopoly sanction decisions 
in full which placed pressure on the NDRC to develop more transparent competition 
enforcement; indeed, the NDRC began to publish since September 2014 some of its 
sanction decisions. 29  The tripartite structure to some extent decentralizes competition 
enforcement power and avoids the negative and ineffective enforcement and corruption 
often caused by monopolistic power of a centralized agency.30 Moreover, the separation of 
competition enforcement powers amongst the agencies enables relevant AMEAs to 
develop and accumulate a high degree of expertise specializing in certain areas or 
industries.31 This means that the limited enforcement resources have the possibility to be 
allocated more efficiently. Thus, competition enforcement is expected to be greatly 
improved.  
6.3 Existing Problems in the Anti-monopoly Enforcement Structure 
Although the two-level and tripartite anti-monopoly enforcement system has its own 
advantages, the structure inevitably gives rise to serious problems when it comes to 
enforcement. This section will focus on the following enforcement issues: legal bases, 
conflicts between the AMEAs, the role of the AMC, the relationship between the AMEAs 
and sectoral regulators, public and private enforcement and the lack of independence, 
professionalism and transparency.  
6.3.1 Confusion as to the Legal Bases of the Competition Enforcement of 
the Three AMEAs 
The promulgation of China’s AML to a great extent alleviates the problems of scattered 
and fragmented competition-related rules before 2008 and establishes unified principles.32 
However, the AML does not abolish the pre-existing competition rules to be found in other 
laws or regulations, neither does it clarify the relationship between the new AML and the 
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pre-existing competition rules. Although China’s Legislation Law provides some guidance 
on the hierarchy of Chinese legal measures, conflicts and uncertainties do exist. According 
to the principles set out in China’s Legislation Law, in a situation of conflicts, laws prevail 
over other legal measures; new laws prevail over old ones; and special rules prevail over 
general ones.33 In this context, the AML adopted by People’s Congress will prevail in most 
conflicting cases.  
However, nothing can prohibit the application of the previous competition rules if they are 
applied in a way consistent with China’s AML. To some extent, this leads to uncertainty to 
both AMEAs and undertakings. On one hand, the AMEAs will be uncertain as to which 
law shall be invoked as the legal basis for the sanction decision without relevant 
interpretations, though in recent NDRC decisions they are mainly based on the AML. 
Sometimes, invoking different legal bases means different determinations on the nature of 
the conduct concerned. For instance, the rules on working collaboratively to control market 
price, predatory pricing and discriminative pricing in the Price Law may overlap with the 
rules managing the restrictive agreements and the abuse of dominance in the AML. These 
practices probably appear in the licensing agreements of patent rights. In some situations, 
the price-related conduct will be illegal under the examination by the Price Law; however, 
within the reasonable analysis of an individual investigation by the AML, the same 
conduct may not impair competition seriously and thus be excluded from the sanction by 
the AML.34 On this occasion, the NDRC should take into account the relevant factors 
comprehensively when exercising its discretion to take a reasonable decision, given it is 
not feasible to determine mechanically here that the AML will prevail over the Price 
Law.35 
On the other hand, the concerned undertakings will be uncertain as to which law they 
should consider when assessing their anti-monopoly compliance and what kind of role 
other rules play in anti-monopoly investigations. This increases the burden on undertakings. 
An example will be given in the context of fines. The NDRC can fine an undertaking for 
conducting price fixing no more than five times its illegal gains under the Price Law36 and 
the Provisions on the Administrative Punishment of Price-related Violation (provisions 
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adopted to facilitate the application of the Price Law)37 as long as the fine does not exceed 
the one required by the AML; while under the AML, the fine imposed on price fixing shall 
be between one to ten per cent of the previous year’s sale revenues.38 This means that there 
are different bases and methods under different laws to calculate the fine imposed for the 
same anti-competitive conduct established by the same AMEA. Which method will prevail 
in practice is hard to predict and totally depends on the choice of the relevant AMEA. Even 
if the two legal measures impose the same amount of a fine on the anti-competitive 
practice of an industrial association, NDRC chose to invoke the Provisions on the 
Administrative Punishment of Price-related Violation, instead of the AML, as the legal 
basis in a price fixing case.39 In addition, in a price cartel case, the NDRC invoked all the 
Price Law, the Provisions on the Administrative Punishment of Price-related Violation and 
the AML.40 Considerable doubts arise as to the legal bases of the NDRC competition 
enforcement in this case.  
Besides, after the confirmation that there would be three AMEAs, they respectively 
published some their own regulations to facilitate their competition enforcement. Each of 
the three AMEAs only discharges its duties in accordance with its own rules and is not 
responsible for the regulations published by other AMEAs. This aggravates the confusion 
and uncertainty as to the legal bases for competition enforcement.  
This uncertainty is particularly noticeable in the exploitation of patent rights. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, there are rules pre-2008 applicable to the anti-competitive practices in the 
exercise of patent rights, ranging from principled rules in basic laws to rules focusing on 
specific areas. Although Article 55 confirms the applicability of China’s AML to IP-
related anti-competitive practices, it does not clarify the status of previous rules on 
competition enforcement. Additionally, in consideration of the complexity of patent rights, 
the anti-competitive practices in the exercise of patent rights may trigger the 
responsibilities of more than one AMEA in one investigation. Which legal measures will 
be relied on as the legal bases will depend on which AMEA is carrying out the 
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investigation. For example, the SAIC has adopted Provisions on the Prohibition of the 
Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict Competition as one of its 
legal bases to regulate the anti-competitive exercise of IPRs; while the NDRC does not 
adopt such rules.41 Accordingly, the uncertainty faced by patent rights owners in terms of 
legal bases in competition enforcement is not only from the various scattered rules but also 
from the practices within the three AMEAs. Thus, the scope and sources of the uncertainty 
are much wider and complicated.  
The problems that emerge from the legal bases of competition enforcement will reduce to a 
significant extent the deterrent role of the AML and may increase the burden and pressure 
on the undertakings concerned. Multiple parallel legal bases for competition enforcement 
will discourage the implementation of China’s AML and delay its further promotion and 
development. Additionally, it will disadvantage the consolidated competition enforcement 
all around China. As a consequence, the uncertainties in the legal bases of competition 
enforcement will form an inner obstacle within the anti-monopoly enforcement system to 
effectively implement the AML and finally give rise to negative influence on fair market 
competition. 
6.3.2 The Overlap and Conflict between the Three AMEAs 
As stated above, there seems to be clear boundaries between the competition enforcement 
powers of each of China’s three AMEAs and exclusive domains have been allocated to 
them. However, the enforcement responsibilities of the three AMEAs are based on the 
nature of the specific anti-competitive conduct which inevitably leads to overlapping 
powers and gives rise to frictions. These frictions may result in the ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency of competition enforcement in China and, simultaneously, cause confusion 
and uncertainties to undertakings under investigation. The burden and pressure on 
undertakings to comply with the AML may be increased. There is also a possibility that the 
overlapping jurisdiction may lead to institution rivalry over important and influential cases, 
and to non-action over trivial cases.  
This is particularly harmful in the exploitation of patent rights. Normally, the grant of 
patents will encourage innovation, strengthen the incentive for original research and 
                                                          




development and then stimulate competition.42 The licensing of patent rights facilitates the 
dissemination of technologies and promotes economic efficiency which, in the majority 
cases, is pro-competitive. 43  It is acknowledged that patent licensing will benefit the 
licensor, the licensee, the consumer and society by sharing costs and risk, broadening the 
reach of patent and generating revenue, increasing market penetration, reducing costs, 
improving efficiency and obtaining competitive advantages.44 Therefore, the exercise of 
patent rights will only be controlled by competition law in very exceptional and special 
circumstances where it restricts or eliminates market competition. In these circumstances, 
licensing agreements can probably involve some restrictive terms or conditions of pricing 
issues, non-pricing issues, dominant issues or a combination of all of them.45 Such patent 
licensing agreements may fall within the enforcement jurisdiction of more than one AMEA 
and will have more potential to induce the jurisdiction problems between multiple 
authorities. In addition, the specificity and complexity of the exercise of patent rights will 
require that the relevant AMEA have professional staff to undertake high quality 
competition enforcement, which will to some extent aggravate the multi-authority 
problems.  
The problems and uncertainty caused by the two-level and tripartite enforcement structure 
may not only impact on the application of China’s AML to regulate anti-competitive 
practices in the exercise of patent rights, but may also impair the positive role of patent 
rights. On one hand, negative competition enforcement will diminish the deterrence of 
China’s AML. It can discourage parties from observing the AML, encourage patent owners 
to exercise their patent rights beyond the legal scope of the patent and, consequently, 
distort competition. On the other hand, excessive competition enforcement will create too 
much deterrence on patent owners, unduly intervene in the exploitation of patent rights and 
reduce innovation in the market. In addition, in China, there has not been an authority or 
organisation appointed to specifically handle anti-competitive practices in the exercise of 
patent rights. Therefore, it is necessary to consider an effective enforcement mechanism for 
matters related to the exercise of patent rights. 
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6.3.2.1 The Overlaps between NDRC and SAIC 
The relationship between NDRC and SAIC is particularly relevant. The boundary of the 
jurisdiction between NDRC and SAIC depends on whether the conduct is price-related. 
However, price-related anti-competitive conduct usually co-exists with non-price-related 
conduct. For instance, undertakings may fix prices by an agreement and simultaneously 
restrict the amount of goods and the share of the market in the same agreement. Moreover, 
undertakings may abuse their dominant position by both charging excessive prices and 
unjustifiably tying-in products. Some practical example investigations are displayed in the 
following table, which are solely undertaken and concluded by the NDRC but concern both 
price and non-price related anti-competitive behaviour.  





• Abuse of dominance by charging unfair 
high patent royalty fees; 
• Abuse of dominance by tying standard 
essential patents with non-standard 
essential patents 
• Abuse of dominance by imposing 
unreasonable conditions 
Subparagraphs 1 and 5, 





• Reach and implement the restrictive 
agreement to fix price 
• Reach and implement the restrictive 
agreement to divide the relevant market 
Subparagraphs 1 and 3, 





• Reach and implement the restrictive 
agreement to fix price 
• Reach and implement the restrictive 
agreement to divide the relevant market 
Subparagraphs 1 and 3, 





• Reach and implement the restrictive 
agreement to fix price 
• Reach and implement the restrictive 
agreement to joint boycott transactions 
Subparagraphs 1 and 5, 
Paragraph 1 of Article 13 of 
China’s AML47 
Moreover, a 2010 NDRC announcement published made the allocation of enforcement 
powers between NDRC and SAIC even more ambiguous. A provincial NDRC office, the 
Hubei Province Price Bureau, investigated an undertaking for the alleged abuse of 
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dominance by unjustifiable bundling.48 The provincial office suspended the investigation 
by accepting commitments offered from the undertaking concerned. 49  Pursuant to the 
division of enforcement duties, there is no doubt that the SAIC has sole jurisdiction over 
purely non-price-related bundling; however, in this investigation, it was the NDRC’s 
provincial bureau that led the investigation and took the suspension decision. There was no 
further announcement to clarify why NDRC instead of SAIC dealt with an investigation of 
abuse of dominance by non-price-related bundling. Neither did SAIC respond. Therefore, 
doubts arise as to whether the AMEAs will always act within the scope of their own 
enforcement competences.50  
As a consequence, anti-competitive practices in one investigation may trigger the 
responsibilities of more than one AMEA. In this situation, if both NDRC and SAIC are 
involved in the same investigation, and separately responsible, there is a waste of 
enforcement resources and an increase of enforcement costs. For instance, in December 
2014 the SAIC authorized its provincial department in Chongqing to initiate an 
investigation on QingYangYaoYe, a pharmaceutical undertaking and concluded in October 
2015 that the undertaking had abused its dominance by refusing to deal and so violated the 
AML.51 Then, NDRC opened a file in October 2015 to investigate QingYangYaoYe and 
three other pharmaceutical companies for the same series of practices. The NDRC 
concluded that they had been parties to a restrictive agreement to fix prices and to divide 
the relevant market, which was prohibited by Article 13 of the AML. 52  In fact, both 
investigations involved QingYangYaoYe concerning the same anti-competitive practices. 
However, they were investigated by different AMEAs with no further guidance or 
instructions for the public. As Blumenthal has commented, multiple enforcement agencies 
give rise to ‘duplication of effort, at least to some degree, and duplication of fixed costs.’53 
Even if the AMEAs can themselves coordinate their overlapping jurisdiction, without clear 
instructions, the consequences are unpredictable. Likewise, in the US, the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
have concurrent antitrust enforcement powers. In order to avoid conflicts, these two 
agencies have established a clearance mechanism. Even so, cooperation between the DOJ 
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and the FTC can be costly and the compliance costs borne by undertakings can also 
increase.54 It has been pointed out that ‘clearance disputes impose substantial costs in a 
small but meaningful number of mergers.’55 To some extent, the Chinese AMEAs may 
suffer similar problems as the US agencies which are caused by multiple enforcement 
agencies, though the problems are not necessarily in the same enforcement areas. 
In addition, if the anti-competitive practices in one investigation fall within both the scope 
of the NDRC and the scope of the SAIC and they only settle the issues from their own 
respect, negative enforcement will appear and the deterrence of the AML will be badly 
influenced. It has been stated that in an investigation led by Anhui Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (one of the SAIC’s provincial departments) in 2016 on Sunyard 
System Engineering Company and other two companies, 56  there should have been an 
investigation of three agreements at issue, a horizontal agreement to fix prices and the 
other two related to the division of relevant sales market and of the raw material market.57 
However, the SAIC’s provincial department only dealt with one horizontal monopolistic 
agreement to divide the relevant sales market and left the other two alleged restrictive 
agreements unresolved. There was no further action taken by either the SAIC or the NDRC 
as far as the other two kinds of alleged restrictive agreements were concerned. 
Consequently, it can be seen from this example that the anti-monopoly enforcement in this 
case was not fully developed and there were still some anti-competitive practices being left 
to threaten the fair competition in the relevant market. To a great extent, this kind of 
situation is raised by the overlapping jurisdiction between the SAIC and the NDRC. 
Until now, there has been no guidance provided to manage the situation in which NDRC 
and SAIC have concurrent competition enforcement powers over an investigation. It is 
sometimes rumoured that in practice an AMEA can exercise its enforcement power over 
anti-competitive conduct as long as some of the conduct falls within its responsibility. 
Once one of the AMEAs accepts the complaint, the other AMEAs should refuse to 
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investigate the same complaint.58 However, it is not clear to how to define ‘the same 
complaint’. Sometimes, different complaints may focus on different alleged anti-
competitive practices, but they appear in the same situation. In addition, if complainants do 
not inform the relevant AMEAs in advance, it is hard for them to know that more than one 
AMEA is investigating the case.59 As a consequence, it poses a risk that the overlapping 
jurisdiction will enable both NDRC and SAIC to strive for the leading role or to deny 
jurisdiction.60 From another aspect, it is generally admitted that in practice, owing to the 
specific circumstances in China, the NDRC usually has priority in competition 
enforcement where there is overlapping jurisdiction. This seems to make the anti-
monopoly enforcement in China even more confusing and ambiguous. 
When overlaps arise, which AMEA can conduct the investigation should be determined on 
the basis of the objective factors such as expertise and staff availability. This would have 
been the appropriate way to resolve the jurisdiction problem when there are multiple 
enforcement authorities. What is going on with the clearance procedures between the DOJ 
and the FTC in the US can provide good guidance. However, the allocation of enforcement 
powers on the basis of whether the conduct is price-related is neither wise nor appropriate. 
The coordination of AMEAs’ overlapping jurisdictions does not constitute an effective 
system and it lacks transparency, which is mystifying for both the AMEAs and the 
undertakings concerned.   
This risk is especially presented in the area of patent licensing. The most common anti-
competitive practices when exercising patent rights are fixing prices, dividing the market, 
limiting production, refusing to license, tying-in, charging excessive patent royalties, 
exclusive grant-back, non-challenge clauses and patent pools. The exercise of patent rights 
is normally achieved through licensing agreements. On one hand, the licensing of patent 
rights will facilitate the diffusion of technologies and contribute to economic efficiency; on 
the other hand, it allows patent owners to get some monetary rewards for their risks and 
investments in the research and development. Accordingly, when licensing agreements are 
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related to conduct that eliminates or restricts competition, they probably contain more than 
one restriction, which can be both price and non-price related. Taking into account the 
complexity of patent rights, the conflicts of jurisdiction between the two AMEAs seem to 
be more prominent in patent-related investigations. For example, the Qualcomm 
investigation in China, which involved the abuse of dominance by charging excessive 
royalty fees, by bundling standard essential patents with non-standard essential patents and 
by imposing unjustifiable conditions, was carried out by the NDRC and not by the SAIC.61 
In fact, both the NDRC and the SAIC had jurisdiction over the Qualcomm investigation 
pursuant to their respective anti-monopoly competences. It is rumoured that the Qualcomm 
investigation was first initiated by the SAIC, then transferred to the NDRC, and concluded 
by the NDRC. However, no official announcement was released to explain the manner in 
which both authorities were involved. There was also no official explanation to clarify why 
it was the NDRC but not the SAIC that carried out the Qualcomm investigation or how 
these two AMEAs coordinated or transferred the investigations. Uncertainties, therefore, 
exist in the sensitive area of patent rights licensing. 
Furthermore, where the alleged anti-competitive practices are non-price-related in the light 
of its content, but they are price-related in terms of their final purpose, the situation seems 
to be even more uncertain. For example, a restriction on the output of products in an 
agreement can be perceived as non-price-related because it does not directly fix the price. 
However, the restriction can be regarded as price-related in terms of its indirect influence 
on the price.62 The same analysis may also apply to the introduction of a joint boycott. This 
kind of analysis gives rise to doubts from another perspective that have already appeared in 
some investigations. For example, the NDRC has penalized three pharmaceutical 
undertakings for their achieving and implementing a restrictive agreement to eliminate 
competition by fixing prices and boycotting.63 In the NDRC decision, it concluded that the 
purpose of the conduct of boycotting was to exclude other competitors in the relevant 
market and then to increase the price.64 This seems to mean that the boycotting conduct in 
this case is a way to achieve the aim of increasing the price, so it should be investigated by 
the NDRC. However, according to the allocated enforcement powers, the SAIC should 
have the concurrent power to investigate this case owing to the restrictive conduct of 
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boycotting. It is hard to predict whether the NDRC has handled the whole investigation 
and put forward a conclusion for the consideration of the indirect influence on price of 
joint boycott. If so, the NDRC would have the discretion to decide by itself whether it will 
control the investigation. Given the lack of clear guidance, the potential tension between 
the NDRC and the SAIC seems to be grave.  
Under the logics set up in the NDRC’s decision on boycotting mentioned above, the SAIC 
should be able to be in charge of an investigation on price-related conduct if this conduct is 
regarded as a leverage to achieve the final non-price-related purpose. Here will take the 
refusal to deal as an example. Basically, the refusal to deal falls within the scope of the 
SAIC. In order to refuse to deal, undertakings may deliberately propose unacceptable 
conditions, including requiring excessive price, to force the other party to give up the 
transaction.65 In this scenario, increasing price is not the real purpose, but the way to 
achieve the refusal to deal. Xu believes that it is the main purpose of the conduct 
concerned that should be emphasized and considered when allocating the overlapping 
jurisdictions.66 However, according to Article 13 of Provisions against Price Fixing, this 
kind of refusal to deal should be managed by the NDRC. Article 13 articulates that 
dominant undertakings should not refuse to deal in a disguised form by requiring excessive 
sale price or extremely low purchasing price.67 Then, it comes to the conflict of jurisdiction 
between the NDRC and the SAIC. It seems to be that as long as the relevant enforcement 
authority is willing to take the investigation, they can do that. The allocation standard of 
whether the conduct is price-related or not seems not to function effectively as it should be. 
This confusion may also lessen the advantageous effect brought by the decentralisation of 
enforcement powers that a high degree of expertise specializing in certain areas or 
industries can be developed. In terms of the exercise of patent rights, it is much more 
doubtful whether the competition enforcement will be effectively undertaken without a 
clear and strong standard. 
6.3.2.2 The Potential for Enforcement Rules to Diverge 
In addition, there is a danger of potential divergent enforcement rules being applied in 
similar cases. This is undesirable as it gives rise to legal uncertainty for market operators. 
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In particular, when multiple AMEAs have discretion, the risk of different enforcement 
results is increased. Different AMEAs with overlapping enforcement powers may deviate 
from each other on how to interpret and implement the AML.68 It has even been contended 
that multiple AMEAs can lead to inconsistent antitrust policies, impose additional pressure 
on undertakings and finally undermine the fairness and efficiency of competition 
enforcement.69  
There is a risk that the application of different rules may lead to different outcomes on 
similar practices. Like most competition law regimes, the Chinese AML stipulates rules of 
principle and then leaves it to the AMEAs themselves to adopt specific guidelines or 
regulations to facilitate the enforcement process. Accordingly, the three Chinese AMEAs 
respectively publish their own separate regulations on their enforcement policy. Each 
AMEA conforms only to its own rules and is not liable for the rules adopted by the other 
AMEAs. In this context, there is a substantial risk that the AMEAs may adopt different 
enforcement rules which are then applied to similar practices. For example, Article 46.2 of 
the AML articulates a leniency policy which enables the penalty imposed on the 
undertaking that first reports the existence of a restrictive agreement and provides material 
evidence to a relevant AMEA, to be mitigated or immune at the AMEAs’ discretion.70 
Both the NDRC and the SAIC specify this policy in their individual regulations, but there 
are differences. It is stated by the NDRC that the first undertaking which contacts the 
NDRC with the relevant information, and provides important evidence, may be exempted 
from punishment.71 Other reporters can be given a reduction of the punishment by more 
than or less than 50%, in the light of different situations.72 Pursuant to SAIC’s provisions, 
the same exemption is granted to the first reporter.73 However, the SAIC, unlike the NDRC, 
does not adopt a threshold of 50% for other reporters, and the reduction of the punishment 
is on the basis of specific situations at the SAIC’s discretion. 74  In addition, SAIC’s 
Provisions on the Procedures for the Administrative Departments for Industry and 
Commerce to Investigate and Handle Cases of Monopolization Agreements and Abuse of 
Dominant Market Position, stipulate that their leniency policy shall not be applicable to the 
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main offender of the restrictive agreement.75 While, the NDRC does not include such a rule 
in their regulations. Moreover, in determining ‘the other concerted conduct’, the SAIC’s 
Provisions for the Industry and Commerce Administrations on the Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Agreements list three elements to be considered: consistency of the conduct 
of the undertakings; intentions and information exchange; and reasonable explanations.76 
However, NDRC’s Provisions against Price Fixing only state the first two elements and so 
do not take reasonable explanations into account.77  These two examples of differences 
show the risk of the divergent enforcement rules. Under these circumstances, one single 
investigation may have two different outcomes if dealt with by different AMEAs. The 
undertakings have to face different legal obligations and the compliance costs may be 
considerably increased. 
Different enforcement rules may also result in selective reports or complaints of anti-
competitive conduct. For instance, the undertakings that would like to benefit from the 
leniency policy may prefer to report to the NDRC who has a much clearer and assured 
reduction standard on fines than the SAIC. Divergent enforcement rules may achieve 
different conclusions of facts and lead to likely different outcomes of similar conduct. The 
lack of uniformity in the enforcement rules of multiple AMEAs may result in undertakings 
wrongly believing that their conduct is not anti-competitive.  
In particular, the AML leaves significant discretion to the three AMEAs in several aspects. 
Without unified instructions, AMEAs may reach different conclusions in similar 
investigations on the determination of a dominant position, on an abuse of dominance, on 
the amount of a fine, etc., which can result in inefficient and unfair competition 
enforcement. For instance, the AML provides that a fine can be imposed ranging from 1% 
to 10% of the sales revenues in the preceding year.78 The final amount of a fine is at the 
discretion of the AMEA handling the investigation. However, the AML does not prescribe 
which year should be regarded as the ‘previous year’ when calculating a fine. The previous 
year can mean either the one before the year in which an AMEA decided to open a file or 
the one before the year in which an administrative decision was made. Such uncertainty 
can result in the confusion to the public and, indeed, this problem has already arisen. For 
example, in 2011 the NDRC investigated horizontal agreements signed by some Japanese 
bearing manufacturing companies. In 2014 these agreements were found to be anti-
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competitive and fines were imposed which were calculated on the basis of the 2013 sale 
figures.79 Similarly, in 2013, the NDRC initiated an investigation of Qualcomm and in 
2015 adopted a decision imposing a fine, but the fine was based on the 2013 sale figures.80 
Moreover, in 2015 the NDRC investigated four pharmaceutical companies for being 
parties to an alleged horizontal restrictive agreement. The investigation ended in 2016 with 
fines being imposed based on 2014 figures.81 It can be seen from these examples that even 
if the cases were investigated by the same AMEA, divergent enforcement appeared. The 
situation may be particularly confusing when the unclear reference of the ‘previous year’ is 
compounded with the discretional proportion of the fine. It is also not clear whether the 
sale revenues should be calculated globally or in a specific geographical area. Thus, it is 
important to ensure an even playing field.  
The AMC has appointed the NDRC which drafted two sets of guidelines in 2016: the draft 
Guidelines for Application of the Leniency Regime to Cases of Horizontal Monopoly 
Agreements 82  and the draft Guidelines on Recognizing the Illegal Gains Obtained by 
Business Operators from Monopolistic Acts and Determining the Amount of Fines. 83 
These two sets of guidelines aim to unify the enforcement standards and rules of the 
different AMEAs in the application of leniency policy and in the calculation of fines. If 
they are finally adopted by the AMC, the risk of divergent enforcement in these areas will 
be much reduced. 
As far as IP-related issues are concerned, the situation is even more problematic as not 
only the general, but also the specific enforcement rules, diverge. The SAIC is the only 
AMEA to date that has adopted an IP-related anti-monopoly measure. The SAIC 
Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or 
Restrict Competition (the SAIC IP Provisions) came into effect on 1 August 2015.84 The 
SAIC IP Provisions are only binding on the SAIC. Any effect on the other two AMEAs is 
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unknown. However, in principle, the other two AMEAs are not concerned with the SAIC 
IP Provisions. That means, the alleged anti-competitive practices in the exercise of patent 
rights involving both price-related and non-price related conduct may be treated differently 
by the NDRC and the SAIC. For example, the SAIC IP Provisions provide specific 
explanations on what constitutes an abuse of dominance by imposing unreasonable 
conditions in the exercise of IPRs, while to what extent NDRC will consider these 
circumstances is hard to be predicted.85 In addition, the benefits of the SAIC IP Provisions 
are not available to undertakings investigated by NDRC.86 Although the NDRC has not 
adopted its own IP-related anti-monopoly regulation, the SAIC and the NDRC had, at the 
request of the AMC, drafted separately and submitted two sets of anti-monopoly guidelines 
on IPRs for public comment (the 2016 SAIC draft IPRs guidelines87 and the 2015 NDRC 
IPRs draft guidelines88).  
Neither draft guidelines have been yet formally adopted by the AMC. However, the 
differences in the two documents clearly reveal the potential divergent enforcement in the 
IP area, or at least show their different enforcement policy, even though unified IP-related 
guidelines will be adopted finally by the AMC. For example, both the SAIC IP Provisions 
and the NDRC draft IPRs guidelines include a safe harbour rule, but they adopt different 
thresholds.89 Additionally, in defining the relevant market, the SAIC draft IPRs guidelines 
adopt the concept of relevant innovation market, but the NDRC draft IPRs guidelines do 
not mention this definition. It is acknowledged that matters concerning IPRs are 
complicated, so the proposed competition enforcement rules are full of challenges.  
In March 2017, after collecting public comment on the two draft guidelines, the AMC 
released unified draft IPRs guidelines for public comments (the AMC draft IPRs 
guidelines).90 Compared to the NDRC and SAIC drafts, the AMC draft IPRs guidelines are 
much more principled and leave significant discretion to the AMEAs. Combined with the 
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special characteristics of the exercise of patent rights, too much discretion can result in 
uncertainties and unfairness in competition enforcement. As a consequence, divergent 
enforcement may still exist and the predictability and the deterrence of the AML in 
regulating the anti-competitive exercise of IPRs will be reduced. 
6.3.3 The Ineffectiveness of the Anti-monopoly Commission                                         
Although the creation of the AMC has been regarded as positive, it does not play an 
important coordination role as expected. According to the AML, the AMC is under the 
control of the State Council but it is quite different from the other ministries controlled by 
the State Council. As already stated, the AMC cannot be regarded as an AMEA and has no 
power to engage in direct competition enforcement. Neither does it have independent 
support staff. Its daily work is carried out by MOFCOM. On the basis of these factors, the 
role of the AMC to ‘coordinate administrative enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law’ has 
not been fully developed.91 
The AMC’s lack of specific powers means it lacks authority. Owing to the strong powers 
of each AMEA, any proposal of the AMC to coordinate conflict between each AMEA is of 
minor importance. The AMC does not provide guidance as to the overlapping competences 
of the three AMEAs and has not established an allocation or transfer mechanism between 
the AMEAs. Although there are cases concerning overlapping powers of the AMEAs, no 
reports or announcements have been released as to whether the AMC may intervene and 
coordinate. When the AML first came into effect, the lawyer Zhengwei Dong complained 
of Microsoft’s alleged anti-competitive practices to all the three AMEAs and suggested 
that the three AMEAs should initiate an anti-monopoly investigation on Microsoft. 92 
MOFCOM replied first and stated that the complaint had been transferred to the relevant 
department inside the MOFCOM; however, Zhengwei Dong later received a formal letter 
from MOFCOM stating that the complaint concerned did not fall within the competence of 
MOFCOM since its role is a merger control reviewer, and suggested that Dong contact the 
other two AMEAs.93 It was satisfying that MOFCOM replied instantly, but at the same 
time it exposed the inefficiency of the AMC as a coordinator for competition enforcement. 
An undertaking had to complain to each of the three AMEAs. Dong argued that the AMC 
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should make full use of its coordinating competence and clarify the relevant 
responsibilities between the three AMEAs. 94  
In addition, the AMC does not play a critical role in unifying competition enforcement 
rules. It has done little to coordinate the discretion exercised by each AMEA to ensure that 
competition enforcement is reasonably consistent. Neither does the AMC provide 
constructive or effective advice as to how to facilitate the concurrent jurisdiction between 
the AMEAs and the relevant sectoral regulators. No guidelines are available to resolve 
conflicts that arise in competition enforcement, although a few guidelines on other aspects 
have been adopted by the AMC. Additionally, the lack of unified anti-monopoly IPRs 
guidelines intensifies the friction and uncertainty in the enforcement activities of the 
AMEAs when dealing with IP situations. Accordingly, as a consultative and coordinating 
organisation, the AMC’s role in coordinating competition enforcement has not been 
effectively developed.95 
6.3.4 The Relationship between AMEAs and Sectoral Regulators 
In recent years, the deregulation and liberalization of the industries that had been state-
owned monopolies for a number of years, has been a significant economic breakthrough in 
China, though the process is considerably slow. Currently, monopoly and competition co-
exist in these regulated industries.96 Before 2008 there had already been several sectoral 
regulators created to regulate and supervise the operation of state-owned monopoly 
industries such as the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the General 
Administration of Civil Aviation and so on. At the same time, relevant sectoral regulations 
were adopted, most of which are still in effect today. There are certain competition-related 
rules adopted by these sectoral regulations which allow concurrent jurisdiction of the 
AMEAs and relevant sectoral regulators. In practice, many European countries have a 
competition authority separate from sectoral regulators which apply competition rules to 
specific industries but make sure that they do communicate effectively with each other 
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when there are mutual interests. 97  Concurrent jurisdiction on competition issues in 
regulated industries may resolve the problem of asymmetry of information by the AMEAs 
and simultaneously avoids the risk of industry protectionism by sectoral regulators.98 In 
order to facilitate effective enforcement by the competition authority and the relevant 
sectoral regulators, clear rules are required to assign responsibilities to each agency and to 
exchange information. For instance, the French competition authority is obliged to seek the 
opinion of the relevant sectoral regulator on technical issues in respect of the competition 
matter it is dealing with; the opinion is not binding but the French competition authority is 
required to explain why it deviated in the specific case from the sectoral regulator’s 
opinion.99  In the UK, the Competition Act 1998 empowers both the Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA) and the sectoral regulators to implement the competition 
rules.100 A principle is set up that cases will be allocated between the CMA and sectoral 
regulators on the basis of which authority is ‘better or best placed to do so’.101 It is further 
confirmed that when there is a dispute, the CMA will have the final power to determine the 
allocation.102 Based on the current political and economic circumstances in China, it is 
believed that the AMEAs and sectoral regulators should cooperate and coordinate 
effectively in competition enforcement in the regulated sectors. 103  However, no legal 
measure has yet been adopted to delineate the concurrent jurisdiction between the AMEAs 
and sectoral regulators. Even the AML itself does not make provision for this concurrency. 
Therefore, this situation brings uncertainty to undertakings on the predictability of laws 
and the enforcement rules to be applied; jurisdiction conflicts between the AMEAs and 
sectoral regulators may arise where they disagree on the jurisdiction or where they do not 
wish to seize jurisdiction. The advantages of the concurrent jurisdiction cannot be fully 
developed in regulated industries. 
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6.3.5 The Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement 
Normally, public and private enforcement are two important pillars of competition 
enforcement system. They are complementary to each other and work together to prohibit 
anti-competitive conduct. China’s AML follows the common world practice and confirms 
that both public and private enforcement are possible. In fact, in China, private 
enforcement of anti-competitive practices originated before the enactment of the AML, 
most of which were related to patent rights.104 Since China’s AML came into effect, the 
number of private anti-monopoly actions has increased significantly and they cover several 
areas.105 Some of these private actions attracted considerable attention from the public.106 
However, the successful claims of private litigation are fairly rare as a result of the heavy 
and difficult burden of proof.107 China’s AML merely confirms the right of the relevant 
parties to initiate civil litigation seeking damages but it does not elaborate how public and 
private enforcement are linked. Although there have not yet been serious conflicts between 
public and private enforcement, this does not mean that conflicts and uncertainty cannot 
exist or will not arise in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the likely 
uncertainties that may hinder the effective development of competition enforcement and 
try to resolve them. 
6.3.5.1 Concurrent Complaints to the AMEAs and Courts 
Article 2 of the Supreme People’s Court Provisions confirms that both stand-alone and 
follow-on litigation is possible.108 This means that an effective decision of the AMEAs 
finding illegal anti-competitive conduct is not a requisite for a plaintiff to lodge a civil 
litigation for damages. On one hand, Article 2 to a great extent protects the litigation rights 
of the parties seeking damages and complements the deficiencies of the AMEAs. On the 
other hand, the confirmation of no requisite introduces new problems to the relationship 
between public and private enforcement. For instance, the Supreme People’s Court 
Provisions do not delineate what will happen if a plaintiff at the same time files a 
complaint to an AMEA and to the competent people’s court. In principle, the AMEA and 
the court can separately admit the complaint within their respective responsibilities, as long 
as the required conditions are fully satisfied. However, if the AMEA and courts separately 
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investigate a case, resources may be wasted and substantially different decisions may be 
reached. In this situation, neither the AML nor the Civil Procedure Law provides for 
suspension by the courts. There has been no agreement reached between the AMEAs and 
the courts in terms of concurrent complaints. As a consequence, whether courts do suspend 
the litigation and wait for the result of the AMEA may become a contentious issue. 
6.3.5.2 The Effects of Findings by the AMEAs or by the Courts 
In addition, it is not clear to what extent the AMEAs’ findings of fact and infringement can 
influence the decision of the courts in terms of the same alleged anti-competitive conduct. 
In the UK, it is stipulated that the confirmed CMA findings of fact are binding on the 
parties unless the court directs otherwise or the CMA has decided to take further action.109 
Infringements decisions are binding on courts which deal with claims for damages.110 In 
the EU, Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 ensures the uniform application of EU 
competition law by clarifying that national competition authorities and national courts 
cannot take decisions running counter to a Commission decision.111  In order to avoid 
conflicting results, national courts should assess whether to stay the proceedings if the 
European Commission is contemplating the decision.112 In addition, the effect of national 
decisions is confirmed in the Damages Directive that an infringement of competition law 
arising from a final decision of a national competition authority or by a review court shall 
be binding on the courts in that country in the light of damages litigation.113 Such final 
decision of a national competition authority in another Member State shall be presented as 
prima facie evidence before their national courts where an infringement of competition law 
has been alleged.114 At the same time, a number of EU rules have been adopted to facilitate 
access to evidence in damages actions before national courts. For example, litigants before 
a national court, may access the European Commission’s case file.115 
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However, the Chinese legislation does not articulate as clearly as the UK and EU 
legislation that the findings by the AMEAs in a competition investigation should be 
binding in civil proceedings before the courts.116 The only relevant article seems to be that 
the probative force of public documentary evidence of a State organisation is much more 
powerful than other documentary evidence.117  This can be perceived that the AMEAs 
findings to some extent will have effects on civil proceedings before courts. However, it is 
hard to predict the extent and it is likely to depend on the discretion of judges. It is 
acknowledged that the most severe difficulty for plaintiffs in an action for damages for 
alleged anti-competitive conduct is the burden of proof. 118  The unclear effects of the 
AMEAs’ factual findings may deprive plaintiffs of a powerful weapon in their claim for 
civil damages.  
Moreover, what are the effects of the final judgments by courts on the investigation by the 
AMEAs is another problem. This is particularly so when it comes to the area of patent 
rights. In May 2014, the NDRC announced that it had accepted commitments made by 
InterDigital concerning its SEP licensing practices and, therefore, suspended the anti-
monopoly investigation of InterDigital that started from June 2013.119 In this case, the 
commitments made by InterDigital to the NDRC which secured the suspension of the 
investigation were, to some extent, influenced by the judgments of the courts in Huawei vs. 
InterDigital.120 However, to what extent the court judgments influenced the NDRC is not 
very clear. Did the decision to suspend the investigation by the NDRC take into account 
the judgments of the Guangdong Higher People’s Court? If the NDRC had not suspended 
the investigation, would it have adopted the findings of facts or of infringements directly 
from the final judgments? Besides, there is a risk that the NDRC may take a different 
decision from the courts. 
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6.3.5.3 Differences in Interpreting and Applying the AML by the AMEAs and 
the Courts in China 
An additional aspect that must be considered is the differences in interpreting and applying 
the rules of China’s AML by the AMEAs and the courts. For example, in accordance with 
Article 7 of the Supreme People’s Court Provisions, it is the responsibility of the defendant 
to demonstrate that its horizontal agreements do not have the effects of eliminating and 
restricting competition.121 While, the burden of proof is borne by the claimant when the 
case concerns vertical restrictive agreements. In the second instance of Beijing Ruibang 
Yonghe Technology Trade Co., Ltd. vs. Johnson & Johnson Medical (Shanghai) Ltd. and 
Johnson & Johnson Medical (China) Ltd., the judge affirmed that the plaintiff should bear 
the burden of proof to demonstrate that the vertical agreement concerned would eliminate 
or restrict competition and the judge made a detailed analysis of the nature and the effects 
of the conduct of maintaining resale prices.122 However, it can be seen from the published 
NDRC decisions that NDRC seldom analyses in detail the restrictive effects on 
competition of a vertical agreement aimed at maintaining resale prices. 123  It seems to 
indicate that in the view of the NDRC the anti-competitive effects of the vertical 
agreements prohibited by the AML exist objectively and do not need to be demonstrated 
by the NDRC.124  In other words, the NDRC does not bear the burden of proof as a 
‘claimant’ in an investigation of alleged vertical restrictive agreements. Accordingly, the 
enforcement rules adopted by the AMEAs seem to be a little different from those adopted 
by courts.125 This situation will result in unfair and inconsistent application of the AML 
and undermine the certainty and predictability of law.  
Currently, there is no guidance or mechanism to coordinate the differences in the 
competition enforcement rules between the AMEAs and the courts. The question to keep 
the administrative enforcement consistent with the judiciary enforcement in terms of anti-
competitive issues is a difficulty to be overcome.   
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6.3.6 Lack of Independence 
As discussed above, it is the Anti-monopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Enforcement 
Bureau, the Bureau of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly and the Anti-monopoly 
Bureau, respectively housed within the SAIC, NDRC and MOFCOM that are responsible 
for specific competition enforcement.  In addition to enforcing the AML, all of the three 
national ministries have concurrent functions and missions to formulate and implement 
macroeconomic and other policies.126 The low hierarchy of the competition authorities and 
the multi-functions of their head ministries are likely, to some extent, to hinder the 
implementation of the AML in an independent and impartial way.127 For example, when 
competition policies contradict industrial policies, there is a possibility that the NDRC may 
prioritize industrial policies; when competition policies conflict with trading policies, 
MOFCOM may give a priority to the trading policies. 128  In this context, the role of 
implementing competition policy may not be fully and effectively played. 
6.3.7 Lack of Professionalism 
Moreover, competition enforcement is complex and technical, so it requires a large number 
of highly qualified staff with strong economics or law backgrounds to carry out the 
investigation and the analysis. For instance, in 2015, the US Federal Trade Commission 
was composed of 1176 highly qualified civil service employees, including 658 attorneys 
and economists.129 There are 657 employees in total in the US Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice, dedicated to implementing antitrust laws. 130  In the EU, the 
Directorate-General for Competition is substantially responsible for competition issues, 
with a total of 914 highly qualified staff including the Chief Competition Economist whose 
task is to provide independent economic advice on individual cases and policy.131 It has 
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been stated that given China’s large market and the size of its economy, ‘the resources for 
antitrust enforcement in China should not be less than those of antitrust agencies in any 
other jurisdictions’.132 However, the total number of staff in all the three AMEAs in China 
dedicated to applying the AML is less than 100 133  which is not equivalent to the 
tremendous workload and great pressure on the three AMEAs. Owing to the multi-
functions of the three ministries, it cannot be guaranteed that the limited human resources 
will all be devoted to the implementation of the AML.134 It has even been stated that a 
significant number of merger cases entered into phase 2 investigation as a result of the 
understaffing of MOFCOM, some of which should have been cleared in phase 1.135 Even 
though the NDRC and the SAIC are allowed to empower their provincial bureaus to share 
the competition enforcement responsibilities, their assistance is subject to limited 
authorisation and cannot fundamentally alleviate the manpower pressure.136  
The problem will be particularly aggravated when an investigation concerns the anti-
competitive exercise of patent rights. This is because compared to other anti-competitive 
practices, analysing the effects of the exercise of patent rights will require more technical 
knowledge and the process is more complicated. Patent rights are different from other 
ordinary civil rights. The exclusive right is granted by the State to the owner to enjoy for a 
specific period of time. Normally, the exercise of patent rights is pro-competitive and must 
not be unduly restricted. Therefore, to determine whether the exercise of patent rights falls 
within its legal scope or is anti-competitive should need the help of experts in patent rights, 
such as specialized IP lawyers. For example, the definition of a relevant market in a patent-
related investigation may require the establishment of the technology market and the 
innovation market. Similarly, the analysis of substitutable technologies will require certain 
professional background and the assessment of the relevant market. The calculation of the 
proper patent royalty fees should be based on professional analysis. However, external 
lawyers are not allowed to engage in the competition enforcement led by the three AMEAs 
in China and the qualified staff to handle competition issues in IP areas are not enough and 
are in demand.137  
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6.3.8 Lack of Transparency  
Another serious problem that has been often debated is the lack of transparency. It is clear 
that it has not become a common practice for Chinese administrative agencies to provide 
detailed decisions to the public.138  MOFCOM is the only AMEA that has a statutory 
obligation to publish its decisions on prohibited or conditionally approved mergers, while 
the other two AMEAs may publish their decisions.139  But the decisions published by 
MOFCOM are relatively light in their reasoning.140 Since 2013, the SAIC began to release 
its full competition sanction decisions and this practice has been followed by the NDRC 
since 2014. Although transparency has been improved dramatically compared to previous 
years, the transparency of the reasoning in the decisions is still not enough. The lack of 
resources is one reason that gives rise to a lack of transparency. The severe imbalance 
between the workload and the manpower of the AMEAs leaves less chance for the case 
handlers to provide detailed reasoning for the decision. In addition, transparency is also 
lacking in competition investigation procedures. For example, there are no instructions or 
clear procedures to guide the transferral of a case from one AMEA to another which may 
result in uncertainty as to the competences of each AMEA. Under these circumstances, the 
certainty and the predictability of the AML will be seriously weakened. This is so 
especially in the area of the exercise of patent rights where there is a little competition 
enforcement experience.  
6.4 Conclusion   
Normally, whether the AML can be effectively implemented depends on whether the 
competition enforcement is effective and efficient. The AML introduced a two-level and 
tripartite administrative enforcement structure. This kind of structure was the result of a 
political compromise to balance the pre-existing authorities, which best fits the 
circumstances in that situation. Among the three AMEAs in China, the responsibility of the 
MOFCOM is relatively clear that it only reviews merger control issues. However, the 
boundary between the NDRC and the SAIC is problematic as the basis of competence is on 
whether the conduct concerns pricing. The boundary seems to be clear on the surface, but 
it has caused problems. These problems result in the ineffectiveness and inefficiency in the 
application of the AML. The deterrence and certainty of the AML is also undermined. 
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In order to optimize the functions and structure of the Communist Party and state 
institutions, and improve their efficiency and effectiveness to cope with the requirements 
and challenges in the current circumstances, the Institutional Reform Plan of the State 
Council was recently adopted by the 13th  National People’s Congress. To recap, according 
to the Institutional Reform Plan, all the responsibilities of the three AMEAs will be merged 
into a newly established independent authority—the SAMR. The tripartite enforcement 
will come to an end. As a result, some of the conflicting problems caused by the 
overlapping enforcement powers will be substantially diminished. After the institutional 
reform, there will be only one single and independent AMEA to address competition issues. 
The conflicts and overlaps between the responsibilities and competences of the different 
AMEAs will no longer exist. The situation to strive for a leading role in an anti-monopoly 
investigation or negative enforcement to deny jurisdiction will not be a problem anymore. 
Duplicate enforcement will be avoided and the enforcement efficiency and authority will 
be improved. Enforcement AMEA costs and the compliance costs of undertakings may be 
reduced. Moreover, the divergent enforcement of multiple authorities can be alleviated to 
the maximum extent so that the certainty and predictability of the AML can be guaranteed.   
However, some problems in the competition enforcement system can still have a negative 
impact on application of the AML, especially in the area of the exercise of patent rights, 
despite having a single AMEA. For example, the confusion as to multiple legal bases for 
competition enforcement will not be fundamentally removed. There will still be multiple 
laws, regulations or other rules available for the SAMR to apply but there is also a lack of 
unified guidelines to facilitate competition enforcement activities. Whether and how the 
SAMR can fully and effectively perform its functions is another problem waiting to be 
answered. In addition, the merger of the three AMEAs is unlikely to resolve the problem of 
the relationship between the SAMR and the sectoral regulators. The rules to coordinate 
appropriately their concurrent competences on competition issues need to be proposed. To 
what extent the role of the AMC can be promoted after the SAMR formally comes into 
operation is also hard to be answered. Moreover, the institutional reform does not impact 
on the conflict between public and private competition enforcement. No agreement has 
been reached to address the concurrent complaints to the SAMR and courts. It is still not 
clear to what extent the findings of the SAMR can influence the decisions of a court in 
terms of the same alleged anti-competitive conduct, and vice versa. Another problem that 
must be considered by the SAMR is how to avoid or to coordinate the potential differences 




and quality of the professional staff employed in the new SAMR, and the transparency of 
its investigation activities and decisions all need to be improved. 
As discussed above, competition enforcement in the exercise of IPRs is a newly-
developing field. It is full of challenges and complexity. When the problems in the 
competition enforcement system encounter the anti-competitive issues in the exercise of 
IPRs, the situation is severe. In addition, when the Institutional Reform Plan will be 
formally implemented and the way in which the SAMR will execute its anti-monopoly 
duties is not clear at the moment. Thus, there is also no clear idea how competition 
enforcement in the area of IPRs will be developed after the reform. In this context, it is, 
therefore, necessary to make some appropriate proposals to enable competition 
enforcement in China to meet the challenges in the field of the exercise of IPRs. This will 
be done in Section 9.1 of Chapter 9. In the following chapters, two noticeable challenges 


























 Restrictions on the Licensing of Standard Essential 
Patents from the Perspective of China’s Anti-monopoly Law 
7.1 Introduction 
Previous Chapters 3-6 have identified the problems of China’s anti-monopoly enforcement 
in the area of the exercise of patent rights, from the perspective of both legal rules and 
enforcement authorities. Those problems undermine the effectiveness and deterrence of 
China’s Anti-monopoly Law, especially when it comes to the exercise of patent rights in 
some special circumstances. From this chapter on, the focus will be on the specific anti-
competitive practices of patent owners when exercising their patent rights. Chapter 7 will 
discuss the challenging competition concerns arising from the licensing of standard 
essential patents. 
In the last few decades, there has been dramatic development in the information and 
communication technology (ICT) sector which significantly improves consumer welfare. 
In order to ensure the interoperability and the compatibility between different products, the 
role of standardisation experienced a substantial increase. Normally, standardisation 
agreements contribute to significant positive economic effects. 1  However, it is also 
contended that standard-setting may lead to restrictive effects and harm competition in 
specific circumstances. 2  This is particularly so when standards incorporate intellectual 
property rights (IPRs), mostly patents.3 The exclusive nature of patent rights may defeat 
the public interest nature of standards which will bring about serious competition concerns. 
In order to mitigate the tension, most standard setting organisations (SSOs) have developed 
their own IPR policies and require the holders of standard essential patents (SEPs)4 to 
commit to licensing their SEPs on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. 
The objective of these commitments is to strike a balance between the SEP owners and the 
standard implementers. However, the uncertainty and ambiguity of the FRAND 
commitments makes it hard to be applied in practice and the number of disputes pertaining 
to SEPs grows sharply. At the international level, there has not yet been any unified or 
binding principle adopted to address the competition concerns arising from SEPs. Different 
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jurisdictions have approached the issue in different ways. As a consequence, the interface 
between SEPs and competition law has become a global contentious and controversial 
issue in the 21st century.   
In China, the noticeable question as to how the Anti-monopoly Law (AML) may regulate 
the licensing of SEPs has become a difficult problem for both the anti-monopoly 
enforcement authorities (AMEAs) and the courts. This issue has been debated fiercely 
amongst academia and the legal profession. The first case concerning the exercise of SEPs 
in China arose in October 2013 when the Guangdong Higher People’s Court affirmed that 
the SEP holder InterDigital had abused its dominance and violated Article 17 of the AML.5 
Then, at the beginning of 2015 Qualcomm was fined by NDRC for its abuse of dominance 
in the manner in which it exploited its SEPs. In April 2015, SAIC Provisions on the 
Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict 
Competition (Provisions) specifically prohibit in Article 13, those restrictions practised by 
SEP owners. It is clear that China’s AMEAs and courts have placed substantial importance 
on competition enforcement in respect of the licensing of SEPs. However, practical 
questions and uncertainty remain in this newly developed enforcement area. Existing legal 
measures are not robust enough to address these concerns. Problems are particularly 
serious and noticeable when it comes to the disclosure obligation of patent owners in 
standard-setting process and the circumstances in which the seeking of an injunction by a 
SEP owner will be regarded as violating competition law. Accordingly, a coherent and 
balanced response is urgently needed under current China’s legal framework. From this 
aspect, the enforcement experience and best practice of the EU and US in the interface 
between SEPs and competition law can provide good examples for China, in particular, the 
recent 2015 ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Huawei v. 
ZTE. 6 
It is not possible to scrutinize every competition concern resulting from standardisation and 
the licensing of SEPs. This chapter will focus only on two kinds of challenging anti-
competitive conduct, one arising from the disclosure obligation of patent owners in 
standard-setting process and the other from the injunctive relief of SEPs. In accordance 
with the research objective of the thesis, this chapter will endeavour to provide support and 
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rationale for the proposed solutions in the final concluding chapter to these problems under 
the Chinese competition rules. This chapter will be divided into five sections. After the 
introduction, the benefits and competition concerns raised by standardisation will be 
discussed and the relevant IPRs policies of the SSOs will be examined and commented 
upon. In the third section, competition concerns in the light of the disclosure obligation of 
patent owners in the standard setting process will be analysed. The fourth section will 
discuss whether the availability of injunctive relief should be limited and in what 
circumstances the seeking of an injunction by a SEP owner will be considered to be anti-
competitive conduct. The chapter will end with some conclusions. 
7.2 Standards and Standardization     
Given the different development level and economic circumstances, standard setting 
organisations define standards differently. One of the pervasive definitions of standard 
provided by the International Organisation for Standardisation is that ‘a standard is a 
document established by consensus and approved by a recognized body that provides for 
common and repeated use rules, guidelines or characteristics or their results, aimed at the 
achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context’.7 Industry standards are 
normally recognized as ‘one of the engines driving the modern economy’. 8  Among 
industry standards, those incorporating patented technologies are playing a pivotal role in 
promoting industrial innovation and increasing competitiveness.9 The standards considered 
in this chapter are technical standards based on patent-protected technologies. The patent 
that is necessary to implement a technology standard to manufacture standard-compliant 
products is so defined as standard essential patent (SEP).10 
7.2.1 The Benefits of Standardisation 
Standardisation usually contributes substantially positive and pro-competitive economic 
gains. 11  Standardisation guarantees interoperability and compatibility between different 
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products, benefiting both businesses and consumer welfare. The setting and 
implementation of a standard can integrate repeated technical issues, promote 
communication and interconnection between devices or services from different origins and 
remove trade barriers. In this context, competing producers comply with common technical 
standards and their products interoperate seamlessly. As a result, the utility value of 
products to consumers is increased. 12  Standardisation promotes economies of scale, 
increases efficiency and reduces production costs.13 Accordingly, standardisation benefits 
consumers by increasing consumer choice, reducing product price and fostering public 
health and safety.14  
In addition, standardisation plays an important role in encouraging innovation. For 
example, it is submitted that the inclusion of a patented technology into a standard may 
produce more licences for the patent owner and increase their licensing revenue which will 
incentivize more investment in research and development. 15  Standardisation is able to 
facilitate the dissemination of technologies. The widespread and successful technical 
standard can attract a large number of users who will require a patent licence if they 
manufacture standard-compliant products. It is suggested that the remuneration generated 
by SEPs is higher than that generated from normal patents.16 The findings of Rysman and 
Simcoe show that there will be an increase in the use of the patent if it is claimed necessary 
to implement a standard. 17  Standardisation also provides efficiency to encourage 
technology developers. With unified technical standards, manufacturers no longer need to 
shape their products respectively to each territory and can be more efficient and effective 
to serve the market.18  
Moreover, standardisation is beneficial to promote competition. Competition is intensified 
between different technology developers as they seek to incorporate their technologies into 
a technical standard. From this respect, the quality and the value of the standard will be 
enhanced and consumer welfare will be improved. It is acknowledged however that the 
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process of standardisation is a process that also leads to the exclusion of competition. This 
is for the reason that standardisation will exclude from the market the non-standard-
compliant products or services. Accordingly, the number of competitors in the product 
market can be decreased and the inter-technology competition may be discouraged. 19 
Nevertheless, this kind of exclusion of competition is in nature optimizing the competition 
structure. It excludes the products or services with low quality (so they are non-standard-
compliant) and indeed increases the competition to a higher level.20 The limitation on inter-
technology competition motivates the intra-technology competition, which in turn may 
lower prices and diversify the kinds of products.21 In this situation, undertakings are likely 
to transfer some resources to differentiate non-standardised products.22 
7.2.2 Competition Concerns Raised by Standardisation 
However, the setting of technical standards does not come without concerns. It is 
recognized that the setting of standards is able to restrict competition, reduce consumer 
choice and potentially control the development of a market, which gives rise to 
competition concerns.23 The competition concerns can be particularly serious when the 
standard is combined with patents. The patent system provides incentives to promote 
innovation by conferring inventors with exclusive exploitation rights for a limited period of 
time. It is believed that the exclusivity of patent rights is fundamental to the enjoyment of 
advantages generated by patent rights.24 Standards are set to facilitate the diffusion of 
technologies and improve the interoperability between products in the public interest. 
Therefore, there is a theoretical tension between the exclusive nature of patent rights and 
the public interest nature of standards.  
It may be questioned whether the public interest has already been seriously considered 
before a patent right is granted. In order to be granted a patent, the invention at issue has to 
meet a number of strict requirements which are necessary and in the public interest. On this 
basis, it is believed that the exclusivity of patent rights will not contravene public interest. 
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However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the public interest in standard setting requires 
different considerations.25 The consideration of public interest here is not for the purpose 
of the ownership of a patent right but for the exercise of the right. It is particularly so when 
it comes to SEPs. The incorporation of the patents into a standard will bring the owners 
extra advantages and market power, so the inappropriate exercise of the SEPs will have 
detrimental influence on consumers and the public interest as further elaborated below.  
When a patent is incorporated into a standard, the network effect and the lock-in effect is 
likely to grant the patent owner appreciable market power. It should be emphasized 
however that the holding of SEPs does not automatically confer dominance on SEP owners. 
Although SEP owners are more likely to obtain dominant market power, it is not always so 
and each market situation has to be analysed on a case-by-case basis. Once a standard is 
embedded and SEP-users have invested sunk costs, it may be considerably difficult and 
expensive to switch to an alternative technology as a substitute standard.26 This means that 
the relevant market is in fact locked into the SEPs and the standard, and entrance barriers 
may arise. The exclusivity of SEPs and the lock-in effect together confer a strong 
bargaining power on the SEPs owners. It is said ‘holders of SEPs may effectively be able 
to act as gatekeepers to the market.’27 In this context, the SEP owners may have greater 
opportunities to abuse their dominant positions and hold up the users of the standard by 
excluding them from the market, by requiring unreasonable licensing terms, by using 
litigation threats or by charging excessively high royalties. The patent owners may carry 
out a patent ambush during the process of setting a technical standard. Patent ambushing 
arises when an undertaking participating in the standard setting process deliberately 
conceals the existence of a patent application and claims the patent rights once the standard 
is adopted and the market is locked in. In specific conditions, the patent ambush has a 
potentiality to eliminate competition in the market and prejudice consumer welfare. 
Moreover, the SEP owners may tactically seek an injunction, with anti-competitive 
objectives, that is to prohibit the SEP-users from being able to use the SEP. Without a SEP 
licence, undertakings cannot produce standard-compliant products and will finally be kept 
out of the market. The injunctive relief may also be used as a leverage to charge high 
royalties beyond the value of the SEP itself or other unjustifiable licensing terms. As a 
consequence, serious competition concerns may arise.  
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In addition, the patent hold-up may discourage potential SEP-users from adopting or 
developing the relevant standard. This can undermine the SEP holders who seek to 
stimulate the wide and successful use of the standard.28 Consumers may also be affected by 
the passing on effects of high royalties.29 It has been argued that the risks of patent hold-
ups are mostly theoretical and there has been seldom solid empirical evidence to 
demonstrate its magnitude.30 However, lack of current empirical evidence does not mean 
that it will not happen in the future and some cases have already appeared in practice. The 
negative effects of patent hold-ups are detrimental to effective and efficient competition or 
the public interest. Policies should be to some extent forward-looking and prevent probable 
risks. Telyas emphasizes that the power of a SEP to eliminate competition and the potential 
for SEP owners to abuse their market dominance should not be underestimated.31  
7.2.3 The IPR Policies of SSOs 
In order to alleviate these competition concerns, most SSOs have designed and developed 
their ad hoc IPR policies to prevent patent hold-up problems. SEP owners are required to 
commit to licensing their patent rights on FRAND terms. FRAND commitments aim to 
strike a balance between the interest of SEP owners and the interest of SEP-users without 
prejudice to the public interest. On one hand, FRAND commitments make sure that the 
SEPs incorporated in a standard are available and accessible to all the potential standard 
users; on the other hand, SEP owners can be reasonably rewarded for their inventions 
which will foster innovation and the incorporation of the inventions into standards.32  
However, in practice, FRAND commitments are neither sufficient nor enforceable to 
prevent patent hold-ups.33 The FRAND commitments are in nature a preventive contractual 
measure and there is no guarantee that it will sufficiently remove competition concerns.34 
SSOs do not define in detail what FRAND commitments mean or in what manner FRAND 
commitments can be implemented to resolve disputes. In particular, what can be regarded 
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as reasonable is hard to determine. Accordingly, FRAND commitments are too ambiguous 
to address the risks caused by patent hold-ups. 35  
In addition, the uncertainty and ambiguity of FRAND commitments may give rise to 
another problem, patent hold-out, which may reduce the incentives of patentees to involve 
their patents into standards. It has been pointed out that in the past 20 years, the IPR 
policies of many SSOs have become more restrictive.36 There are serious concerns about 
the risks caused by patent hold-ups so more restrictions are imposed on the SEP owners’ 
licensing conduct. This seems to indicate that the balance of interest shifts to potential 
licensees and the advantages of the licensors are impaired. 37  Compared with ordinary 
patent owners, SEP holders are required by SSOs to grant a licence on FRAND terms. In 
this situation, the SEP-users may tactically delay or refuse to negotiate, threaten to raise 
competition complaints, to pay unreasonably low royalties or even ‘free ride’ on the 
innovations.38  
In the context of FRAND commitments, it is not clear what can be classified as 
opportunistic conduct that should be criticized, or what should be regarded as legitimate 
leverages to protect the patented technologies. Therefore, FRAND commitments seem not 
to achieve well its original objectives and functions. The balance of interest between SEP 
owners and potential SEP-users seems not to be always achieved and conflicts may arise 
between them. Moreover, most rules within the policies of SSOs are not binding and have 
no legal consequences. They are to a great extent only internal management tools or 
procedural rules. As a consequence, the deterrent effect of SSO policies is limited in 
preventing anti-competitive practices. The IPR policies of the SSOs themselves do not play 
a successful role in addressing competition concerns from patent hold-ups, though they do 
make some contribution.  
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7.2.4 Contract Law, Patent Law and Competition Law 
In addition to the internal regulation of SSOs, the disputes pertinent to the licensing of 
patent rights in the process of setting and applying a standard are normally addressed 
internationally in three ways, namely by contract, patent and competition laws. Ordinary 
disputes will generally be dealt with in the context of contract or patent law from a 
perspective of private enforcement. As discussed above, the incorporation of a patent into a 
standard may give the patent owner a strong market power with potential to abuse this 
dominance and eliminate competition. Therefore, competition authorities in the world 
strive to ensure that the market power of SEP owners is not anti-competitively exploited.  
In terms of anti-competitive concerns raised by SEPs, the regulation by contract and patent 
laws has insufficiencies and disadvantages. Within the characterized legal system of China, 
except for the AML, there are currently six laws or regulations that can be applied to anti-
competitive concerns raised by the exercise of patent rights.39 However, most of these 
applicable rules are of a civil law nature and are not as powerful as public laws. Some of 
them are only general principles that are in practice difficult to enforce. In addition, these 
rules aim to resolve problems from the perspective of private law and to protect private 
interest, though they also, to some extent, prevent the detriment of public interest.  
Nevertheless, what anti-competitive exercise of patents undermines is effective 
competition and the public interest. In particular, SEPs are a little bit different from normal 
patents. SEPs combine the public interest nature of a standard with the exclusive nature of 
patents. From this aspect, competition law is able to play an indispensable and important 
role in untangling the competition concerns raised by SEPs. The management of these 
issues by competition law can compensate for the deficiencies of both private law and the 
ambiguity of FRAND commitments. It is flexible enough to conduct a reasonable analysis 
on a case-by-case basis. 
Competition law will be applied to the standard setting and implementing process only in 
exceptional circumstances in which effective competition is restricted, or innovation is 
discouraged and so public welfare is damaged. What is prohibited by competition law is 
anti-competitive conduct during the standardisation and application process, other illegal 
conduct will still be regulated by relevant competent laws.  
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In fact, it has been an international practice to allow competition law to be applied to the 
anti-competitive conduct in the process of setting and using a standard. It is submitted that 
‘the contractual approach is theoretically questionable and not optimal for solving the 
issues related to FRAND enforcement.’40 As far as the EU is concerned, several seminal 
competition cases where the SEP owner sought an injunction before a national court have 
been decided on the basis of Article 102 TFEU. Additionally, the European Commission 
adopted Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal Cooperation 
Agreements.41 The Guidelines confirm the benefits that are produced by standardisation 
but they provide a safe harbour whereby, under certain conditions, the standardisation 
agreement will not cause competition concerns. In the US, in 2013 the US Department of 
Justice and the US Patent and Trademark Office published a Joint Policy Statement on 
Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments.42 
In this document, these two US authorities show their awareness of the serious antitrust 
concerns that arise in standardisation. Moreover, in 2014, Edith Ramirez, formerly 
Chairwoman of the Federal Trade Commission, emphasized the importance of antitrust 
intervention in SEP related cases. 43  The development of Chinese anti-monopoly legal 
measures and the enforcement in this area also indicates that the AML is playing a more 
and more important role in resolving the competition concerns arising from SEPs.44 
Therefore, competition law plays a significant and a necessary role in addressing the anti-
competitive concerns in standard setting, and ensuring that SEP owners exploit their rights 
appropriately. 
7.3 Disclosure and Identification of Standard Essential Patents 
In addition to FRAND commitments, another significant component of SSOs’ IPR policies 
is the disclosure obligation. In the standard setting process, most SSOs require the 
participants to identify and disclose any patent or application for a patent that might be 
essential to the setting of the standard under development. The disclosure obligation aims 
to enhance the transparency in the standard setting process, to ensure that SSOs and 
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participants take informed decisions and to guarantee the effective implementation of 
adopted standards.45 Another purpose of the disclosure obligation that must be taken into 
account is that it is the basis for obtaining FRAND commitments from patent owners and 
to some extent prevents patent hold-ups and other potential exploitative conduct.46 It is 
reported that an early patent disclosure is of great importance and is widely encouraged in 
the standard setting process.47  
However, owing to the SSOs’ differences in respect of their nature, content or objectives, 
their respective detailed rules of disclosure obligation are more or less different.48 To what 
extent the disclosure of potential SEPs should be done depends on the SSOs’ own 
assessment. For example, SSOs have a different level of strictness on whether the 
disclosure obligation covers patent applications. Similarly, they differ on the subject and 
on the content of what has to be disclosed. There is no agreement on the length of time 
within which disclosure must take place, nor on the scope of the disclosure, to whom to 
disclose and the consequence of non-disclosure. Whether the obligation to disclose is 
mandatory is still under discussion. 
For the public interest and compliance costs, SSOs normally try to avoid including 
patented technologies into standards and prefer non-proprietary technologies. From this 
perspective, the obligation to disclose potential SEPs means a risk for the owners that their 
patents will probably be designed around and not be adopted as a standard. 49  As a 
consequence, potential SEP owners may have an interest in intentionally undertaking 
patent ambushes.50 In the context of patent ambush, potential SEP owners deliberately hide 
the existence of their patents or applications for patents in the standard setting process, in 
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order to facilitate the incorporation of their patented technologies into the developing 
standards, which may otherwise be deselected. Once the standard is adopted, then they 
assert their patent rights, and so market power is obtained and the market is locked in. If 
the standard is widely implemented, the non-disclosure of potential SEPs may enable 
patent owners to obtain market power improperly or unlawfully and to restrict competition. 
Patent ambushes may set up barriers for the effective application of a standard and, 
therefore, prejudice the public interest and competition.  
The non-disclosure conduct may not only violate the obligation within SSOs’ IPR policies, 
but also may breach the rules of contract law, patent law or competition law. The IPR 
policies of SSOs focus on preventing patent ambushes ex ante and their effects are very 
limited as a result of their vague nature. Contract or patent law rules, such as the equitable 
estoppel principle, may, to great extent, address the failure of disclosure in some 
circumstances but they both have shortcomings and deficiencies.51 Contract law remedies 
are weak in respect of non-disclosure.52 The measures within patent law are too technical 
to be triggered and, therefore, are more like a ‘shield’.53 Accordingly, competition law is 
relied upon to regulate the failure to disclose. From a competition law perspective, patent 
ambushes may exclude competing technologies before the standard is adopted and 
unjustifiably enable the owner to take advantage of the dominance obtained from the non-
disclosure. However, competition law will only intervene in specific situations where 
competition is restricted and there are anti-competitive effects. If doctrines or rules under 
other IPR policies, contract law or patent law are sufficient to resolve the problems, 
competition law will not be applied. The circumstances in which competition law should 
intervene in patent ambushes situations are a controversial issue and different conclusions 
have been reached by the courts. An interesting case to analyse in this context is Rambus 
which was litigated before both the US and EU courts. 
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7.3.1 Rambus vs. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)54 
In the US, the Rambus case arose from the 2002 FTC’s administrative complaint that 
Rambus unlawfully monopolized markets for four computer memory technologies that had 
been included into industry standards for dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chips. 
It was alleged that between 1991 and 1996, Rambus joined and participated in a non-profit 
SSO for computer memory standard setting—the JEDEC Solid State Technology 
Association (JEDEC),55 undertaking the work of standardisation of DRAM technologies.56 
Later, Rambus attended meetings working on setting synchronous DRAM (SDRAM) 
standards and on developing an advanced double data rate (DDR) SDRAM standard.57 The 
JEDEC required in its policy that members should disclose any patents or pending patent 
applications that might be necessary to the developing standard in the standard setting 
process. However, Rambus not only failed to disclose its patent interest in specific 
technologies that were eventually included into the standards but also gave misleading 
information. In 1996, Rambus formally withdrew from the JEDEC. In 1998, the DDR 
SDRAM standard was adopted, which incorporated four of Rambus’ patented 
technologies. 58  The standards adopted by the JEDEC were widely implemented in 
downstream products and the industry was in fact locked into the technologies in these 
standards. Rambus then began to assert its patent rights against manufacturers of JEDEC 
standards-compliant products and to charge substantial royalties.59 
 As a consequence, the FTC lodged a complaint alleging that Rambus breached the 
disclosure obligation within the JEDEC IPR policy in the standard setting process. The 
omission or misrepresentation of Rambus, therefore, constituted unlawful monopolisation 
prohibited by Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the unfair competition proscribed by 
Section 5 of the FTC Act. In accordance with the FTC’s complaint, the anti-competitive 
practices and deceptive conduct of Rambus resulted in or threatened to result in substantial 
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adverse effects on competition and consumer welfare.60 The failure of Rambus to disclose 
during the standard setting process ‘significantly contributed to its acquisition of monopoly 
power.’61 The FTC concluded that, but for the deceptive conduct of Rambus, the JEDEC 
standards would have been designed around Rambus’ technologies or this would have 
obtained Rambus’ FRAND commitments to licensing.62 The FTC found that Rambus had 
the ability to subvert the standard setting process and anti-competitively hold up the 
memory industry by deliberately concealing the potential SEP information.63 The FTC then 
provided a remedy in a separate opinion that prohibited Rambus from misleading SSOs, 
ordered a compulsory licence and imposed limitations on the royalty rate on the patented 
technologies.64 
Rambus appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In 2008, 
the appellate court set aside the FTC’s final orders and concluded that the FTC did not 
substantiate the finding that the JEDEC would have designed its standards around Rambus’ 
patents if Rambus had discharged its disclosure obligation. Serious concerns were raised as 
to whether Rambus had breached the JEDEC’s disclosure obligation because of its 
vagueness. The Court held that Rambus’ failure to disclose was not anti-competitive or 
exclusionary and only prevented JEDEC from obtaining FRAND commitments from 
Rambus.65 The Court reasoned that a higher royalty would be more likely to motivate 
innovation and to promote alternative technologies.66 As a result, the FTC Decision was 
reversed in 2008. Even though the FTC appealed to the US Supreme Court, its Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari was denied and the FTC finally dismissed the complaint in 2009.  
It can be seen that the FTC and the Court reached different conclusions on the evidence in 
this case though both of them considered the issue under competition law. The question as 
to the conditions under which the failure to disclose in the standard setting process should 
be considered as a violation of competition law rules has resulted in contrasting stances 
between the FTC and US federal courts. On the FTC side, the FTC concluded that: first, 
Rambus intentionally concealed or misrepresented material patent information in the 
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standard setting process; and secondly, the challenged conduct of Rambus either excluded 
other competing technologies which would have been incorporated into standards and 
licensed free but for Rambus’ failure to disclose, or significantly increased the patent 
royalty fees that would have been negotiated on FRAND terms.67 On the appellate court 
side, it held that: first, JEDEC did not clearly define whether the patent application should 
be disclosed so Rambus could not be inferred to have violated the disclosure obligation; 
and second, the influence of Rambus’ challenged conduct on the selection of technologies 
by JEDEC in the standard setting process was not able to be demonstrated so the conduct 
cannot be deemed to undermine effective competition.68 
The binding effects of the disclosure obligation in SSOs’ IPR policies depend considerably 
on the extent to which competition law or other legal instruments impose legal liabilities.69 
The final Rambus decision in the US failed to identify the anti-competitive nature of the 
intentional failure to disclose in the standard setting process and turned ignored to its 
detrimental effects on competition between technologies for their incorporation into 
standards.70 This kind of result may provide a negative influence.71  On one hand, the 
standardisation participants might be discouraged from strictly complying with SSOs’ IPR 
policies. Without serious antitrust liabilities, participants may imitate Rambus’ strategy, 
ignore the disclosure obligation and take advantage of the information asymmetry to 
conduct patent ambushes. Therefore, they may unlawfully obtain dominant power in the 
relevant market and practise anti-competitively. On the other hand, the indulgence for the 
failure to disclose may raise concerns for the implementation of standards and negatively 
influence the standardisation of technologies, with prejudice to customers. Accordingly, 
the antitrust conclusion adopted by the FTC to deal with deliberately concealing patent 
interest in the standard setting process should be respected. 
7.3.2 Rambus Case in the EU72 
In parallel proceedings in the EU, the European Commission sent a Statement of 
Objections to Rambus in 2007 which set out its preliminary conclusion that Rambus 
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infringed Article 102 TFEU by abusing a dominant position in the market for DRAMs. 
The European Commission held that Rambus intentionally deceived the JEDEC by 
concealing the existence of its potential SEPs and patent applications. 73  Therefore, it 
concluded that Rambus engaged in a patent ambush in the standard setting process.74 
Following the patent ambush, Rambus claimed unreasonable royalties for its SEPs which 
Rambus would not have been able to charge but for its failure to disclose. In 2009, the 
European Commission decided to accept Rambus’ commitments to cap its royalty rates 
worldwide and made them binding by adopting a Decision.75 In detail, Rambus committed 
to claiming no royalties on the patents that were adopted as standards when Rambus was 
still a member of JEDEC and to capping its royalty rates at 1.5% for the later generations 
of DRAM standards of JEDEC.76  
The Rambus case was the first time that the European Commission investigated a patent 
ambush and it shows a different approach from the one adopted in the parallel US 
proceedings. In this case, it can be summarized that EU competition law will not be 
infringed unless several conditions are satisfied: ‘(1) [the patent ambush] actually lead to 
the exclusion of technologies which provided a better cost/benefit ratio and (2) in effect the 
licence terms imposed ex post are non-FRAND.’ 77   The European Commission has 
stressed that the patent holders would act in bad faith if they did not disclose to the SSO 
their potential patents that would be incorporated into the standard under development until 
after the adoption of the standard.78 It is concluded that the JEDEC requires or, at very 
least, expects all its members to disclose their granted and pending patents that are 
potentially essential to the standard under development. 79  However, contrary to the 
appellate court in the US, the fact that Rambus have violated the JEDEC’s disclosure 
obligation would not be necessary for a finding of abuse under Article 102 TFEU.80 The 
abuse of dominance under Article 102 is normally built on a finding that the party 
concerned is dominant in the relevant market and the conduct at issue aims at or has effects 
on restricting competition. As a result, the European Commission did not regard the failure 
to disclose itself as an abuse of dominance violating Article 102, since the patent owner 
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was not dominant at the time of the conduct. In the context of patent ambush, the violation 
of Article 102 must be established on the basis of ex post effects. This means that it is 
indispensable to demonstrate that the non-disclosure undertaken by Rambus was to 
exclude anti-competitively competing non-proprietary technologies in the standard setting 
process. This is because ‘absent such finding there is no frame of reference for deciding 
whether royalties claimed ex post are non-FRAND.’81 Therefore, it was the practice of 
claiming royalties by Rambus for its SEPs ‘at a level, which absent its allegedly intentional 
deceptive conduct, it would not have been able to charge’, that constituted the abuse of 
dominance within the meaning of Article 102.82 In contrast, according to Section 5 of the 
FTC Act, the FTC found the deceptive conduct itself to be illegal. 
7.3.3 The Disclosure Obligation in China 
Before 2008, the failure to disclose the existence of potential SEPs in a standard setting 
process was considered by Chinese courts in accordance with Chinese patent law. The 
reason for the application of patent law was that the SSOs did not require the participants 
to make FRAND commitments nor did they impose a disclosure obligation.83 In addition, 
China had not adopted the AML until 2008 so there were no competition rules to be 
considered. Now, with the rapid development of technologies and the standardization of 
technologies, the SSOs have adopted rigorous IPR policies and most of them require 
participants to disclose their potential SEPs and to commit to licensing their SEPs on 
FRAND terms. Confronted with the complex interface of public standards and private 
patents, the regulation of failure to disclose is no longer limited to private law. Now, there 
is much discussion and debate as to how to deal with this situation under competition law.  
The first SEPs case handled by the Supreme People’s Court was its reply to the request by 
Liaoning Higher People’s Court for instructions on the Ji Qiang, Liu Hui and the 
Chaoyang Xingnuo Construction Engineering Co., Ltd. case as to patent infringement.84 
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The defendant was accused of infringing the plaintiff’s patent when implementing an 
industry standard in the construction area. The patent owner in this case participated in the 
standard setting process but did not disclose the existence of the patent that was essential to 
the standard.85 In the Supreme People’s Court’s 2008 reply letter, it is confirmed that 
relevant authorities or institutions at that time had not set up specific governing rules on 
the disclosure and utilization of patent information in the standard setting process. 86 
Nevertheless, the Supreme People’s Court provided the opinion, in the light of the 
individual case, stating that the patentee should be considered as having authorized others 
to use the patent when implementing the standard, if the patentee participated in the 
standard setting process or if the patentee agreed to its patent being incorporated into the 
standard.87 In this situation, the use of the SEP by the defendant would not be deemed as 
patent infringement. The Supreme People’s Court realized that the failure to disclose the 
patent interest during the standard setting process and then seeking to obtain patent 
royalties was not beneficial to the public and should be, to some extent, punished and 
prohibited. As a consequence, in order not to discourage innovation, the Supreme People’s 
Court still allowed the patentee to charge royalties for the use of the patent but required 
that the royalties should be lower than those would have been normally expected for the 
use of a patent. 
This was the first time that Chinese courts expressed a negative view on the failure to 
disclose patent information during the standard setting process. To some extent, this case 
promotes the development and improvement of the disclosure obligation in the Chinese 
standardization process. Additionally, it provided a precedent for future cases concerning 
the non-disclosure of patent interest. It can be seen that the Supreme People’s Court 
indirectly emphasized that the remedies for the infringement of SEPs should be 
restricted.88  The SEPs owners should meet the disclosure obligation and the royalties 
levied for the licensing of SEPs should not exceed what would have been charged before 
they were incorporated into standards. 89  However, this Reply letter did not take into 
account the patent owner’s competitive advantage or dominance obtained from excluding 
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other substitute technologies and being included into the standard. It ignored the influence 
of the failure to disclose on competition and only addressed the conduct from the 
perspective of civil disputes. The reason for this approach was the fact that the AML had 
not yet been formally adopted at the time that the conduct took place.  
Although in 2009 the Supreme People’s Court, in the draft interpretations concerning the 
patent infringement disputes, differentiated the consequences of disclosing from those of 
the failure to disclose patent information, this was not included in the final adopted 
version.90 In addition, the 2015 draft amendment to China’s Patent Law proposed that a 
failure to disclose be regarded as an implied authorization to SEP-users. Unfortunately, 
there has been no further progress on this draft amendment.91 In 2013, Interim Provisions 
on the Administration of National Standards Involving Patents articulate for the first time 
the disclosure obligation for parties participating in the standard setting process and non-
participants are also encouraged to disclose relevant patent information.92 At the same time, 
the Interim Provisions stipulate that if participants breach their good faith and conceal 
relevant patent information as required, they ‘shall bear corresponding legal liabilities’.93 
However, what the legal liabilities will be is not specified. The ‘free licensing’ liability for 
non-disclosed SEPs was removed from the final adopted document. Again, the extent to 
which the failure to disclose potential SEP information will influence competition in the 
relevant markets has not been taken into account.  
Finally, in 2015, seven years after the adoption of the AML, SAIC provided, in its 
Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or 
Restrict Competition (Provisions), for the possibility of antitrust liability for deceiving the 
SSOs in the standard setting process. 94  According to Article 13.2 of the SAIC IP 
Provisions, dominant undertakings are prohibited, unless they have justifiable reasons, 
from intentionally concealing their patent rights during the standard setting process or 
expressly waiving their rights first but, after the incorporation of the patents into standards, 
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alleging their patent rights against standard users.95 One of the aims of Article 13 is to 
mitigate patent ambushes that eliminate or restrict competition in the standardisation. 
However, the wording of Article 13.2 means that it is only applicable to the failure to 
disclose patent information undertaken by participants who are already dominant in the 
relevant technology market before their patents are incorporated into standards. Article 13 
will not impose antitrust liability on the deliberate failure to disclose or the false promises 
made by a non-dominant participant in the standard setting process but who later becomes 
dominant in the relevant market because the elements in the undisclosed patent have been 
adopted by the SSO. 96  Therefore, the competition concerns on the non-disclosure of 
potential SEP interest have not been fully considered under China’s current legal system. 
7.4 Injunctive Relief of Standard Essential Patents 
7.4.1 The Relationship between Injunctive Relief and SEPs  
In recent years, whether injunctions should be granted to the FRAND-encumbered SEP 
owners or in what circumstances the seeking of injunctions on SEPs violates competition 
law have become contentious issues in the intersection of IPRs and competition law. This 
problem has also attracted significant attention and heated discussion in China, but there 
has been no consensus reached. 
For a limited period of time, patent owners inherently enjoy an exclusive right to exclude 
others from practising their invention without a licence. Injunctive relief is generally 
perceived as an effective tool to protect patent rights and as a legitimate and effective 
remedy against patent infringers. An injunction is a court order which prohibits the 
continuation of a patent infringement.97 Such injunctions can be either preliminary as a 
precautionary measure or permanent. The right to seek injunctions is one of the basic rights 
of a patent owner provided by national patent laws and it is a part of the existence of the 
patent right. Many international treaties and regional measures have explicitly confirmed 
the importance to ensure effective remedies for patent owners, such as the TRIPs 
agreements, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, or individual national patent laws. Therefore, in the absence of extraordinary 
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circumstances, it is the right of a patent owner to refuse to license and to seek an injunction 
to prevent the unauthorised use of his patent. 
However, in the context of SEPs, the situation is different, taking into account the special 
characteristics of SEPs. To some extent, the process of standardisation is a process to 
exclude competition. In order to ensure the effective and efficient dissemination of the 
standard, patent owners are required in the standard setting process to commit to licensing 
their patents on FRAND terms to any interested third party, once their patents are 
incorporated into the standard. The FRAND commitments of SEP owners are regarded as 
‘extraordinary circumstances’ where the right to seek injunctions on SEPs should be 
limited to some extent. The FRAND commitments mean that only in exceptional 
circumstances are SEP owners allowed to refuse to license their patents. This is totally 
different from the position of non-FRAND-encumbered patent owners. In this context, 
prospective licensees have a justifiable expectation that they will obtain a FRAND licence 
from the SEP owners when they are manufacturing products compliant with the relevant 
standard. FRAND commitments may be regarded as a defence against injunctions. 98 
Nevertheless, it is essential to stress that FRAND commitments are nothing more than a 
contractual obligation and not a waiver of the right of SEP owners to seek injunctions 
against patent infringement. With regard to FRAND-pledged SEP owners, monetary 
compensation is a more appropriate remedy for infringement than injunctive relief in 
certain circumstances. 99  In essence, the SEP owners’ voluntarily making FRAND 
commitments is characterized as a recognition that their SEPs will be licensed in return for 
fair remuneration100 and then the seeking for injunctions against willing licensees can be 
considered to be anti-competitive conduct.101 
7.4.2 Concerns  
In certain circumstances, injunctions can be used in an anti-competitive way by a dominant 
FRAND-encumbered SEP owner to eliminate competition and impose non-FRAND 
licensing terms on potential willing licensees. As discussed above, SEP owners are much 
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more likely to be dominant in the relevant market due to the lock-in effects caused by the 
incorporation of their patents into a standard. Injunctive relief can be used by SEP owners 
as a strategic leverage to force prospective licensees to accept unreasonable conditions and 
to charge excessive royalty fees which would not have been accepted in FRAND-based 
negotiations without the threat of injunctions. However, the nature of a FRAND 
commitment is a contractual obligation and the consequence of contravening a FRAND 
commitment is not that serious. In essence, a FRAND commitment is a preventive 
contractual measure adopted by SSOs to minimize the detrimental effects of patent hold-
ups and there is no guarantee that contract law can provide sufficient deterrence to reduce 
competition concerns in this field.102 The contractual approach is in theory questionable 
and not the optimal solution for issues related to FRAND enforcement.103 Therefore, in this 
situation, the right to seek injunctions may be inconsistent with consumer welfare and 
public interest, and should be limited to some extent by competition law. 
As concluded in the Motorola case,104 in ‘exceptional circumstances’, the seeking and 
enforcement of an injunction of a SEP, without a justifiable reason, constitutes an abuse of 
dominance.105 The exceptional circumstances refer to the standard setting process and the 
patent owners’ commitment to licensing their SEPs on FRAND terms and conditions.106 
The lack of a justification indicates that the potential licensee was not unwilling to enter 
into a FRAND licensing agreement.107 The issue of a FRAND commitment changes the 
nature of seeking injunctions as part of the existence of a patent right, into a kind of 
exercise of patent rights. If a SEP owner is exercising its patent rights when seeking 
injunctions, it will be appropriate for competition law to be applied to the alleged anti-
competitive conduct. Accordingly, the issue of a FRAND commitment is a basic and 
prerequisite condition to regard the seeking of injunctions of SEPs as an abuse of 
dominance.108 This then raises issues as to what FRAND commitments are.  
In the SSOs’ IPR policies, they do not provide further explanations for FRAND 
commitments. It is vague and ambiguous as to what FRAND commitments refer to and 
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how FRAND commitments can be enforced in practice. It is clear that the participants of 
the SSOs or the SEP owners have not reached a common understanding as to the meaning 
and implications of FRAND commitments. As a consequence, it is uncertain in what 
circumstances the seeking of injunctions by the SEP owners can be considered as a 
violation of FRAND commitments and, consequently, should be prohibited by competition 
law. Similarly, it is unclear under what circumstances the prospective licensees can oppose 
the injunction. The extent to which injunctive relief is available has a strong incentive-
related influence on the bargaining powers of the SEP owners and the potential licensees. 
Hence, in interpreting FRAND commitments and considering the availability of injunctive 
relief, it is of great importance to strike a balance between the interest of the SEP owners 
and the interest of the prospective licensees. On one hand, the recourse to injunctive relief 
by FRAND-encumbered SEP owners should be appropriately restricted in case the 
injunctions are sought anti-competitively; on the other hand, as a part of the existence of 
patent right, injunctions should be available against infringements to encourage patent 
owners to participate in innovation and standard setting activities.  
Different jurisdictions addressed these issues in various ways. The EU’s solutions to these 
problems have changed from time to time, but the experience achieved is meaningful. 
Therefore, the approach adopted by the EU is a good example for China to consider on its 
way to finding a proper methodology to keep a balance between the interests of different 
parties on the availability of injunctive relief for SEPs. It is hoped that, in the future, the 
SSOs can provide clear and detailed instructions as to the meaning and implications of 
FRAND commitments to facilitate the SEP licensing.  
7.4.3  The EU109  
Contrary to the US, the EU sets the analysis of the problem as to whether injunctions 
should be granted to FRAND-pledged SEP owners in the context of competition law. It 
can be seen from the recent judicial decisions in the EU that a more conservative and 
balanced approach has been adopted for the availability of injunctions on SEPs. 
Injunctions of SEPs are no longer granted automatically to FRAND-encumbered SEP 
owners. The interests of SEP owners, potential licensees and the general public are all 
seriously taken into account when determining whether to grant injunctions in the context 
                                                          
109 The analysis of the EU case law provides robust support and reasoning for the balanced proposals made to 
China in Chapter 9, Section 9.3. The discussion and comments in this section is necessary and meaningful to 





of SEPs, but the question of how to strike a balance between these interests is complicated 
and difficult to answer. The EU enforcement in this field has shifted from a licensor-
friendly approach to a licensee-friendly one. Then, in 2015, the CJEU rendered a 
preliminary ruling in Huawei v. ZTE,110 which provides a relatively balanced framework 
for the negotiation between SEP owners and prospective licensees and can be a point of 
reference in determining the availability of injunctive relief. Although the safe harbour 
created in the Huawei v. ZTE by the CJEU provides important guidance on the post-
Huawei cases, the EU is still exploring an optimal way to keep a balance between the 
interests of different parties in terms of the grant of injunctions of SEPs. 
7.4.3.1 Orange Book Standard Case 
On the EU side, it is the ‘Orange Book Standard’ case111 that can be regarded as the start 
of the case law on whether, and in what circumstances, the seeking of injunctions to 
enforce SEPs may be forbidden. The German Federal Supreme Court, in this case, 
formally allowed a defence (‘the compulsory licence defence’) based on competition law. 
The defence relies heavily on the case law where compulsory licences were imposed on the 
basis of infringement of competition rules. The Orange Book Standard case is a seminal 
decision in the development of a competition law based defence to patent infringement 
litigation.  
In the Orange Book Standard case, the plaintiff owned a patent that is essential to a de 
facto standard for CD-Rs. Any undertaking that produces standard-compliant CD-Rs has to 
obtain a licence from the plaintiff. The licensing of the SEP at issue constitutes the relevant 
market. As the only provider, the plaintiff has a dominant position in the relevant market. 
The defendant had made an offer of the royalty rate of 3%, but was rejected by the plaintiff. 
Then, the plaintiff initiated a patent infringement action and sought an injunction against 
the defendant. However, the defendant claimed that the conduct of the plaintiff amounted 
to an abuse of dominance and raised an antitrust defence.  
According to the Federal Supreme Court, if a licence of the patent at issue is essential for 
the prospective licensee to enter into the market, the patent owner is dominant in the 
relevant market and there is no justification for the refusal to license, the seeking of 
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injunctions by the patent owner may constitute an abuse of dominance and the defendant 
can raise an antitrust defence. However, the Federal Supreme Court emphasized that the 
antitrust defence will only be successful if the following two conditions are cumulatively 
met by the defendant: a) the prospective licensee must have made a binding, unconditional 
and reasonable offer to the patent owner to conclude a licensing agreement, which cannot 
be rejected by the patentee without violating competition law; b) the prospective licensee 
must behave like an actual licensee meaning that if the party seeking a licence has 
exploited the patent before obtaining a licence, then obligations contained in the offer must 
be complied with. As the defendant in this case did not satisfy the above two conditions, 
the Federal Supreme Court confirmed the lower court’s judgment and granted the 
injunction.  
The decision of Orange Book Standard case resulted in significant controversy. It is 
submitted that the German Federal Supreme Court has adopted a more favourable position 
towards patent owners in the availability of SEP injunctions.112 There is support for the 
requirement imposed on the potential licensee to behave as if licensed in order to balance 
the interest of the parties and to remove the concern of the use of the patent without 
permission.113 However, the conditions or obligations imposed on the users of the standard 
at issue seem to be too strict, the application of which would result in over-protection of 
SEP owners.114 Such requirements more easily place the potential licensee in a position of 
being held-up.115 In addition, the standard at issue is a de facto standard, the patent owners 
of which did not make FRAND commitments. In this situation, the patent owners have 
stronger power in the licensing negotiations than the FRAND-encumbered SEP owners.116 
The seeking of injunctions by the non-FRAND-encumbered patent owners will not be 
regarded as abusive as long as the required royalties are not clearly excessive. 117 
Accordingly, the conditions established in this case should not be purely and simply 
applied to all parties seeking a licence of SEP.  
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7.4.3.2 Motorola and Samsung Cases 
Contrary to the rules established in the Orange Book Standard case, the European 
Commission took a more favourable position to prospective licensees as to whether SEP 
injunctions should be granted in Motorola and Samsung cases. 
In the Motorola case, the European Commission found that Motorola abused its dominance 
by seeking and enforcing an injunction against a willing licensee, Apple, on the basis of a 
FRAND-encumbered SEP which violated Article 102 TFEU.118 It was admitted that ‘the 
seeking and enforcement of an injunction by a patent-holder is generally a legitimate 
course of action.’119 However, in the context of SEPs, the situation is different. As an 
owner of a standard essential patent, Motorola has committed to licensing its SEPs on 
FRAND terms to any interested third party. In principle, the seeking of injunctions of such 
SEPs may amount to an abuse of a dominant position if the SEP-user is willing to negotiate 
and enter into a FRAND licence. In this case, Apple had agreed to be bound by a third 
party to determine the FRAND terms and conditions in the event that the bilateral 
negotiations did not achieve a satisfying conclusion. The allowing for FRAND rate-setting 
by a third party such as a German court is regarded as a clear indication of potential 
licensees’ willingness to enter into a FRAND licence and to pay adequate remuneration for 
the use.120 Accordingly, Motorola’s seeking of injunctive relief in respect of SEPs in such 
exceptional circumstances contravened Article 102 TFEU. However, the European 
Commission did not impose a fine on Motorola reasoning that there is lack of certainty as 
to the application of competition law to injunctions where SEPs are concerned and 
divergent conclusions have been reached by national courts.121 
In the Samsung case, the European Commission adopted a similar opinion on the alleged 
infringement of Article 102 TFEU by Samsung seeking injunctions on SEPs.122 In 2011, 
Samsung, a FRAND-encumbered SEP owner, sought injunctions against Apple for the use 
of its Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) SEP. The European 
Commission then investigated Samsung’s behaviour and found Apple to be a willing 
licensee. The European Commission concluded first that the seeking of injunctions on 
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Samsung’s FRAND-encumbered SEPs might, in exceptional circumstances, raise 
competition concerns as to the compatibility of the injunctive relief with Article 102 
TFEU. 123  In order to respond to these concerns, Samsung committed not to seek 
injunctions on its SEPs for five years against any prospective licensee who agreed to a 
particular licensing framework for the determination of FRAND terms.124 In 2014, the 
European Commission finally adopted a decision to make these revised commitments 
legally binding on Samsung. 
The decisions of the Motorola and Samsung cases set up a rule to regulate the seeking of 
injunctions on the basis of FRAND-encumbered SEPs under competition law and provide 
a safe harbour for potential willing licensees to defend themselves against abusive 
injunctions. Normally, the injunctive relief itself does not constitute an abuse of dominance 
prohibited by competition law. Only in exceptional cases where patent owners have 
committed to licensing their SEPs on FRAND terms and there is no evidence that the 
prospective licensee is unwilling to enter into a FRAND license, the seeking of an 
injunction violates EU competition rules. The European Commission made a further 
clarification as to the meaning of a ‘willing’ licensee in these two cases. The acceptance of 
a binding determination of FRAND terms by a third party in case of dispute can be 
regarded as willingness. The challenge by SEP-users to the validity or infringement of the 
SEPs at issue does not mean that the prospective licensees are unwilling to enter into a 
FRAND licensing agreement. It is concluded that ‘the mere holding of IPR cannot, in itself, 
constitute an objective justification for the seeking of an injunction by a SEP holder against 
a potential licensee that is not unwilling to enter into a licence agreement on FRAND terms 
and conditions’.125 
However, the application of the conditions created in these two cases (Motorola and 
Samsung) will result in the weakening of the SEP owners’ rights. As stated by Wathelet, a 
mere ambiguous and non-binding expression of a potential licensee to negotiate and enter 
into a FRAND licensing agreement, cannot be considered as willing enough to restrict the 
seeking of injunctions by FRAND-encumbered SEP owners. 126  The Orange Book 
Standard case and the Motorola/Samsung cases are at the two extremes of a spectrum, 
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neither of them can appropriately balance the concerns on patent hold-ups and patent hold-
outs in the context of injunctions on FRAND-encumbered SEPs. Therefore, it is important 
to find a middle path. 
7.4.3.3 Huawei v. ZTE127 
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd (Huawei), a leading multinational company in the field of 
telecommunications, is the proprietor of a European patent which is essential to the ‘Long 
Term Evolution’ (LTE) standard. Huawei committed to the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI) to licensing the SEP to third parties on FRAND terms when the 
patent was incorporated into the LTE standard. ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland GmbH 
(ZTE), one of Huawei’s competitors, provided telecommunications equipment products 
complying with the LTE standard, which inevitably made use of the SEP. Between 
November 2010 and March 2011, Huawei and ZTE engaged in discussions in respect of 
ZTE’s alleged patent infringement and also on the possibility of achieving a FRAND 
licence. During the discussions, Huawei proposed the amount of royalties which it 
considered reasonable, while the ZTE sought a cross-licensing agreement. As a 
consequence, there was no agreement reached. However, ZTE continued to use Huawei’s 
SEP to manufacture LTE standard-compliant products without paying Huawei royalties or 
rendering an account of the past uses. Then, in April 2011, Huawei brought an action 
before the Landgericht Düsseldorf (District Court) in Germany against ZTE for the alleged 
patent infringement. Huawei sought an injunction to prohibit the infringement and required 
the rendering of accounts, the recall of infringing products and damages. 
According to the Düsseldorf District Court, the existence of a patent infringement and the 
existence of Huawei’s dominant position were not in dispute.128 Then, the substance of the 
case concerned the question of whether Huawei’s seeking of an injunction on the basis of 
the SEP constituted an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 
TFEU. However, different approaches had been adopted by the German courts and the 
European Commission on the conditions under which an injunction sought by a FRAND-
encumbered SEP owner can be granted and enforced without violating the EU competition 
rules. On the basis of the conditions established in the Orange Book Standard case, a 
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prohibitory injunction should be granted to Huawei. 129  While, on the basis of the 
conditions established in the Motorola and the Samsung decisions, Huawei’s claim for an 
injunction should be dismissed. 130  Therefore, in 2013, the Düsseldorf District Court 
decided to stay proceedings and referred five questions to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling on the circumstances where injunctive relief by a FRAND-encumbered SEP owner 
will be considered to be an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by Article 102 
TFEU.131  
On 16 July 2015, the CJEU finally delivered the preliminary ruling on Huawei v. ZTE,132 
which provides a framework for FRAND negotiations between dominant SEP owners and 
potential licensees. The CJEU’s judgment confirmed the legitimate right of SEP owners to 
resort to remedies such as injunctive relief to protect effectively the exercise of their patent 
rights. 133  However, given the FRAND commitments made by the SEP owners, it is 
justifiable to impose some requirements on the proprietors before they seek injunctions 
against alleged infringers.134 Therefore, the CJEU listed specific conditions that must be 
satisfied by the dominant SEP owner when seeking an injunction against the alleged 
infringer: a) prior to bringing an action before a court, it is up to the SEP owner to first 
alert the alleged infringer by specifying the infringed SEP and the way in which it was 
infringed; b) if the alleged infringer has expressed willingness to conclude a FRAND 
licensing agreement, it is the SEP owner that must first provide a specific written offer for 
a FRAND licence to the alleged infringer, in which the amount of royalty fees and the way 
to calculate the royalties must be specified.135 At the same time, in order to balance the 
interests of the two parties, the CJEU also set out conditions for the alleged infringer to 
observe before an antitrust defence can be raised against the injunction on the SEP: a) the 
alleged infringer should diligently respond to the SEP owner’s offer in good faith and 
complying with recognized commercial practices in the relevant field, without delaying 
tactics; b) if the alleged infringer does not accept the SEP owner’s initial offer, it must 
promptly provide a written counteroffer on FRAND terms to the SEP owner; c) if the 
counteroffer is then rejected by the SEP owner, the alleged infringer must provide 
appropriate security for the potential royalty fees and render an account of the uses of the 
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SEP at issue.136  In addition, the CJEU concluded that if the parties do not reach an 
agreement on the details of the FRAND terms, they may, by common agreement, request 
an independent third party to determine the amount of royalty fees.137 Any challenge to the 
validity, essentiality or the infringement of the SEP at issue by the prospective licensees 
should not per se be categorized as unwillingness of the licensee.138 
On the basis of the CJEU’s judgment, if the alleged infringer satisfies all the conditions 
listed above, a dominant SEP owner’s seeking an injunction on the use of a SEP will 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. 
However, if the alleged infringers are not able to demonstrate that they are ready, willing 
and able to achieve a FRAND licence in good faith and in recognised commercial practices, 
they cannot avoid the injunctive relief sought by the SEP owner. The CJEU’s preliminary 
ruling on Huawei v. ZTE on one hand imposes some restrictions on the dominant FRAND-
encumbered SEP owners’ right to seek injunctions, and, on the other hand, establishes 
some conditions for the potential licensees to raise an antitrust defence against the 
injunctive relief. The safe harbour created in the CJEU’s preliminary ruling on Huawei v. 
ZTE strikes a balance between the protection of patent rights and the maintaining of free 
competition.  
The CJEU tries to provide a procedural framework to promote better bilateral negotiations 
between the SEP owners and the prospective licensees, and to consider the availability of 
the injunctive relief on the basis of the interests of both sides. The CJEU’s preliminary 
ruling provides guidance and a middle path compared with the previous approaches 
adopted in the Orange Book Standard case and Motorola and Samsung decisions, though it 
is still submitted that the words used in this ruling are more beneficial to SEP owners than 
those used in the Opinion of Advocate General.139  
However, there are still some uncertainties. The CJEU did not explain the notions of 
‘willingness’, ‘good faith’ or ‘diligent response’, which leaves significant room for the 
national courts to use their discretion. More importantly, the CJEU did not provide 
guidance on the meaning of FRAND but the core of most of the conditions established in 
the CJEU’s preliminary ruling leads to the meaning of FRAND. The ambiguity of FRAND 
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leaves confusion and conflict for the post-Huawei cases. Without clear interpretations, it is 
still hard to determine whether the patent royalty fees charged by the SEP owner are 
excessive and infringe the FRAND commitments. As a consequence, follow-on questions 
are pending.140  
7.4.4 The US141  
In general, the US antitrust authorities and courts deal with the seeking of injunctions on a 
FRAND-encumbered SEP from the perspective of patent infringement, taking into account 
the interests of both parties. In 2013, the US Department of Justice and the US Patent and 
Trademark Office jointly stated that in some situations, the SEP owners’ seeking of 
injunctions may force the SEP-users to accept unreasonable terms which do not comply 
with FRAND commitments, and ‘may be inconsistent with the public interest’.142 In this 
context, the injunction should not be granted unless the SEP-users are unwilling 
licensees.143 Although the statement mentioned above is not legally binding, it shows the 
attitude of the relevant authorities.  
Since the eBay case,144 the US Supreme Court has brought an end to the automatic issue of 
an injunction against the patent infringer and a four-factor test was established to consider 
the availability of the injunctive relief. In order to obtain an injunction, the patent owner 
has to satisfy the following four conditions that: a) it has suffered an irreparable injury; b) 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; c) considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a 
remedy in equity is warranted; and d) the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction.145 Compared with the approach adopted in the EU, the four-factor 
test seems to impose more obligations on the patent owners who would like to seek 
injunctions in patent infringement cases. What the approach emphasizes is the balance 
between the private and the public interests.  
The four-factor test established in the eBay case is generally applied to all the patent 
infringement cases where the injunctive relief is sought, not specifically just for the SEP-
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related injunctions. Accordingly, it is submitted that the unique aspects of the FRAND-
encumbered SEPs result in intrinsic difficulties for SEP owners to satisfy the four-factor 
test.146 This is so for the reason that the US courts usually consider the commitment to 
license SEPs on FRAND terms as SEP owners’ recognition that monetary damages are 
sufficient in disputes.147 In other words, except for injunctions, there is another remedy 
available — monetary damage. Additionally, one of the aims of the standardisation of 
patented technologies is to benefit the public, that is, for public interest. That means the 
grant of an injunction on a SEP can harm public interest and not satisfy the four-factor test 
established in the eBay case. These aspects make it challenging for the SEP owners to 
obtain an injunction under the four-factor test. In this context, the appellate courts in the 
US later clarified that the commitment to license SEPs on FRAND terms does not mean 
the waiver of the right to seek injunctions against infringement. In theory, it is possible and 
appropriate for the FRAND-encumbered SEP owners to be granted an injunction in certain 
circumstances where the alleged infringers are unwilling licensees and behave in bad 
faith.148 Even so, there is an increasing conservative trend in the US for the grant of an 
injunction on the basis of the FRAND-encumbered SEPs.  
There are seldom cases in the US where SEP owners are awarded SEPs injunctions, but 
injunctions were granted for patents that were not SEPs.149 So far, there has not been any 
case in the US in which the recourse to the injunctive relief by the FRAND-encumbered 
SEP owners has been considered under antitrust rules. In the US, the courts focus more on 
the determination of a FRAND royalty rate, while in the EU, the courts pay more attention 
to the analysis of the parties’ conduct before the grant of an injunction. 
7.4.5 The Evolving Landscape on Injunctive Relief of SEPs in China 
Whether the FRAND-encumbered SEP owners should be granted an injunction against the 
alleged infringer has raised considerable concerns in China. China has adopted the world-
wide recognised principles in this field. It is acknowledged by Chinese authorities and 
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scholars that the rights of the FRAND-pledged SEP owners to seek injunctions should be 
appropriately restricted or it can become a leverage for SEP owners to force prospective 
licensees to accept unreasonable licensing terms that will not be agreed by SEP-users 
without the threat of injunctions. As a consequence, this is likely to constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position violating competition rules. It is also emphasized that the right to seek 
injunctions is a basic and legitimate remedy for patent owners to protect their patent rights. 
This, normally, should be respected. The Chinese judicial and administrative enforcement 
authorities have considered the EU and US experience. However, there is no consensus as 
to the circumstances in which an injunction sought by the FRAND-encumbered SEP 
owners may violate the AML. 
The adverse effects resulting from the abuse of injunctive relief by dominant SEP owners 
are considered the most direct and detrimental to competition which can directly exclude 
competitors’ similar products from the relevant market.150 As a consequence, it attracts 
quite a lot of attention from China’s AMEAs. MOFCOM, one of China’s AMEAs that was 
responsible for merger control, raised significant concerns as to its impact on competition 
resulting from the concentration of the ownership of SEPs. For example, in 2014, the 
MOFCOM for the first time in a conditional approval decision expressly required that after 
the acquisition of Nokia, Microsoft was prohibited from seeking injunctions against 
patented products manufactured in China.151 Then, in 2015, in reviewing the acquisition of 
Alcatel-Lucent by Nokia, one of the conditions imposed by MOFCOM to approve the 
transaction was that Nokia was not allowed to prohibit the implementation of the FRAND-
pledged standard by seeking injunctions on the basis of its SEPs, unless Nokia had already 
proposed FRAND licensing terms and the prospective licensees were unwilling to accept 
or observe such FRAND terms.152 It can be seen that the Chinese AMEA — MOFCOM 
has regarded the observance of FRAND commitments by SEP owners and the 
unwillingness of SEP-users as the prerequisite conditions to grant an injunction. 
China’s AML does not explicitly articulate the seeking of injunctions on FRAND-
encumbered SEPs by dominant SEP owners as an abuse of a dominant position. Thus, the 
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decision in the first SEP-related anti-monopoly litigation in China — Huawei v. 
InterDigital plays an important role in understanding the position in China. In Huawei v 
InterDigital,153 the Chinese Court concluded that the seeking of injunctions by InterDigital 
in the US was seemingly exercising its legitimate remedy to protect its patent rights but 
actually it was a negotiation tactic to force Huawei to accept unreasonable licensing terms 
and conditions, which did not follow the FRAND commitments. InterDigital lodged an 
action for an injunction against Huawei when they were still at a negotiation stage. The 
Chinese Court found that during the negotiations, Huawei behaved in good faith and was 
willing to accept FRAND licensing terms.154 Therefore, the InterDigital’s seeking of an 
injunction was not justifiable and should be prohibited.155 However, the courts did not 
clearly find such seeking of an injunction as an abuse of dominance, but only considered 
such conduct as a prohibited leverage to impose non-FRAND terms on SEP-users. 
Some key regulatory initiatives have taken place in the last two years as a direct result of 
the competition concerns which have emerged from the situation. The first legal document 
that sheds light on the issue of injunctions in the context of SEPs is the Interpretations (II) 
of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the 
Trial of Cases Involving Patent Infringement Disputes (Interpretations (II)).156 It came into 
effect on 1 April 2016. In accordance with Article 24.2 of Interpretations (II), the court will 
not support the SEP owners’ right to seek injunctions where FRAND-encumbered SEPs 
have been explicitly disclosed as long as the following two conditions are satisfied: a) the 
patent owner intentionally violates its FRAND commitments in the negotiations with the 
alleged infringer in respect of the licensing terms which results in the failure to conclude a 
licensing agreement;  and b) the alleged infringer has not committed an obvious fault 
during the negotiation. 157  The Supreme People’s Court differentiates SEP-related 
infringements from traditional IP infringement disputes and emphasizes the importance to 
consider the subjective fault of both parties in determining whether to grant an injunction 
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where a SEP is concerned.158 Additionally, according to the wording of Article 24, it is 
only applicable to patent owners that have committed to licensing their patents on FRAND 
terms in the standard setting process.159 Similar to the US approach, Article 24 of the 
Interpretations (II) addresses the grant of injunctions on FRAND-encumbered SEPs from 
the perspectives of patent law and tort law but does not consider whether such seeking of 
injunctions constitutes an abuse of dominance. 160  Accordingly, Article 24 can also be 
applicable to injunctive relief sought by non-dominant SEP owners, where an antitrust 
defence is impossible. It is acknowledged that Article 24 is a significant improvement in 
the regulation of SEP owners who seek injunctions on FRAND-encumbered SEPs. 
However, the Interpretations (II) do not explain what kind of conduct can be attributed to 
FRAND-compliance and in what circumstances the alleged infringer can be determined as 
fault free. There are no clear and detailed examples of obligations established for either 
SEP owners or the alleged infringers though the Supreme People’s Court has emphasized 
the importance of keeping a balance between the interest of SEP owners and the interest of 
SEP-users.  
On 20th April, the Higher People’s Court of Beijing Municipality published Guidelines for 
Patent Infringement Determination (2017), in which Articles 149-153 complement and 
elaborate Article 24 of the Interpretations (II) to clarify when injunctions should not be 
granted to SEP owners.161 Articles 149-153 on the SEPs took into account the enforcement 
experience in the developed countries and adopted similar conditions established in 
Huawei v. ZTE162for SEP owners and SEP-users. Article 152 of the Guidelines for Patent 
infringement Determination enumerates the situations in which the SEP owners can be 
determined as intentionally violating the FRAND commitments, namely (a) not informing 
the alleged infringer of the infringed patent in writing and not identifying the scope and the 
way in which the patent was infringed; (b) not offering the alleged infringer specific 
licensing terms and patent information in writing with recognized commercial practices 
after the alleged infringer clearly expresses the willingness to negotiate licensing; (c) not 
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clarifying the time limit for the alleged infringer to reply; (d) stopping or terminating the 
licensing negotiation without justifiable reasons; (e) requiring obviously unreasonable 
conditions in the process of negotiation and leading to the failure to achieve an agreement; 
or (f) other obvious faults.163 Moreover, Article 153 explains the obvious faults of the 
alleged infringer in the process of negotiation: (a) not replying diligently in a reasonable 
period of time after receiving the notice of infringement in writing from the patent owner; 
(b) after receiving the proposed licensing conditions in writing from the SEP owner, not 
replying diligently whether to accept the conditions or not offering new licensing terms 
after rejecting the SEP owner’s conditions; (c) delaying or refusing to negotiate without 
justifiable reasons; (d) requiring obviously unreasonable conditions in the process of 
negotiation and leading to the failure to achieve an agreement; or (e) other obvious 
faults. 164  The rules in the Guidelines for Patent Infringement Determination provide 
explanations to the uncertainties in Article 24 of the Interpretations (II) and provide 
guidance to the behaviour of both parties in the licensing negotiations. It has to be admitted 
that the Guidelines for Patent Infringement Determination can give good guidance for the 
anti-monopoly enforcement in the seeking of injunctions on FRAND-encumbered SEPs. 
However, both Article 24 of the Interpretations (II) and this guidelines are explaining 
whether the injunctions should be granted to SEP owners, and if not, in what circumstances. 
These guidance and explanations are both from the perspective of patent and tort laws. 
Neither of them considers whether and how the conduct to seek injunctions on SEPs will 
influence competition and violate the AML. Therefore, the question is how to establish an 
appropriate anti-monopoly analysis approach in this context. Detailed guidance and 
regulatory rules from the perspective of the AML are awaited. 
In March 2017, after collecting public comment on two draft guidelines from the NDRC 
and the SAIC, China’s Anti-monopoly Commission (AMC) published unified draft IPRs 
guidelines for public comment (the AMC draft IPRs guidelines).165  The AMC draft IPRs 
guidelines considered injunctive relief from the anti-monopoly enforcement perspective. It 
is stated that the seeking of injunctions by dominant SEP owners as a means to force SEP-
users to accept unreasonable licensing terms and excessively high royalty fees may 
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eliminate or restrict competition and constitute an abuse of a dominant position.166 The 
AMC draft IPRs guidelines introduce five factors to be considered when determining the 
negative impact on competition caused by the injunctive relief, namely the performance 
and actual will of both parties in the negotiations, the commitments encumbered by the 
SEPs on injunctive relief, the licensing terms provided by both parties during the 
negotiation, the influence of the injunctive relief on the licensing negotiation, and the 
influence on the relevant downstream market competition and the consumer welfare.167 
The AMC draft IPRs guidelines expressly mention the AMEAs’ concerns as to the 
negative effects brought about by the SEP owners’ seeking injunctions. They set up an 
analysis framework where some essential factors need to be considered. However, it is not 
enough or clear as to how to apply this analysis frame to practical investigations. More 
importantly, the AMC draft IPRs guidelines do not take the seeking of injunctions by SEP 
owners as independent anti-competitive conduct but leverage to accept the unreasonable 
licensing terms. As guidelines, some instructions on how to examine the relevant parties’ 
behaviour should be available. For example, in what circumstances the prospective 
licenses can be determined willing? What kind of terms can be regarded as FRAND-
compliant? The AMC draft IPRs guidelines leave it open as to what kind of approach will 
be adopted in the final published version.  
7.5 Conclusion  
In last five years, China’s AMEAs have begun to increase their scrutiny of anti-
competitive conduct in the licensing of IPRs and a series of measures have been or are 
waiting to be adopted. In particular, the competition concerns arising from the licensing of 
SEPs have become a contentious issue. Among them, the two most noticeable concerns 
arise from the failure to disclose patent information in the standard setting process and the 
seeking of injunctions by FRAND-encumbered SEPs owners. The enforcement 
experiences of the EU and US authorities in these aspects have provided valuable guidance 
for China when developing its own anti-monopoly enforcement policy.  
When applying the AML to address these two challenging concerns, some problems need 
to be clarified and resolved. It is acknowledged that the AML will only be applied to the 
exercise of patent rights that results in the elimination or restriction of competition. In 
                                                          






terms of the disclosure obligation, there is controversy as to in what circumstances the 
failure to disclose patent interest in the standard setting process will violate relevant 
competition rules. The controversy not only appears in different authorities in the same 
country but also takes place between different countries whose competition rules seem to 
be a little divergent in detail. On one hand, the FTC and the federal court in the US have 
achieved contrasting results in determining whether the non-disclosure of patent 
information by Rambus violated the antitrust rules.168 On the other hand, the European 
Commission analysed the same Rambus case with a different approach in accordance with 
its own competition enforcement framework and preliminarily rendered the Rambus 
violating Article 102 TFEU.169 In the context of Chinese market, the limited enforcement 
experience did not give appropriate consideration to the influence of the failure to disclose 
patent interest in the standard setting process on the competition in the relevant market.170 
In addition, the only available competition rule — Article 13 of the SAIC Provisions does 
not take into account the market power obtaining from the non-disclosure conduct in the 
standard setting process.171 As a consequence, Article 13 can do nothing in the situation 
where SEP owners who were non-dominant at the time of non-disclosure but become 
dominant when their patents are incorporated into a standard. Therefore, China is proposed 
to establish an appropriate approach on the basis of the divergent enforcement of the US 
and EU in this respect which should satisfy China’s own legal and economic circumstances. 
The proposed approach should identify the conditions in which and how the AML can be 
applied to the non-disclosure conduct, provide guidance on what factors and the extent to 
which these factors should be considered in analysing the anti-competitive effects of such 
non-disclosure and impose deterrent effects on the potential violators.172 
With regard to the seeking of injunctions, its effective and legitimate position to protect 
patent rights against infringers should be definitely confirmed. However, when the seeking 
of injunctions comes to the FRAND-encumbered SEPs, the situation seems to be different. 
The inappropriate use of injunctive relief by some SEP owners may constitute an abuse of 
dominance violating competition rules. Whether the seeking of injunctions by SEP owners 
should be addressed in the context of patent and tort laws or in the context of competition 
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rules have achieved different answers in the EU and US.173 Even in the EU itself, the 
attitude to the seeking of injunctions on SEPs had shifted from licensor-friendly to 
licensee-friendly before the CJEU concluded a relatively conservative and balanced 
approach in the Huawei v. ZTE.174 As a consequence, it is still being debated fiercely how 
to apply competition rules to the seeking of injunctions on FRAND-encumbered SEPs. 
This is also a hard and challenging problem faced by China.175 It is not clear whether the 
abuse of the injunctive relief on SEPs should be treated as an independent anti-competitive 
practice or as a tactic to realise the other anti-competitive purposes within the scope of 
China’s AML. A basic regulating approach is necessary to be confirmed. In addition, in 
what situations and to what extent the seeking of injunctions by SEP owners should be 
limited from the perspective of competition enforcement confuse the relevant AMEA a lot. 
The conditions adopted by the CJEU in the Huawei v. ZTE provide good guidance, though 
there remains some controversy. On the basis of the existing enforcement principles 
established in developed countries, China should find an effective and appropriate way to 
address these concerns subject to its own legal and economic circumstances. Some 
proposals will be made to resolve these problems in Section 9.3 of Chapter 9. 
 
 
                                                          
173 See also Sections 7.4.3 and 7.4.4. 
174 See also Section 7.4.3. 





   The Regulation of Reverse Payment Patent 
Settlement Agreements in the Pharmaceutical Industry from 
the Perspective of China’s Anti-monopoly Law 
8.1 Introduction  
In addition to the challenging competition concerns arising from the licensing of standard 
essential patents discussed in Chapter 7, Chapter 8 will examine another noticeable 
competition concern arising from reverse payment patent settlement agreements (RPPSAs). 
Reverse payment patent settlement agreements (the so-called pay-for-delay agreements) 
are normally concluded between brand-name drug manufacturers 1  and generic drug 
manufacturers. This is done in the context of settling a patent dispute where the brand-
name pharmaceutical company which owns a patent provides monetary payments (or other 
forms of value) to the generic competitor in exchange for the latter’s commitment to delay 
market entry. 2 This kind of RPPSAs mainly arise in the pharmaceutical industry.3  
From the perspective of Patent Law, settlements are permitted as a legitimate and 
preferential way to terminate private disputes with regard to the uncertainties and high 
costs of patent litigation.4 Such standard patent settlements can promote efficiency5 and 
benefit society, 6  so competition concerns seldom arise in this context. However, the 
situation can be different when it comes to the patent settlement agreement with a payment 
from the patent owner to the alleged infringer in the pharmaceutical industry. 
The research and development of new drugs is characterized as expensive, risky, difficult 
and time-consuming. When the new drugs formally come into the market, much time has 
already been spent on administrative procedures and the patents on such drugs are almost 
at the end of their patent protection term. Generic drugs are required to have 
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bioequivalence with the corresponding brand-name drugs. As a result, generic drugs can 
substitute the brand-name drugs once the former have obtained the formal approval from 
relevant authorities, and they will become substantive competitors in the relevant market. 
Owing to the considerable difference between the costs and risks of the patented drugs and 
those of their generic versions in the process of research and development, generic drugs 
enjoy a great advantage in the selling price compared to that of the patented drugs. Once 
the generic drugs enter the relevant market, the price of the brand-name drugs will be 
seriously impacted and reduced.7 In this situation, often the patent owner cannot obtain 
enough compensation for their prior investment in the limited term and this is likely to 
profoundly discourage the patent owner from innovating.8 If the patent protection system is 
not able to compensate patent owners appropriately, they may have the financial incentive 
to extend their patent term through, for example, paying the generic company for delaying 
the market entry of the competing generics.9 The involvement of value transfer from the 
patent owner to the alleged infringer and the commitment of the latter to delay marketing 
the generic drug, make RPPSAs controversial in the context of antitrust scrutiny. On one 
hand there is some rationale for such RPPSAs; on the other hand, the agreements may 
eliminate the competition from generic companies and deprive consumers of cheaper and 
affordable drugs, which will generally harm consumer welfare.  
In recent years, the legality of such agreements has attracted the attention of antitrust 
authorities in many countries. It has become a contentious issue and been hotly debated. As 
a pioneer, the US antitrust enforcement authorities and courts have examined this practice 
for more than ten years. Following the 2008 pharmaceutical sector inquiry, the EU 
formally began to focus on the anti-competitive effects of pay-for-delay agreements. In 
2013, the US Supreme Court, for the first time, in Actavis,10provided guidance on the 
antitrust analysis of RPPSAs and adopted the rule of reason principle. Even so, diversity 
and split still exists in district courts as to how to apply the Supreme Court’s guidance in 
specific cases. In the same year, the EU General Court confirmed the European 
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Commission’s decision in Lundbeck11 that this practice was a restriction by object. Thus, 
Lundbeck is the first EU judgment on pay-for-delay agreements from an EU competition 
law perspective. 
RPPSAs are of such a complicated nature that they raise concerns from three aspects: 
patent law, competition law and national health care system. It is a sophisticated 
intersection of patent protection — encouraging research and development in the 
pharmaceutical industry and competition enforcement—maintaining fair and effective 
competition in the relevant market. The determination of the legality of such RPPSAs is a 
matter of balancing the interests of patent owners and consumer welfare that is the main 
goal of antitrust enforcement. As a result of the complexities, there is no unanimous 
consensus as to how to assert the compatibility of RPPSAs in the pharmaceutical industry 
with competition/antitrust law.  
The discussion on the potential anti-competitive effects of RPPSAs has gradually emerged 
in China. In the earlier years, it was argued that the appearance of such problematic 
agreements in the US was mainly caused by shortcomings in the US regulatory framework 
which was applied to the pharmaceutical industry; China does not have a similar regulatory 
framework, so it was assumed that this kind of antitrust concern would not emerge in 
China.12 However, this view cannot be accepted in this thesis. There are reasons to believe 
that the special context of China’s pharmaceutical industry can provide an environment for 
the existence of pay-for-delay agreements.13 Therefore, the competition concerns raised by 
the RPPSAs should be seriously considered by China’s anti-monopoly enforcement 
authorities. They should nip in the bud and prepare in advance. Despite the absence of a 
unanimous approach, the US and EU antitrust enforcement authorities have accumulated 
valuable enforcement experience in dealing with such agreements within the 
pharmaceutical industry. On this basis, China should adopt an effective and appropriate 
anti-monopoly analysis framework to deal with such competition concerns. The Chinese 
framework can be adapted to suit China’s legal and industrial context.  
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This chapter will be divided into five sections. Following the introduction, the origin and 
reasons for the existence of pay-for-delay agreements will be described. Then, the 
approaches to the pay-for-delay agreements adopted by the US and EU antitrust authorities 
and courts will be examined. The fourth section will focus on how RPPSAs should be 
assessed in China as well as providing commentary on proposals for the anti-monopoly 
analysis approaches. The final section concludes the chapter. 
8.2 RPPSAs in the Pharmaceutical Industry  
8.2.1 The Origin 
RPPSAs in the pharmaceutical industry first originated in the US.  
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act) was adopted in 1984 and one of its objectives was to balance the patent 
protection for brand-name drugs (patented drugs) with the incentive to encourage the 
marketing of generic drugs in the US.14 Before marketing a new drug, the manufacturer 
must file a New Drug Application (NDA) to obtain the approval from the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). In the NDA, the patent owner must provide convincing evidence to 
show that the new drug is safe and effective for use and is required to identify all the 
patents on the drug or on the methods of use.15 The information of the announced patents is 
published by FDA in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluation which is also called the Orange Book. One of the important contributions of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act is to establish an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) that 
simplifies the lengthy application process for a generic version of the drug already 
approved by FDA.16 The Hatch-Waxman Act also aims to increase the accessibility of 
affordable drugs, so potential generic manufacturers can market generics before the patents 
on the brand-name drug expire by filing a Paragraph IV certification in the ANDA. Since a 
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Paragraph IV certification is regarded as an artificial act of patent infringement, 17  it 
constitutes grounds for drug patent holders to initiate patent infringement litigation.18 The 
applicant in an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification is required to give written notice 
to each patent owner affected by the certification, as well as to the holder of the approved 
application for the patented drug. 19  If the patent holder, subject to the Paragraph IV 
certification, lodges an action for patent infringement within 45 days after receiving the 
aforesaid notice, the ANDA process will be automatically stayed for 30 months, unless the 
patent expires before that period or the patent is determined invalid or not infringed by a 
court decision.20 In order to encourage generic challenges, the first generic filer with a 
Paragraph IV certification will be granted a 180-day exclusivity period for the marketing 
of its generic version of the listed drug, during which the FDA will not approve new 
ANDAs. 
The special regulatory framework in the US pharmaceutical industry ‘creates a unique 
incentive structure’,21 which provides a basis for the strategic behaviour of both the brand-
name drug manufacturers and the generic drug manufacturers. The creation of the ANDA 
and the 180-day exclusivity period encourages generic challenges to the drug patents and 
motivates generic drugs to enter the market before patented drugs expire.22 This, to some 
extent, poses a risk that patent owners may be held up by the generic drug manufacturers.23 
At the same time, the Hatch-Waxman Act reversed the traditional balance of litigation 
risks. There is little litigation risk for the potential generic company to be an ANDA 
applicant with a Paragraph IV certification, except for some basic legal costs. The potential 
generic company will not suffer significant losses or damages because the automatic 30-
month pending period stops the generic drugs entering the market and preserves the 
generic company from producing competing generics.24 If the potential generic company 
fortunately wins the patent litigation, even if unlikely (the chance is not great), the 
company will save significant funding investments in research and development and then 
they can easily occupy the relevant market. If the brand-name drug company wins the case, 
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there will only be some financial loss for the potential generic company. As a result, 
challenging the drug patents by submitting a Paragraph IV certification is always beneficial 
for generic manufacturers. On the other hand, the patent owner faces considerable financial 
risks from such a challenge. The success of the patent litigation will not bring extra 
benefits for brand-name companies but the loss of the patent litigation will deprive them of 
their market position and the financial consequences can be serious. These consequences 
make brand-name companies averse to the significant litigation risks.25 In addition, patent 
owners may have to encounter the risk that they cannot earn enough profits from marketing 
their patented drugs to recover earlier research and development costs. This may 
discourage their innovation activities. Therefore, brand-name drug companies try their best 
to take various strategic measures to impede the market entry of generic drugs. 
Pharmaceutical companies have been successful in taking advantage of the loopholes in the 
regulatory framework and they soon found a ‘win-win’ way for both the brand-name drug 
company and the generic drug manufacturer to share monopolistic profits. The brand-name 
drug company pays the generic manufacturer a large amount of money or other forms of 
value in a so-called patent settlement agreement in exchange for the generic 
manufacturer’s delaying its 180-day exclusivity period and so to exclude other generic 
companies from entering the relevant market. 26  By doing so, the brand-name drug 
company can eliminate the competition from generic drugs and maintain its market 
position for a longer period of time. It is clear from the judgment of the US Court of 
Appeals, Eleventh Circuit that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) understands reverse 
payments as ‘a natural by-product of the Hatch-Waxman process’.27 
8.2.2 Reasons for the Conclusion of RPPSAs28 
In addition to the special regulatory rules found in the US pharmaceutical industry, some 
other factors also contribute to the pharmaceutical companies’ choice of RPPSAs. Brand-
name pharmaceutical companies may sometimes settle patent disputes due to the 
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uncertainty of the validity of the patent and of the outcome of the patent litigation.29 All 
property rights to some extent have a kind of uncertainty, especially patent rights whose 
uncertainty is mainly displayed in the commercial significance and their validity and 
scope.30 Patent rights are not absolute rights. They are granted for a maximum period of 20 
years from application. Even after the grant, patents can be subject to revocation if 
successfully challenged. According to a FTC study, ‘[g]eneric applicants have prevailed in 
73 [%] of the cases in which a court has resolved the patent dispute’ between 1992 and 
2002.31 It is reported that ‘generic companies won overall more than 60% of all patent 
litigation initiated in the EU from 2000-2007 in which a final judgment was given’.32 The 
validity of the patent is always subject to challenges before courts which leads to a great 
uncertainty of the litigation results. In order to avoid huge financial risks caused by the loss 
of a patent litigation, brand-name companies will choose to settle their patent disputes or 
even pay the alleged infringer to withdraw the challenges.  
Moreover, the expensive litigation costs of patent disputes in terms of time and money are 
another important reason for pharmaceutical companies to settle.33 This is particularly true 
in the EU, where there is neither a unitary patent law nor a unified patent court yet into 
force. In the current EU situation, patent owners who would like to enforce their patent 
rights effectively and prevent alleged infringers from marketing their infringing generics, 
have to bring an infringement action in each member state where they have patent rights 
that are allegedly being infringed. This process is considerably ‘costly and time-
consuming’.34 Additionally, the differences between individual national patent laws cannot 
guarantee ex ante effective remedies or consistent litigation results ex post. It is stated that 
in the EU pharmaceutical industry, 30% of patent litigation are parallel proceeded in 
several member states and 11% of them obtain conflicting results in different national 
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courts.35 Therefore, brand-name drug manufacturers are well motivated to settle patent 
disputes even though their patents are strong.36 
The brand-name drug company and the generic company may have common interests to 
reach a RPPSA.37 It is believed that the amount of profit a brand-name drug company loses 
from competition with a generic company is more than what a generic company can earn.38 
The conclusion of a pay-for-delay agreement provides an opportunity for both to share the 
avoided losses of the brand-name drug company. In this situation, the patent owner can be 
compensated for its prior investment in research and development and maintain the large 
amount of profits, which will otherwise be lost due to the limited protection term of the 
drug patent. While, the generic company can obtain riskless financial revenue without 
actual manufacturing. The reverse payment may sometimes be higher than what the 
generic company anticipates if its generic drug successfully enters the market. 39At the 
same time, it can eliminate for both sides the uncertainty and risks caused by patent 
litigation and can save them time and monetary costs. 
RPPSAs firstly appeared in the US, but they go beyond the US. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
caused the breakout of such RPPSAs but it can only be regarded as a kind of catalyst to 
accelerate the appearance or development of such agreements. The reasons discussed 
above show that combining with the specific legal context, RPPSAs will emerge in 
jurisdictions other than the US, such as the EU and China.40  
8.2.3 Competition Concerns for RPPSAs 
As already stated in the introduction, settlements are a general and preferential legitimate 
way for parties to peacefully resolve their patent disputes. Settlements will not only save 
costs for private parties, but also can save social resources. In general, normal settlement 
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agreements will not raise competition concerns. However, RPPSAs in the pharmaceutical 
industry may delay the market entry of generic drugs. This can have an impact on 
competition to the detriment of the consumer welfare. Generic drugs contribute to the 
promotion of the accessibility of drugs and to the reduction of medical expenditure. The 
price of generic versions can be 90% lower than that of the brand-name drugs.41 Once 
generic drugs enter into the market, the market share of the corresponding brand-name 
drugs will be significantly decreased. Accordingly, in order to respond to the entry of 
generic drugs and maintain their monopolistic profits, brand-name drug manufacturers will 
resort to patent strategic measures such as RPPSAs. RPPSAs impose restrictions on the 
entry of generic drugs, require the generic suppliers not to challenge the validity of the 
relevant patents, and require them not to compete on the relevant market. In return, generic 
suppliers will obtain financial benefits which are not subject to cash payments. The pay-
for-delay agreements may deprive consumers of cheaper drugs and extend the term of 
monopolistic prices to the detriment of consumer welfare. The extra payments made by the 
brand-name drug manufacturers will often be transferred to the consumer by an increase on 
the selling price of patented drugs.42 According to the report, pay-for-delay agreements in 
the pharmaceutical industry can result in an estimated cost of $3.5 billion per year for 
consumers in the US.43 Furthermore, the national health care budgets will be adversely 
affected, as cheaper generic drugs will not be available in the market to compete with 
patented drugs. National competition enforcement authorities and courts in developed 
countries have begun to scrutinize these agreements as to their compatibility with 
competition law. However, there is no consensus as to how to apply competition rules to 
such RPPSAs. 
8.3 Antitrust Enforcement and RPPSAs 
8.3.1 From the US Perspective  
In the US, pay-for-delay agreements in the pharmaceutical industry have been challenged 
strongly in recent years. The FTC44 holds a strong negative attitude to the pay-for-delay 
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agreements and targets them as enforcement priority. However, the attitudes of the US 
courts to such agreements are not always consistent. The development process of the courts’ 
approach to RPPSAs is similar to the one they have experienced in respect of the 
relationship between Patent Law and Antitrust Law. It fluctuated from one end of the 
spectrum to the other until the US Supreme Court adopted a reasonable balancing stance. 
However, this balancing solution still leaves uncertainties for the lower courts when faced 
with such arrangements.  
Initially, the US courts condemned RPPSAs in a series of appeal cases and found them per 
se illegal in violation of antitrust rules. The key case applying the per se illegal rule is the 
decision in re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation.45 This case concerned a pay-for-delay 
agreement in which the generic manufacturer agreed not to market its generic version of 
the patented drug Cardizem CD until either the issue of a final and unappealable judgment 
of non-infringement or the conclusion of a licensing agreement. 46  Simultaneously, the 
generic company agreed to withdraw its antitrust counterclaims.47 As a reward, the patent 
owner agreed to pay the generic company $40 million per year.48 The Sixth Circuit then 
determined that such RPPSA between the patent owner and the generic company was ‘a 
horizontal market allocation agreement’49 and ‘constituted a per se illegal restraint of trade 
in violation of the Sherman Act’.50 The claim of the patent owner that the pay-for-delay 
agreement should be treated as the enforcement of its patent rights to settle the patent 
dispute was dismissed.51 The Court found that the agreement not only delayed the market 
entry of the first generic company but also excluded the entry of other competing generic 
companies, thus maintained the patent owner’s exclusive position in the market.52 
Later, the approach to pay-for-delay agreements swung to the other end of the spectrum, 
applying the ‘scope-of-the-patent test’. The ‘scope-of-the-patent test’ means that the 
RPPSAs can be allowed and outwith antitrust scrutiny as long as the terms and conditions 
of the settlement agreements do not go beyond the ‘scope-of-the-patent test’, the patent 
was not issued through fraud and the patent litigation itself was not a sham. According to 
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the decision in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,53 the generic companies 
had admitted that their products infringed the drug patent on the brand-name drug, but 
claimed the invalidity of that patent.54 In fact, the patent concerned was declared invalid in 
1998.55 However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of the district court that the 
settlement agreement was per se illegal. 56  The reasoning was that the pay-for-delay 
settlement agreement is closely linked to the nature of patents, thus the exclusionary power 
of a patent should not be ignored.57 In this case, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the 
brand-name drug company’s payment to the generic company, in exchange for the latter’s 
delay to enter the relevant market, did not go beyond the exclusionary effects of the patent, 
and should not be considered as per se illegal.58 A full antitrust analysis is required. The 
district court was required to consider ‘the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, 
the extent to which these provisions of the [a]greements exceed the scope and the anti-
competitive effects thereof’ in its antitrust analysis of pay-for-delay agreements.59 The 
‘scope-of-the-patent test’ was then applied in another case, Schering-Plough Corp. v. 
F.T.C..60 In this case, Schering-Plough, a brand-name drug manufacturer of a prescribed 
potassium chloride product—K-Dur 20 separately reached patent litigation settlement 
agreements with two generic companies, Upsher and ESI. In order to settle the patent 
disputes with these two generic companies, Schering-Plough paid each of them a large 
amount of money. In return, Schering-Plough obtained several licences and commitments 
to defer the market entry of the generic versions of Schering-Plough’s K-Dur 20. However, 
the FTC concluded that the Schering-Plough’s settlement payments were not merely for 
obtaining licences. The real purpose was to keep the generic companies out of the relevant 
market. The FTC ruling was then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit 
invalidated the FTC’s order which decided that the patent settlement agreements at issue 
were unreasonable restraints of trade, and affirmed that no evidence showed these 
settlement agreements went beyond the exclusionary effects of the patent concerned.61 
Thus, the settlement agreements did not violate antitrust rules and the analysis approach 
established in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. should be observed. In 
April 2012, the Eleventh Circuit, again, affirmed the ‘scope-of-the-patent test’ in Watson 
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that the RPPSA was exempted from antitrust scrutiny in the absence of sham litigation or 
fraud issue of a patent.62 
Nevertheless, another Circuit took a different view. The same settlements in Schering-
Plough Corp. v. F.T.C. were later challenged in private class actions by direct purchasers 
of K-Dur products. Surprisingly, the Third Circuit in Re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation reached 
the conclusion that the pay-for-delay agreements were presumptively illegal. In Re K-Dur 
Antitrust Litigation, the Third Circuit criticized the ‘scope-of-the-patent test’ which 
exempts RPPSAs from any antitrust scrutiny.63 The court considered such a test to be 
contrary to the Hatch-Waxman Act policies and the Supreme Court precedent.64 The Third 
Circuit followed the FTC’s approach and instructed that on the basis of the economic 
realities, a rule of reason analysis should be briefly applied to examine the legality of the 
RPPSA.65 Any payment from a patent owner to a generic company in exchange for the 
latter’s agreement to delay the market entry of its generic drugs, should be determined as 
‘prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade’.66 However, this presumption 
of illegality can be rebutted if the parties demonstrate that the reverse payment ‘was for a 
purpose other than delayed entry’ or it has pro-competitive effects.67  
Until 2012, different courts reached different conclusions on the application of antitrust 
rules to RPPSAs in the pharmaceutical industry. Two main approaches among US circuits 
can be identified. On one hand, the Federal Circuit, Second Circuit and the Eleventh 
Circuit applied the ‘scope-of-the-patent test’ to exempt most RPPSAs from antitrust 
scrutiny; on the other hand, the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit and the District of 
Columbia Circuit found that such RPPSAs unreasonably restrict trade and violate antitrust 
rules. 68  In particular, the Third Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit reached conflicting 
conclusions on the legality of the same RPPSAs.  
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The conflict was resolved in 2013 when the Supreme Court granted the petition of the FTC 
for certiorari and reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Actavis.69 The Supreme Court 
rejected both the ‘scope-of-the-patent test’ and the presumptively illegal principle in 
analysing the anti-competitive effects of the pay-for-delay agreements. The Supreme Court 
held that such reverse payment settlement ‘can sometimes violate antitrust laws’ and ‘was 
not immune from antitrust attack’. 70  However, such settlement is not presumptively 
unlawful.71 Therefore, it was concluded that RPPSAs should be evaluated under the rule of 
reason. 72  In Actavis, Solvay, the owner of a patented brand-name drug — AndroGel, 
separately settled Paragraph IV patent infringement litigation under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act with two generic companies, Actavis and Paddock.73 In the settlements, Solvay agreed 
to pay the generic companies (the alleged infringers) millions of dollars; in return, the 
generics promised not to market their generic versions of the brand-name drug until five 
years before the patent concerned expired, and provided Solvay with certain services.74 
The FTC alleged that the settling parties, through RPPSAs, unlawfully shared monopoly 
profits, gave up patent challenges and delayed affordable generic drugs to enter the market, 
eliminating competition and violating antitrust rules.75 However, the FTC’s decision was 
reversed by the district court and the Eleventh Circuit by applying the ‘scope-of-the-patent 
test’. Due to the complex nature of these agreements, the antitrust legality of the RPPSAs 
should be determined on the basis of both the patent law policies and the procompetitive 
antitrust policies.76 Patents do grant patent owners some exclusionary power and they are 
allowed to act within the scope of the patent. The value of settlements in patent litigation 
cannot be ignored. However, the RPPSAs do have the potential to bring adverse effects on 
competition and on consumer welfare.77 The fact that generic versions were allowed to 
enter the market before the patented drug expired, can to some extent benefit consumers; 
but it is found that the settlement here divided the monopoly profits between the patent 
owner and the generic manufacturers, paying the latter to keep out of the market.78 The 
potential anti-competitive effects of a reverse payment are determined by a number of 
complicated factors, such as its size, its proportion in the estimated litigation costs, its 
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relationship with the provided services and the possibility of other convincing reasons.79 
Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the rule of reason must be applied in 
examining such settlement agreements. 
The rule of reason analysis approach adopted in Actavis stops conflicts between different 
US circuits as far as the legality of the pay-for-delay agreements is concerned. The 
application of the rule of reason test deprives brand-name companies of the shelter given 
by the ‘scope-of-the-patent test’ to immune them from antitrust attack. Nevertheless, it 
equally provides brand-name companies with an opportunity to show the pro-competitive 
benefits of the RPPSAs. As a result, it will give rise to more uncertainties as to the legality 
of such RPPSAs and it will impose a deterrent on those potential companies who would 
like to achieve such settlements.80 In addition to the rule of reason principle, the Supreme 
Court did not provide much detailed guidance, which leaves uncertainty for lower courts 
when applying this rule. For example, what can constitute ‘unexplained large reverse 
payment’? Is the form of the payment subject to cash? Whether the validity of the patent is 
relevant to the antitrust legality of RPPSAs? These uncertainties may raise new conflicts 
among lower courts when they apply the rule of reason to scrutinize the antitrust legality of 
RPPSAs. 
8.3.2 From the EU Perspective  
Before 2008, there was no guidance or case law concerning the antitrust legality of the 
RPPSAs in the EU. The interest of the European Commission in this area originated from a 
tip-off from the Danish Competition Authority. In 2003, the European Commission and the 
Danish Competition Authority scrutinized the RPPSAs between Lundbeck, a brand-name 
drug company, and several generic companies. At that time, the European Commission and 
the Danish Competition Authority found that such RPPSAs were attributed to a ‘legal grey 
zone’.81 They realized that a standard to assess the compatibility of such agreements with 
EU competition rules needed to be established. 82  Therefore, in 2008, the European 
Commission launched a competition inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector to find reasons 
for the reduction of the number of new medicines brought into the market and for the delay 
in the market entry of generic drugs. In particular, the inquiry focused on the role of patent 
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settlement agreements in delaying the market entry of generics. In order to understand 
better the manner in which such settlement agreements are used and to identify the 
settlement agreements which delay the market entry of affordable generic medicines, the 
European Commission decided to continuously monitor patent settlements between brand-
name and generic companies. Since 2009, annual reports have been published. The 
European Commission divides these settlement agreements into three categories on the 
basis of whether the settlement agreements limit generic entry and whether there is value 
transfer from brand-name companies to generic companies.83 Category A is agreements 
that do not restrict the ability of generic companies to enter the relevant market. Normally, 
these agreements do not raise competition concerns. Category B.I is patent settlement 
agreements that do restrict the market entry of generic medicines but that do not involve a 
value transfer. These are also mostly unproblematic. Category B.II is agreements that not 
only restrict the generic entry but also include a value transfer from the brand-name drug 
company to the generic company. These agreements are most likely to attract antitrust 
scrutiny. Subsequently, the European Commission initiated several antitrust investigations 
concerning RPPSAs in the pharmaceutical industry.  
In 2013, the European Commission adopted its first decision on RPPSAs. The Commission 
concluded that the settlement agreements between the Danish pharmaceutical company—
Lundbeck and four generic companies constituted restrictions of competition by object and 
infringed Article 101 TFEU.84 In the settlement agreements, the brand-name drug company 
Lundbeck agreed to pay a considerable sum of money to its generic competitors in 
exchange for their commitment to stay out of the citalopram market for a certain period of 
time. Some generic companies had already made preparations for marketing their cheaper 
generic versions of citalopram. The European Commission confirmed the benefits of 
settlement agreements in resolving patent disputes but emphasized that the agreements are 
not immune from antitrust scrutiny.85 Before the pay-for-delay agreements in this case 
were concluded, Lundbeck’s basic patents and data protection on the anti-depressant drug 
citalopram had already expired. However, Lundbeck still possessed a number of process 
patents by which limited protection was provided. Nevertheless, the European Commission 
found that ‘Lundbeck’s remaining process patents were not capable of blocking all 
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possibilities of market entry’. 86  A patent owner is allowed to stop potential or actual 
infringement of the patent but it does not have the right to buy off competition. 87 In 
examining the case, the European Commission considered a whole range of factors such as: 
the size of the payment, the competitive relationship between the pharmaceutical 
companies, the generics’ promise not to enter the market during the existence of the 
agreement, the possibility for Lundbeck to obtain the generics’ obligations purely through 
enforcing its process patents before courts, the scope of the patents concerned and whether 
the generic competitors were allowed to enter the market after the patents had expired. The 
Commission found that the RPPSAs in this case ‘did not resolve any patent dispute’ and 
they just deferred the problems caused by the potential entry of generic medicines. 88 
Lundbeck successfully avoided generic competition for the duration of these settlement 
agreements and maintained monopoly profits. The acceptance of the restrictions on market 
entry by generic companies is not due to the strength of Lundbeck’s patents but for the 
considerable value transfer. 89  The settling parties had claimed justifications of their 
settlement agreements under Article 101(3) TFEU but they failed to demonstrate 
sufficiently the efficiency gains. Therefore, the European Commission concluded that the 
RPPSAs restricted competition by their very nature and infringed Article 101 TFEU. In 
2016, the General Court confirmed fully the Commission’s findings in Lundbeck and 
upheld the decision.90 
In addition, the Commission fined some pharmaceutical companies for their pay-for-delay 
agreements in Fentanyl 91  and in Servier 92  that were both found to be restrictions of 
competition by object. Where the restriction is by object, the European Commission is not 
required to prove any actual or potential anti-competitive effect. The Commission only 
needs to demonstrate that the agreement has the object or the nature to restrict competition. 
However, a restriction by object is not always obvious and sometimes contextual analysis 
is necessary. In order to identify the anti-competitive object of a restraint, the Commission 
has to examine the content of the provisions, the objectives, the economic and legal context 
of the restraint agreements, the subjective intention of each party and other relevant 
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factors.93 Only when the detriment of competition cannot be clearly demonstrated, do the 
anti-competitive effects need to be shown.94 Indeed, for the purpose of completeness, the 
Commission did analyze some of the restrictive effects of RPPSAs on competition in 
Lundbeck and Servier. However, the effect-analysis of these problematic RPPSAs in the 
EU’s competition enforcement is still limited and not complete. 
In 2014, for the first time, in its official Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 TFEU 
to Technology Transfer Agreements,95 the Commission provided some guidance on the 
competition enforcement policy for pay-for-delay agreements. On one hand, the legitimate 
status of settlement agreements is confirmed as a means to end legal disagreements.96 On 
the other hand, the Guidelines make it clear that pay-for-delay agreements are not 
automatically immune from the scrutiny of Article 101 TFEU and may raise market 
allocation/share concerns, in particular agreements between competitors which contain a 
significant value transfer.97 
8.3.3  Summary98 
The development of legal principles to be applied in considering the antitrust legality of 
RPPSAs in the US and the EU are good models. There are divergences between the US 
and EU regulatory frameworks but there are also similarities in their competition analysis. 
These two models offer countries that face this kind of competition concerns the positive 
and negative aspects of each legal approach. This would enable them to conclude a most 
appropriate approach in accordance with their own legal and economic context. 
 On the basis of the enforcement experience above, the per se rule should not be used when 
examining the legality of pay-for-delay agreements in the pharmaceutical industry. When 
applying the per se rule, the plaintiff or the competition authority is required only to 
identify the existence of the pay-for-delay agreement. There is no requirement to show 
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restrictive effects on competition. It is submitted that, except in naked restrictive/collusive 
agreements between competitors, it is difficult for courts to differentiate clearly what kind 
of restrictions are per se illegal.99 The application of the per se rule does to great extent 
deter the pay-for-delay agreements. However, it is so strict that it ignores the positive and 
beneficial role of settlements in ending patent disputes and it ignores the possible 
justifications of such complicated agreements in relation to patents. The application of the 
per se rule to RPPSAs will deprive parties of the incentives to settle their disputes 
peacefully. In addition, the settlement regime in the pharmaceutical industry will have no 
role. In this situation, pharmaceutical companies have to face costly, risky and time-
consuming litigation that will discourage the generic companies’ investment in developing 
generic drugs.100  
When it comes to the application of the ‘scope-of-the-patent test’, the pendulum swings to 
the other extreme. This approach focuses only on the exclusionary power of the patent 
concerned and ignores the competitive issues of the RPPSAs.  The application of the 
‘scope of the patent test’ grants automatic legality to the pay-for-delay agreements and no 
court has determined such an agreement as a violation of antitrust rules under this 
approach. 101  It is true that patent rights are special property rights and normally the 
exercise of patent rights will be protected from antitrust scrutiny. However, this does not 
mean that they are totally immune from the application of competition law. When the 
exercise of patent rights goes beyond the scope permitted by patent law and seriously 
distort competition, the conduct of the patent owner will definitely be subject to 
competition law. As stated by the Supreme Court, the antitrust legality of a RPPSA should 
be determined on the basis of both patent law policy and competition policy.102 The US 
circuits, who apply the ‘scope-of-the-patent test’ to pay-for-delay agreements, have 
interpreted wrongly the scope of the patent rights and the relationship between such rights 
and competition.103 Whether the anti-competitive effects of a RPPSA fall within the scope 
of the patent should be established according to the circumstances in each case. The timing 
at which the generic companies are allowed to enter the market is one but not the only 
consideration. The premise of applying the ‘scope-of-the-patent test’ is that the patent at 
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issue is valid. The validity of a patent is normally the fundamental disputed issue in patent 
litigation where a RPPSA is achieved. This is also an important factor in deciding how 
antitrust law will be applied. Nevertheless, when applying this test, most US courts 
problematically held an ‘almost unrebuttable presumption of patent validity’ which ignores 
the possibility of the invalidity of a patent.104 This approach seems to lead to an expansion 
of patent protection and will restrict competition to the detriment of consumer welfare.105 
In addition to the validity issue, the existence of an infringement of the patent is also 
essential to justify the appropriateness of applying the ‘scope-of-the-patent test’ but this 
test ignores infringement issues.106 In fact, if applied in a congruous way, the ‘scope-of-
the-patent test’ itself is not problematic and has some rationale. The scope of the patent 
concerned, the extent to which a RPPSA exceeds that scope and the resulting anti-
competitive effects are all important and necessary elements that should be seriously 
examined in an antitrust analysis. 
The application of the presumptively illegal rule is favoured only in cases where someone 
with basic knowledge of economics is able to establish that the behaviour concerned is 
anti-competitive and prejudicial to consumers. 107  With regard to RPPSAs, they are 
seemingly rational and reasonable because settlements can end disputes beneficially and 
patent rights grant their owners some kind of exclusionary power to do so. In particular, in 
order to avoid antitrust liability, most pharmaceutical companies will agree on an earlier 
market entry date for generic drugs than the expiration date of the patent. Accordingly, the 
real anti-competitive nature of such agreements to delay/eliminate generic competition and 
maintain monopoly profits cannot be easily identified and requires detailed analysis. 
Additionally, the presumption of illegality on RPPSAs may impose too much pressure on 
pharmaceutical companies to settle their disputes. Their incentives to innovate, protected 
by a patent law, may also be adversely influenced.108 The presumptively illegal rule is not 
the best choice here, though it has its own advantages in antitrust analysis.109 
                                                          
104 In Re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation (n 63), 214. 
105 Fan Zhang, ‘The Antitrust Application of Reverse Payment Agreements in Pharmaceutical Industry’ (医
药行业反向支付协议的反垄断规制) (Master Thesis, East China University of Political Science and Law 
2016), 37. 
106 Michael A. Carrier, ‘Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent Settlement 
Problems’ (2012) 16(1) Stanford Technology Law Review, 7. 
107 Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis (n 10), 2237. 
108 Colangelo (n 2) 500. 
109 These advantages are such as: transferring some burden of proof to settling parties, avoiding challenging 
the difficult and complicated problem of the validity and infringement of the patent and reducing the chance 





Comparatively, the rule of reason principle is more flexible and provides an opportunity to 
balance the pro-competitive and the anti-competitive effects of RPPSAs. However, there 
has been a concern that the application of a full-blown rule of reason approach can be 
costly and difficult which, to great extent, discourages antitrust agencies and others from 
challenging the alleged anti-competitive practices.110 As a result, it is better for relevant 
antitrust authorities to shape and structure the investigation and the quality of proof 
appropriately according to the circumstances of each case. This will not only ensure a 
rigorous and robust antitrust analysis but also avoid discussing irrelevant issues. 111  In 
Actavis, the Supreme Court confirmed a non-traditional rule of reason. It does not require 
demonstrating everything that a full-blown rule of reason would demand. For example, in 
evaluating the competitive effects of pay-for-delay agreements, whether the patent is valid 
does not need to be empirically litigated; and the size of the payment can be a strong 
indicator of market power and the weakness of the patent concerned.112 It is believed that 
in assessing the pros and cons of a pay-for-delay agreement, a ‘sliding scale’ is always 
applied.113 
The restriction by object adopted by European Commission to pay-for-delay agreements is 
in theory similar to the presumptively illegal approach and stricter than the rule of reason. 
It can be rebutted with limited justifications under Article 101(3) TFEU such as 
efficiencies. Despite the US Supreme Court finally adopting a more flexible and 
reasonable approach—rule of reason, the EU’s restriction by object is more appropriate to 
the circumstances. In all RPPSAs prohibited by the European Commission, the patents on 
the active ingredients (basic patents) had expired, leaving only process patents with a 
weaker protection.114   The brand-name companies in the EU had already enjoyed the 
exclusionary protection provided by patent law for their basic patents and so the RPPSAs 
unduly extended the protection of the monopoly profits.115 On the contrary, most US cases 
on RPPSAs allowed the market entry of the generics before the basic patents had expired 
which perhaps requires a softer approach. 116  Even though the European Commission 
adopted the approach of restriction by object, in some cases, it analysed the anti-
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competitive effects to some extent for the sake of completeness. The EU and the US have 
adopted divergent approaches to deal with the competition concerns of pay-for-delay 
agreements within their different regulatory frameworks. However, their attitudes to the 
situation are the same, namely that the benefits of patent settlements should be confirmed 
but that they may be subject to antitrust scrutiny. Both competition authorities separate the 
patent validity issue from the antitrust analysis117 and both consider the same factors when 
evaluating RPPSAs such as the size of the payment. It has even been argued that the size of 
payment criterion adopted by the US Supreme Court has the shadow of presumptive 
illegality.118 More importantly, similar conclusions have been reached by the US and EU 
authorities and courts.  
The research and analysis undertaken above has shown a trend that there seems to be less 
and less distinct line between the different tests and approaches. Each approach is no 
longer absolutely incompatible with or opposite to each other. In many circumstances, the 
choice of an analysis approach is situational to meet the legal environment. It can be a 
combination of different legal approaches in one case in accordance with the relevant 
factors. For example, in the European Commission’s decision of restriction by object, there 
is also some analysis of effects. The rule of reason adopted by the US Supreme Court has 
been reshaped to fit the specific case. Therefore, for China, it is very important to find an 
appropriate rule to examine the complicated RPPSAs, which should meet the specific 
circumstances. It is very dangerous to transplant from other legal jurisdictions rules or 
practices which may not be suitable for China’s legal and economic context. 
8.4 The Anti-monopoly Regulation of RPPSAs in China 
Pursuant to the closed and on-going investigations of China’s AMEAs, to date no 
competition concerns from RPPSAs in the pharmaceutical industry have arisen. In spite of 
the rumour that the NDRC is investigating the pharmaceutical industry, there is no official 
press release to confirm the rumour. China’s legislation and antitrust enforcement is still 
untested in this area. Chinese academic literature on RPPSAs only started to appear in 
about 2007. The existing limited literature in this area mainly focuses on US antitrust 
enforcement and little attention has been paid to the situation in China.119 In the earlier 
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years, it was even argued that this kind of pay-for-delay agreements will not arise under 
China’s legal and economic circumstances.120 However, such settlement agreements are 
unavoidable products of the relationship between brand-name companies and generic 
companies. This thesis holds the opinion that China’s AMEAs should not ignore the 
competition concerns caused by such settlements and should prepare well both in theory 
and practice. China’s legal and economic context of the pharmaceutical industry has 
changed significantly, so it is highly likely that these types of settlements will be 
scrutinized at the same time by China’s Anti-monopoly Law (AML). 
8.4.1 RPPSAs in China 
In addition to the general reasons discussed in section two of this chapter, China’s legal 
and economic context in the pharmaceutical industry can also facilitate the emergence of 
pay-for-delay agreements.  
China is one of the largest countries where the manufacturing and use of generic drugs is 
very popular and nearly 90% of the drugs that newly come into China’s market are 
generic.121 As a developing country, generic drugs play an important and essential role in 
China’s public health policy and the research and development of generic drugs has been 
supported for a long time.122 Since China joined WTO in 2001, the intellectual property 
rights of the WTO parties will also be protected in China. The standard of patent protection 
has also been improved at international level. Despite the fact that China is still not a 
leading country in patented drugs, promoting innovation in the pharmaceutical industry has 
been included in its industrial policies since the twelfth Five-Year Plan of China began and 
a tremendous amount of investment has been devoted to this industry.123 At the same time, 
the ability of Chinese pharmaceutical companies in research and development of both 
patented and generic drugs has been considerably increased in recent years. As a result of 
the aging of China’s population and the acceleration of urbanization, effective competition 
between patented and generic drugs is of great importance to the increase in the 
accessibility of medical care and to save public resources.124 The time of sole generic 
medicines has gone and China’s pharmaceutical industry will come into an era of the 
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parallel development of generic and patented drugs.125 It has been shown that some generic 
companies in China are turning to research and development in innovative medicine. 
Moreover, the patent cliff 126  of a number of pharmaceutical patents provides a good 
opportunity for the development of China’s generic companies. It is reported that about 
400 patents of brand-name drugs will expire before 2020.127 This means that the generic 
drugs will then be permitted to enter the relevant market to compete with the referential 
patented drugs. Normally, the market entry of generic drugs will lead to a dramatic 
reduction in the price and in the market share of patented drugs. The coming of the patent 
cliff can be a real challenge to brand-name drug companies. In this situation, brand-name 
drug manufacturers will probably adopt strategic measures to maintain their monopoly 
profits as long as they can. RPPSAs concluded during patent litigation are a good choice 
for them. Furthermore, the RPPSAs between foreign brand-name companies and Chinese 
generic companies or even between Chinese brand-name companies and generic 
companies, will be a major challenge for China’s AMEAs. Adverse effects can arise. 
Therefore, China should establish an effective anti-monopoly scrutiny framework to make 
sure that the development of generic drugs in China is maintained and, simultaneously, 
encourage innovation.  
In addition, disputes between some pharmaceutical companies in China have already 
shown the tendency and a beginning of the appearance of RPPSAs. For example, in 2001 a 
US company brought an action against a Chinese pharmaceutical company for patent 
infringement. 128  It is reported that the US company filed an infringement complaint 
because the Chinese pharmaceutical company refused to accept its offer of a payment.129 
The US company exhausted all the available judicial procedures and the case had lasted for 
nearly 9 years. Finally, in 2010, China’s Supreme People’s Court confirmed the lower 
court’s judgment that the Chinese pharmaceutical company did not infringe the patents 
concerned. The patents in this case were also declared null and void. However, justice 
delayed is justice denied. Though the Chinese pharmaceutical company achieved a final 
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victory, the US company was the real beneficiary. This is for the reason that during the 9 
years the US company maintained its monopoly in the Chinese market and the market 
entry of the relevant generic drugs was, therefore, significantly delayed. 130  Another 
example comes from a dispute between Warner-Lambert Company LLC—a US 
pharmaceutical company and Jialin—a Chinese pharmaceutical company. Warner-
Lambert’s compound patent on Atorvastatin expired in December 2012. So, before the 
expiration, Warner-Lambert’s applied for a number of patents around Atorvastatin in order 
to maintain its market position. In 2007, Warner-Lambert’s sued Jialin before a Chinese 
court alleging the latter’s generic version of Atorvastatin infringed its patents.131 Jialin 
counter claimed that Warner-Lambert’s patents were invalid. In 2015, a final decision 
adopted by China’s Supreme People’s Court declared that all the Warner-Lambert’s 
patents on Atorvastatin were null and void.132 It is clear that the uncertainty of patents, the 
high costs in time and money of patent litigation and the ambition of brand-name 
companies to maintain high profits will lead to the conclusion of RPPSAs. 
As more attention is paid to encouraging innovation of new drugs and improving the 
development of generic drugs, conflicts between the interests of generic and brand-name 
companies will be obvious. However, China’s current regulatory framework in the context 
of the pharmaceutical industry is not appropriate. The current legal rules concerning drug 
patents are general and decentralized. In addition to the general protection granted by 
Patent Law, other laws do not really apply to drug patents. In Measures for the 
Administration of Drug Registration, there are only two short rules on drug patents. One 
concerns the requirement of a patent statement to disclose the ownership of the relevant 
patent and whether the drug concerned infringes patents owned by others.133 The other rule 
prescribes that a registration application for a drug that has been granted a patent to other 
patent owners can be filed within two years before the drug patent expires.134 However, 
there are no integrated instructions on the manner or form to make a patent statement or a 
non-infringement statement in Article 18 of the Measures for the Administration of Drug 
Registration. Article 18 only requires the relevant authority to publicize these statements 
but no substantive examination of the merits is imposed. Neither does the provision contain 
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an obligation to notify the relevant patent owners of the statements. When a patent dispute 
arises during the application, no detailed guidance is provided to explain what to do or 
where to go. There is no effective mechanism to provide the applicant of a drug with 
information of existing drug patents; nor is the coordination with China’s State Intellectual 
Property Office established. Accordingly, the current regulatory framework has not been 
able to catch up with the rapid development of the pharmaceutical industry. 
In order to modify the shortcomings in the current regulatory framework in China’s 
pharmaceutical industry, in May 2017, China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) 
published an announcement to solicit public comment on the draft of Policies for 
Encouraging Innovation in Drugs and Medical Devices and Protecting the Rights and 
Interest of Innovators.135 In this document, a patent linkage system will be established in 
the near future and some similar regulatory rules, like those in the US, will be adopted. On 
the basis of the requirement of a patent statement, if applicants for drug registration claim 
that their generic drugs do not infringe existing patents, they must notify this to the 
relevant drug patent owners within 20 days of filing the application.136 The notified patent 
owner has the right to lodge a patent litigation within 20 days after it receives the notice.137 
Once the judicial proceedings are initiated, the registration application process will be 
automatically stayed for no longer than 24 months.138 In addition, a list of approved drugs 
will also be created under the draft of Policies for Encouraging Innovation in Drugs and 
Medical Devices and Protecting the Rights and Interest of Innovators which is very like the 
Orange Book in the US. This list will include information of drugs approved to enter 
China’s market, such as the properties of the drug, their ingredients, relevant patents, their 
ownership, rights information on data protection, etc. In October 2017, the General Office 
of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council on Issuing the 
Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the Evaluation and Approval Systems and 
Encouraging Innovation on Drugs and Medical Devices (the 2017 Opinions) confirmed the 
basic framework of the patent linkage system to be established in Articles 15-19, though 
detailed rules need to be specified later.139 In addition to the basic principles mentioned in 
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the draft of Policies for Encouraging Innovation in Drugs and Medical Devices and 
Protecting the Rights and Interest of Innovators, the 2017 Opinions require to make pilot 
experiments of patent term restoration and to regularly release the list of expired or invalid 
patents and the patented drugs with no application for a generic version.140 Moreover, in 
accordance with the draft of Policies for Encouraging Innovation in Drugs and Medical 
Devices and Protecting the Rights and Interest of Innovators, in October 2017, the CFDA 
issued an announcement to call for public comments on the revision of the Measures for 
the Administration of Drug Registration.141 The set-up of a complete and effective patent 
linkage system makes the rules concerning drug patents much clearer and provides assured 
protection for the rights and interests of patent owners. At the same time, an effective 
patent linkage system will promote the development of generic drugs and increase the 
accessibility of drugs. This will considerably incentivize innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry and facilitate further evolution. As the patent linkage system in the pharmaceutical 
industry will be adopted soon, the relevant drug patents will be recorded and published. 
However, on the other hand, the modification to the requirement of a non-infringement 
statement and the introduction of a pending period will more obviously and sharply expose 
conflicts and disputes between generic and brand-name drug companies. The suggested 24-
month pending period will be like that of the Hatch-Waxman Act to reverse the litigation 
risks between a brand-name drug company and a generic company.142 This will encourage 
generic companies who have fewer risks and fewer costs to challenge the existing patent 
and force brand-name companies to averse to the high risks. In this context, like the 
aforesaid analysis of the US situation, the drug patent owners in China are likely to seek 
pay-for-delay agreements in patent litigation to maximize their profits. 
More importantly, the Opinions on Pushing Forward the Reform of the Drug Pricing 
adopted by NDRC and other 6 State Ministries came into effect on 1 June 2015 (the 2015 
Opinions).143 The 2015 Opinions stipulate that except for certain types of drugs, the price 
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of all other drugs will be mainly determined by the relevant market.144 In the past, the price 
of the drugs in the Chinese market was substantially determined by the government, thus it 
was less likely to be excessively high.145 The issue of the 2015 Opinions means that the era 
of fixing the drug price by the Chinese government came to an end, and it opened the door 
for independent pricing by the market. In this situation, patent owners will be incentivized 
to achieve a high price for their patented drugs. As a result, the possibility to anti-
competitively exercise drug patents by pharmaceutical companies may be increased and 
strategic measures may be taken to maintain the monopoly price. 
Since the reform in 2015, the pharmaceutical industry has become an important 
enforcement area for anti-monopoly scrutiny by China’s AMEAs. On the basis of the 
factors examined above, there is potential that in the near future the problem of pay-for-
delay agreements in this industry will be exposed in China and will attract the attention of 
the AMEAs. Therefore, China should be prepared in advance and find an appropriate 
approach according to its own legal and economic circumstances to regulate the RPPSAs 
that restrict competition. 
8.4.2 Challenges Waiting to Be Resolved 
Though it is highly likely that RPPSAs will give rise to competition concerns, the AMEAs 
lack the knowledge to review such RPPSAs in China’s pharmaceutical industry. In 
addition, given the lack of finalized IPRs anti-monopoly guidelines, there has not been an 
effective anti-monopoly analysis framework established that focuses on regulating such 
RPPSAs. As discussed in Chapter 3, the relevant legal measures which are still in effect 
are not appropriate to be applied to this new challenge. The only available regulation on 
IPRs adopted by the SAIC does not provide any guidance on such special agreements. As a 
result, it is concluded that preparation is insufficient for the likely challenges brought by 
RPPSAs. 
The benefits of RPPSAs should be confirmed first. Then, situations should be identified 
when RPPSAs are incompatible with the AML. Taking a panoramic view of the antitrust 
enforcement by the US authorities and courts, this was a contentious and controversial 
issue for a long time until the Supreme Court provided guidance in 2013. Now, Chinese 
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AMEAs will encounter the same problem. Chinese AMEAs should first determine a basic 
regulatory rule for problematic RPPSAs. The enforcement experience of the EU and the 
US provides some lessons for China. For example, in the US, the per se rule, the ‘scope-of-
the-patent test’, the presumptively illegal rule and the rule of reason have all been applied; 
in the EU, RPPSAs with anti-competitive effects are mainly determined as restrictive by 
object and in some cases an effects-analysis has also been undertaken. Therefore, there are 
several ways for China’s AMEAs to consider. Although what has been done in the US and 
the EU can provide good guidance, China should adopt an appropriate solution in 
accordance with its own legal and economic context. This thesis assessed these different 
principles in Section 8.3.3. On the basis of the analysis and assessment undertaken in this 
chapter, a proposal for a basic principle will be provided in the concluding chapter. 
Once a basic regulatory rule is set out, China’s AMEAs have to resolve another difficult 
issue namely what factors should be considered when determining the legality of the 
RPPSAs. The authorities in the US and the EU have struggled in this respect. The factors 
to be considered to some extent depend on what kind of anti-monopoly analysis framework 
will be established. In addition, the factors to be considered must reflect the specificity of 
RPPSAs. For example, the validity of the drug patent, the size and forms of the reverse 
payment and the market entry date of generic drugs have all been discussed heatedly and 
have appeared in the anti-monopoly analysis by some competition authorities. However, it 
is still controversial the extent to which these factors will be considered and how relevant 
they are to determine the legality of the RPPSAs. Therefore, China’s AMEAs should not 
only establish the factors to be considered in the relevant guidelines but also explain how 
relevant they are and how to apply them in practice. This will be proposed in detail in the 
concluding chapter.  
8.5 Conclusion  
RPPSAs in the pharmaceutical industry are a very topical area that concerns the 
intersection of Patent Law and Competition Law. On one hand, settlements are a legitimate 
and preferential way for parties to resolve patent disputes and a patent owner has rights 
protected by Patent Law which include excluding infringed products from the market 
during the protection term. On the other hand, the involvement of value transfer from the 
patent owner to the generic company and the latter’s commitment to delay the market entry 





competition in the relevant market and unduly maintain the patent owner’s monopoly 
profits. Finally, it is the consumer welfare that will be damaged. Therefore, such RPPSAs 
have attracted antitrust scrutiny in many countries. This thesis has described the origin of 
such agreements and explained the general and specific reasons for the appearance of such 
agreements in the US, EU and China. As a pioneer, the US authorities have conducted 
antitrust enforcement in this area for more than ten years. However, there was no 
consistent approach adopted until 2013 when the US Supreme Court confirmed a rule of 
reason approach to the competition concerns arising from the RPPSAs. The EU adopted a 
stricter approach — restriction by object. It can be seen that the approach to an antitrust 
analysis is no longer a pure single one. In many circumstances, the selection of the analysis 
approach is situational. The antitrust enforcement of the US and the EU can provide 
valuable experience for China to develop its own approach to anti-monopoly scrutiny in 
this area. Such agreements originated from the US but are now common in other 
jurisdictions. Combining the current situation with the further/upcoming reform in China’s 
pharmaceutical industry, it is believed that in the near future RPPSAs will raise 
competition concerns also in China. When dealing with competition concerns caused by 
such RPPSAs, there will be some challenges facing China’s AMEAs. For example, 
currently the AMEAs have no clear understanding of the situation of the RPPSAs in the 
pharmaceutical industry. There is no anti-monopoly analysis framework established to 
investigate such problematic pay-for-delay agreements. Hopefully, the proposals made in 
the final and concluding chapter of the thesis will provide China’s AMEAs with some 







The main research question of this thesis is to examine the extent to which China’s Anti-
monopoly Law (AML) effectively controls anti-competitive practices of patent owners. 
The thesis focuses mainly on the anti-competitive practices of patent owners in the 
exercise of patent rights and identifies a number of sub-research questions which are 
discussed and analysed in various chapters. In order to demonstrate the necessity and 
importance of the AML to address the anti-competitive practices of patent owners, the 
thesis discussed China’s situation in this field before the adoption of the AML.1  The 
discussion was established based on several influential cases involving Chinese companies 
taking place before 2008 which to some extent showed the ineffectiveness of the Chinese 
laws or regulations adopted before 2008. The applicable rules adopted before 2008 are 
scattered in various laws or regulations each of which has its specific goals and functions.2 
None of these laws or regulations specifically focuses on addressing the practices of patent 
owners from the perspective of competition enforcement. Therefore, it was necessary and 
urgent for China to adopt a systematic competition law that is called the Anti-monopoly 
Law. The relationship between competition law and intellectual property law is no longer 
contradictory but has evolved into a convergent and compatible one.3 This has provided a 
theoretical basis for the application of the AML to control the anti-competitive practices of 
patent owners. However, the interface between the two bodies of law is still a contentious 
and complicated domain that raises significant concerns and challenges for global 
competition authorities. China’s AML came into effect in 2008 but it seems not to work as 
effectively as it was expected in regulating the competition concerns arising from some 
exercises of patent rights.4 Even though there have been some great achievements and 
success in China’s competition enforcement, deficiencies and uncertainties still exist and 
need to be improved. The problems not only arise from China’s internal competition 
enforcement system 5  but also arise from the lack of guidance from the competition 
enforcement authorities in specific industries.6 These can also be seen from the case studies 
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of the Qualcomm investigation7  and Huawei v InterDigital8  undertaken in Chapter 4.9 
Some of the problems caused by the two-level and tripartite administrative anti-monopoly 
enforcement structure are likely to be resolved by the establishment of a single and 
independent AMEA—the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), while 
some will remain impeding an effective anti-monopoly enforcement in China, especially in 
the area of the exercise of patent rights.10 Moreover, facing the challenges arising from the 
licensing of SEPs (these are mainly the failure to disclose patent interest in the standard 
setting process by patent owners and the seeking of injunctions on FRAND-encumbered 
SEPs)11 and reverse payment patent settlement agreements (RPPSAs),12 Chinese AMEAs 
seem not to have enough experience or tools to balance the protection of patent rights with 
the maintenance of market competition. There is no effective anti-monopoly analysis 
framework available to guide the SAMR to undertake competition enforcement in these 
two specific areas that are related to the exercise of patent rights. Until now, the only 
available legal document to facilitate the application of the AML to the exercise of IPRs is 
the 2015 SAIC Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights 
to Eliminate or Restrict Competition (the SAIC Provisions). 13  However, the SAIC 
Provisions have not yet been applied in any anti-monopoly investigation and the impact of 
the SAIC Provisions is hard to be predicted after the newly established single SAMR 
formally comes into operation. More importantly, the SAIC Provisions do not deal with the 
noticeable challenges mentioned above, though they do contribute significantly to the 
competition enforcement in the area of IPRs.14 In addition, the integrated IPRs guidelines 
are still pending after the AMC sought public comment on the draft in March 2017. As 
displayed in the draft IPRs guidelines, they do not give appropriate consideration to the 
challenges identified in the thesis. Therefore, on the basis of all the discussion and analysis 
in the previous chapters, this final chapter will conclude the thesis by providing some 
solutions to the three broad challenges respectively identified in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, 
namely the competences issues of the AMEAs, the issues concerning the licensing of SEPs 
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and the issues on RPPSAs in the pharmaceutical industry. These proposals should facilitate 
and improve the effective application of China’s AML to the exercise of patent rights. The 
valuable EU and US enforcement experience and case law do provide valuable guidance 
and support for China but they themselves are also struggling with some of these issues.15 
Accordingly, the proposals made in this thesis are based on the effective enforcement in 
the EU and US but give significant consideration to the legal and economic circumstances 
in China. The proposals in this chapter will answer the sixth research question. 
The research undertaken for this thesis has led to the conclusion that there is a need for 
four areas to be reformed. The first proposals concern the structure of the enforcement 
agency (Section 9.1); the second proposals focus on the patent owners’ failure to disclose 
their patent interest in the standard setting process (Section 9.2); the third proposals aim to 
control effectively the seeking of injunctions on SEPs within the scope of the AML 
(Section 9.3); and the fourth proposals are related to the regulation of RPPSAs in the 
pharmaceutical industry (Section 9.4). 
9.1 Reforms and Proposals for the Anti-monopoly Enforcement Authority 
The examination and analysis of the problems caused by the two-level and tripartite 
administrative competition enforcement structure in Chapter 6 demonstrates that the 
efficiency and effectiveness of China’s competition enforcement, especially in the area of 
the exercise of patent rights, is undermined.16 Since the Institutional Reform Plan of the 
State Council has just been passed, a centralized and independent AMEA—State 
Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) is established. As a result, the problems 
caused by the overlapping enforcement powers will be resolved, but some other problems 
will remain in the application of the AML to the exercise of patent rights.17 In addition, the 
arrangements for the specific anti-monopoly duties, the institutional structure, the staff and 
the resources after merging the current three AMEAs have not yet been disclosed. 
Therefore, solutions need to be proposed to facilitate the competition enforcement of the 
SAMR in the IP-related area and to improve the coordination between the SAMR and 
relevant sectoral regulators and between the SAMR and the competent courts. Although 
the remaining problems apply generally to alleged anti-competitive practices in all fields of 
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economic activity, the reforms and proposals in this thesis focus mainly on resolving the 
problems concerning the exercise of IPRs and, in particular, patent rights. 
The proposals in this section are related to unifying enforcement rules (Section 9.1.1), 
setting up an IPRs Task Force (Section 9.1.2), coordination between the public and private 
enforcement (Section 9.1.3) and coordination between the SAMR and the sectoral 
regulators (Section 9.1.4). 
9.1.1 Unifying Enforcement Rules18 
Basically, the unification of the relevant enforcement rules can be undertaken from four 
aspects. First, the supremacy of the AML should be confirmed as the main legal instrument 
for competition enforcement in all industries. All other existing rules are subordinate to the 
AML. Second, in the context of merging anti-monopoly competences into a single SAMR, 
it is necessary to review the existing laws and/or regulations that grant other organizations 
anti-monopoly enforcement powers which may conflict or overlap with the AML. For 
example, the Law against Unfair Competition19 was amended on 4 November 2017. The 
amended Law against Unfair Competition removed the rules concerning anti-competitive 
practices that are within the scope of the AML, such as the rule prohibiting tying-in, the 
rule prohibiting selling at prices below cost and so on. Third, it is proposed to formulate 
and unify the procedural rules that govern competition enforcement. It is acknowledged 
that each of the current three AMEAs has adopted its own procedural regulations to 
facilitate the investigation. In order to make sure of consistent enforcement and certainty of 
the AML, the SAMR should review the scattered rules and issue unified and independent 
rules. Finally, once the SAMR formally comes into operation, it should accelerate the 
adoption of the integrated guidelines in the relevant industry, especially in the IP area.20 It 
is submitted that the finally adopted integrated IPRs guidelines should clarify the 
relationship with the SAIC Provisions, avoid the problems identified in the 2015 SAIC 
Provisions and keep the effective rules.21 More certainty and predictability for the anti-
monopoly enforcement of the SAMR should be provided. For example, both the market 
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share threshold and the substitutable technologies threshold to apply the safe harbour rule 
should be adopted in the final integrated IPR guidelines; 22 and a clear relationship between 
the application of compulsory licensing and the abuse of a dominant position by refusing to 
license should be established and emphasized in anti-monopoly legal measures.23 
9.1.2 The Establishment of an IPRs Task Force (IPTF) 
Despite the upcoming merger of the current three AMEAs into a single one, it is submitted 
in the thesis that it is necessary to set up a special team within the new SAMR to focus on 
the competitive issues concerning the exercise of IPRs. 
9.1.2.1 The Necessity of IPTF 
It can be seen from the previous chapters that competition enforcement in IP-related area 
should and need to be fundamentally improved in China. Before the enactment of the AML, 
many alleged anti-competitive cases that related to patent rights were brought to courts, 
such as the DVD Patent Royalties case, Cisco Systems Incorporation vs. Huawei 
Incorporation and Dexian vs. Sony.24 These cases are good illustrations. As early as June 
2008, the Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (the Outline) emphasized 
the importance of prohibiting the anti-competitive exercise of IPRs. 25  After that, the 
directors or spokesmen from all the three AMEAs declared in some conferences and press 
releases that they would endeavour to prohibit the anti-competitive exercise of IPRs.26 
However, the number of the investigations related to IPRs undertaken by the three AMEAs 
is not as high as those in other areas of economic activity. For example, among all the 
NDRC investigations, there have been only two that concerned the exercise of IPRs and, 
indeed, both of them concerned the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights.27 Within 36 
conditional approval decisions by MOFCOM, 10 of them imposed conditions on the 
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exercise of patent rights.28 The SAIC has not yet adopted any decisions concerning IPRs 
though in 28 July 2014 the SAIC conducted dawn raids of several business premises of 
Microsoft in China and the investigations are continuing.29 Accordingly, the competition 
enforcement in IP-related area seems not to be developed as fully as expected. It is 
submitted that it is likely that the ineffective competition enforcement in the field of patent 
rights is connected to the unclear and overlapping enforcement powers of the three 
AMEAs. Besides, the 2017 Promotion Plan for the in-Depth Implementation of the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy and the Acceleration of the Building of a Powerful 
Intellectual Property Nation further emphasizes that the regulation of anti-competitive 
practices concerning IPRs should be strengthened and competition enforcement guidelines 
on IPRs should be adopted. 30  More attention and importance should be given to 
competition enforcement in respect of the exercise of IPRs. 
Another factor that must be taken into account is the complexity and specificity of 
competition enforcement in the field of IPRs. Commonly, IPRs licensing ‘disseminate[s] 
new technology, brings new competitors on the market, and increases the rewards for 
innovation. Its effects are generally pro-competitive and beneficial to consumer welfare.’31 
However, provisions beyond a bare permission to exercise IPRs are normally incorporated 
into licensing agreements.32 To some extent, these provisions may raise competition law 
concerns. In this situation, it is competition law that has to determine ‘whether, and in what 
circumstances, these further obligations have the effect of restricting competition.’33 IPR 
experts are needed to identify and differentiate anti-competitive practices from pro-
competitive practices in the exercise of IPRs. Before the European Commission adopted 
the current more economic approach on the basis of a consumer welfare objective, ‘[t]he 
Commission’s policy on IP licensing agreements has developed and varied significantly 
over the years.’34 It can be seen that competition enforcement in this field is a newly-
developing area and has become contentious from a global perspective, especially in China 
whose AML came into effect only 10 years ago. The competition concerns arising from the 
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32 ibid. 
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exercise of IPRs were evident before the adoption of the AML.35 However, competition 
enforcement in this field has just begun and the relevant guidelines or guiding documents 
are still at an initial stage. Enforcement experience is also lacking. Even though the SAIC 
Provisions on the Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or 
Restrict Competition came into effect on 1 August 2015,36 they have not yet been applied 
in an investigation. This seems to be partly because the relevant AMEAs do not have 
strong confidence in the competition enforcement in this complicated area. The problems 
and divergence caused by multiple enforcement authorities make competition enforcement 
in this field even tougher. Some of the problems arising from the multiple authorities may 
be reduced to some extent by the upcoming merger of the current three AMEAs. However, 
when it comes to the IP-related field, the lack of experience, the lack of transparency, the 
lack of unified and effective enforcement rules, and the lack of pertinent and positive 
enforcement can still be the barriers to the effective and efficient application of the AML. 
Certainty and confidence in China’s competition enforcement will be impaired, and the 
deterrence of the AML in the IP-related area will be lessened.   
It is, therefore, proposed that a special task force should be established to focus only on 
anti-competitive practices in the exercise of IPRs, namely IPRs Task Force (IPTF). Indeed, 
in China investigations to date have mostly concerned patent rights but the IPTF should be 
empowered to deal with the anti-competitive conduct in the exercise of all IPRs.  
9.1.2.2 The Nature of the IPTF 
Competition enforcement in China is such a newly-developing activity in the IPR field that 
the enforcement experience is far from complete.  The establishment of an independent 
task force specifically focusing on alleged anti-competitive practices in exercising IPRs 
will, therefore, increase the enforcement efficiency in this field and accumulate 
enforcement experience which will finally benefit market competition and consumer 
welfare. In this situation, the form of the Merger Task Force (MTF) within the Directorate-
General for Competition in the European Union can be seen as a shining example. 
The Directorate-General for Competition (DG Competition) is primarily responsible within 
the European Commission for enforcing Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
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Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Normally, the DG Competition is 
‘administratively organised in Directorates, each consisting of three to five Units.’ 37 
Currently, most Directorates in DG Competition are sector-specific rather than discipline-
specific in competition enforcement. When the European Commission started to 
investigate mergers, it was a very special and unfamiliar area with many new 
characteristics. Therefore, the MTF was set up in 1990. The MTF was responsible for the 
examination of all the notifications and the preparation of relevant decisions in accordance 
with the Merger Regulation.38 The MTF also engaged in pre-notification work to respond 
to general queries and analyze the implications of the proposed concentration.39 The MTF 
staff was comprised of experienced and professional officials from both the Commission 
and the national competition authorities. The MTF operated for about 10 years. Once 
merger control issues settled down, several decisions were issued, the CJEU case law was 
comparatively complete and the enforcement experience was achieved, the MTF was 
disbanded and the merger control responsibilities were integrated in 2003 into the other 
sector-specific Directorates. The MTF enjoyed a high reputation for its efficiency and 
approachability.40 It is observed that the abolition of the MTF benefited other Directorates 
by spreading the experience and ideas of the MTF throughout DG Competition.41 
Likewise, taking the MTF as an example, the IPTF would be established under the SAMR 
to concentrate solely on competition enforcement in the anti-competitive practices in the 
field of IPRs. In nature, the IPTF would be an independent task force with the same 
hierarchy as the other bureaux of the newly established SAMR. The IPTF would be 
responsible for investigating alleged anti-competitive practices when exercising IPRs. To 
date, there has been no disclosure about the manner in which the anti-monopoly duties will 
be divided and discharged within the SAMR. The current manner in which enforcement 
powers are assigned between the current three AMEAs, namely on the basis of the nature 
of the alleged anti-competitive conduct, seems not to be available in future. It is assumed 
that the SAMR will keep a separate bureau to focus mainly on merger review. Ideally, 
other anti-monopoly duties will be borne by several other bureaux that are sector-specific. 
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If so, the relevant bureau that is responsible for merger control could seek opinions from 
the IPTF when the notified merger concerns the exercise of IPRs, so as to guarantee 
consistency of competition enforcement in the exercise of IPRs. However, if the SAMR is 
mostly composed of sector-specific bureaux without a separate merger control bureau, the 
IP-related mergers should be assigned directly to the IPTF. As soon as the IPTF is 
established, the AMC should fully develop its role to coordinate administrative 
enforcement of the AML. Other bureaux within the SAMR should have a binding duty to 
report timely what they are investigating to the AMC. Once the AMC finds that the 
investigation is related to the exercise of IPRs, the AMC should have the power to transfer 
the investigation to the IPTF. Other bureaux are also encouraged to notify the AMC and 
refer the investigation to the IPTF.  
The main legal instrument for IPTF competition enforcement should definitely be the 
AML. Soon, the AMC is expected to adopt uniform and integrated IPRs guidelines which 
will be another instrument available to the IPTF. The IPTF should be fully empowered to 
launch an investigation according to the rules of the AML on the investigation of suspected 
anti-competitive practices.42 The IPTF should be able to initiate an investigation either on 
its own initiative or on complaints.43 Necessary measures should be available to the IPTF 
to obtain all the necessary information.44 In addition to investigation powers, the IPTF 
should also observe the obligations articulated by the AML, such as the procedural 
obligation45 and the duty of confidentiality.46 When the investigation comes to an end, the 
IPTF should be obliged to issue a decision. Given that competition enforcement in the IP-
related area has not been well developed, enforcement experience needs to be collected and 
guidance needs to be provided. In order to facilitate the IPTF’s work and provide guidance 
and certainty to the public, the decisions of the IPTF should be published on the condition 
that confidential information is omitted. In particular, the reasoning for the decision should 
be required to be clear and detailed. In this context, the public will be able to understand 
how the IPTF applies the AML. Moreover, transparency is increased and public 
supervision is promoted. The certainty and predictability of the AML is reinforced. 
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In the context of the anticipated merging of the current three AMEAs, the members of the 
IPTF are proposed to be selected from experienced officials from each of the three AMEAs. 
Officials who have IPRs expertise should have the priority to be employed in the IPTF. 
With regard to the nature of IPRs, expert officials from the State Intellectual Property 
Office of China should be seconded to the IPTF to engage in the relevant reasoning 
analysis.47 Given the insufficient staff in the current three AMEA and the huge workload in 
competition issues, it is proposed in this thesis to enlarge the number of professional staff 
in the new SAMR and to develop more trainees. In addition, the IPTF does not work in a 
vacuum. If necessary, the IPTF should be able to seek opinions or advice or assistance 
from any other industrial or sectoral department or from the other sector-specific 
enforcement bureaux within the SAMR. In this situation, the AMC would be required to 
play its coordinative role actively and effectively. At the same time, the IPTF should be 
empowered to call on outside experts, lawyers and specialists as necessary. In reality, an 
advisory group of experts has already been set up by the AMC to provide consultative 
proposals. This advisory group of experts is composed of academics and experienced 
officials. This advisory group focuses on anti-monopoly general issues, not specifically on 
IP-related area. However, there is hardly any information on its functioning. For the sake 
of facilitating the work of the IPTF, the advice of the advisory group of experts should be 
fully considered. 
The establishment of the IPTF will resolve the problem of ineffective and insufficient 
competition enforcement in the exercise of IPRs. Simultaneously, the consistency and 
efficiency in competition enforcement will be guaranteed by such an independent body. 
The proposal to create the IPTF is practically and politically possible. At the moment, the 
State Council is carrying out institutional reform. In terms of anti-monopoly enforcement, 
the current three AMEAs will be merged into a single independent one. Therefore, the 
setup of the IPTF can be seen as an internal aspect of the newly established SAMR and 
will not bring about significant costs and pressure. After a period of time, the 
responsibilities of the IPTF can be integrated into other enforcement bureaux of the SAMR 
once everything is settled into a pattern. At the same time, significant enforcement 
experience in IP-related field will have been developed. IPTF best practice can be used to 
benefit and enhance competition enforcement by other bureaux. Therefore, it is reasonable 
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and necessary to set up such a task force specifically to cope with anti-competitive 
practices in the exercise of IPRs. 
9.1.3 Coordination between the Public and the Private Enforcement 
Private enforcement does not only compensate the victims who have suffered damages 
from anti-competitive practices but also can reduce the pressure on public enforcement and 
offset what has been ignored by public enforcement. However, it is inevitable that 
concurrent complaints will continue to be brought to the SAMR and to the courts in respect 
of the same conduct. This is so especially since the 2012 Supreme People’s Court 
Provisions confirm the status of stand-alone litigation. In fact, the solutions adopted by the 
EU and the UK provide good examples for China to alleviate the conflicts between public 
and private enforcement. In any jurisdiction where there is private enforcement of 
competition law, when a public authority initiates proceedings, it is wise for the courts to 
stay proceedings on the basis of legal certainty, because public enforcement should have 
higher status than private enforcement. It has already been suggested by Xianlin Wang that 
the courts should suspend litigation and wait for the result of the AMEAs, particularly 
when the case is complicated and needs a detailed economic analysis.48 In simplier cases, 
the courts should continue but also coordinate with the relevant AMEAs to avoid 
conflicting results.49 In order to have a legal basis for the court to suspend such litigation, a 
provision should be inserted into either the AML or the Civil Procedure Laws. Or at the 
very least, the People’s Supreme Court should adopt or issue a binding rule to this effect.  
In addition, the findings concluded in the final effective administrative decisions should be 
binding on the court that is seized of follow-on litigation for damages. The findings in the 
judgment of a competent court should only be regarded as prima facie evidence for the 
investigation by SAMR but not binding. This is because public enforcement is more severe 
and more punitive, and should be conducted in a more strict and rigorous way.  Compared 
with courts, competition authorities seem to be better at undertaking an anti-monopoly 
investigation. Therefore, the findings of a competent court should be given respect and 
effect but to a limited extent. The suggestions above are proposed for the sake of the 
consistent application of the AML from both the public and private aspects. They aim to 
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avoid duplicate efforts and enhance the enforcement efficiency. More importantly, it 
contributes to improving the certainty and predictability of the AML.  
9.1.4 Coordination between the SAMR and the Sectoral Regulators50 
The involvement of the SAMR in an investigation can avoid the risk of industry 
protectionism caused by sectoral regulators and sectoral regulators can offset the 
asymmetry of information caused by the SAMR. Therefore, both the SAMR and sectoral 
regulators play an important role in the competition enforcement in regulated industries. In 
order to facilitate their coordination in competition enforcement, the French model is a 
good example for China to consider. It is submitted that the SAMR should be required to 
seek professional advice on technical issues from the relevant sectoral regulator 
responsible for competition enforcement in the specific industry. However, the advice 
should not be binding on the SAMR. The ultimate power to determine the investigation 
should lie with the SAMR, but the SAMR should be required to explain why the advice of 
the relevant sectoral regulator was not followed. 
9.2 Proposals for Competition Rules where there is a Failure to Disclose 
by a SEP Owner51  
It is necessary to clarify that it is not proposed that the AML should bring within its scope 
all failures to disclose in the standard setting process. The proposal is that only those 
practices that result in anti-competitive effects should be regulated by the AML. Based on 
the US and EU antitrust enforcement experiences on the failure to disclose potential SEP 
information in the standard setting process, submissions will be made as to how to remedy 
this omission under China’s AML.  
In this section, the proposals will focus on the anti-monopoly analysis of the deliberate 
non-disclosure by SEP owners in the standard setting process (Section 9.2.1) and the 
relevant effective punishment and remedies (Section 9.2.2). 
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9.2.1 The Proposals for the Anti-monopoly Analysis of the Deliberate Non-
disclosure by SEP Owners 
Whether the failure to disclose by a SEP owner should be regulated by competition law 
depends on whether the patent owner holds a dominant position on the market. For those 
SEP owners who are dominant at the time of non-disclosure to the relevant SSOs, the 
AML is definitely applicable, as confirmed by the SAIC IP Provisions. Such non-
disclosure conduct may trigger the application of Article 17 of the AML where the 
undertaking concerned is in a dominant position on the market and the non-disclosure will 
be regarded as an abusive conduct as confirmed by anti-monopoly enforcement 
authorities.52 The 2015 SAIC IP Provisions stipulate that antitrust liability exists for the 
failure to disclose by SEP owners who were dominant at the time of non-disclosure.53  
Concerns normally arise from the SEP owners who, at the time of non-disclosure to the 
SSOs, were not dominant but after the SEP was granted became dominant in the relevant 
market. Normally, the non-disclosure in the latter situation is not directly covered by the 
SAIC IP Provisions or the AML. This is because the prerequisite to trigger the antitrust 
liability of Article 17 of the AML is that the undertaking concerned is already dominant at 
the time of anti-competitive conduct. Therefore, the AML will not condemn the deceptive 
conduct itself if the patent owner was not dominant at the time of non-disclosure, even 
though it later becomes dominant because of the ownership of the SEP. 
However, an abuse of a dominant position arises where the non-disclosure conduct results, 
or is likely to result, in adverse or detrimental impact on competition and innovation in the 
market. There are normally further anti-competitive purposes behind the non-disclosure 
conduct by a SEP owner in the standard setting process. The patent owner is able, ex post, 
to abuse its dominance which resulted from the non-disclosure conduct by engaging in 
patent hold-ups, such as requiring unreasonable licensing terms, charging excessive 
royalties, etc. It is submitted, therefore, that the post-dominant abusive conduct provides an 
opportunity for the AML to be applied. This is similar to the approach adopted in the EU.54 
It is clear from the Rambus case that, in the EU, Article 102 TFEU is only applicable to the 
abusive conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position and not to the deceptive conduct 
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of an undertaking which became dominant only after the deception. Hence, the ex post 
abusive practices are necessary to determine the ex ante deceptive conduct violating 
competition rules, unless the patent owner is dominant at the time of non-disclosure. 
Additionally, several other factors are proposed to be included into the final integrated 
IPRs anti-monopoly guidelines to facilitate and improve the anti-monopoly analysis in the 
investigation of such non-disclosure by patent owners in the standard setting process. In 
analysing the anti-competitive effects caused by the licensing of patent rights in 
standardisation, the important role of the lock-in and network effects should be borne in 
mind. 
One of the factors that must be taken into account is whether the patent owners have 
violated the disclosure obligation by intentionally concealing their patent interest in the 
standard setting process. It is believed that if the SSOs do not require a disclosure 
obligation in their IPR policies, the non-disclosure ‘should not raise competitive 
concerns.’55 Currently, such non-disclosure conduct has no consequences where the SSO 
imposes no disclosure obligation. In these cases, competitive concerns are simply not 
relevant. In the absence of a disclosure obligation, there is no possible violation of the 
AML. The failure to disclose may contravene other duties but it will not have influenced 
the adoption of a standard nor contributed to the increase of dominance of the patent 
owner.56 In this context, it will be meaningless to treat it as deceptive conduct and as a 
violation of the AML. Therefore, to trigger antitrust liability, the violation of a disclosure 
obligation must be firstly established.  
Moreover, it is proposed that the extent to which the failure to disclose contributes to the 
incorporation of the patent into a standard and to the establishment of a dominant position 
in the relevant market due to the ownership of a SEP, should be a key consideration. In the 
anti-monopoly investigation, the enforcement authorities should consider the relationship 
between the non-disclosure itself and the creation of market power. If the dominance of a 
patent owner was mainly or fully achieved because of the failure to disclose, then the 
deceptive conduct is likely to have adverse or detrimental effects on competition and likely 
to infringe the AML. However, if the deliberate concealing of patent information only 
leads to the incorporation of the patent into a standard, but does not result in market power 
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for the patent owner, then the conduct of a non-dominant patent owner will be deemed not 
to raise serious competition concerns in the market. In this latter situation, the non-
disclosure conduct will not fall within the scope of the AML though it may violate other 
legal measures. In addition, if the patent owner demonstrates that the dominant market 
position does not come either from the failure to disclose or from the inclusion of the 
patent into a standard, the non-disclosure conduct will fall outside of the scope of the AML 
again. 
In addition, the deceptive tactics in the standard setting process may lead to the exclusion 
of substitute or competing technologies from the standard under development. The non-
disclosure is not just a deception for the SSOs but the patent owners are knowingly 
depriving competitors of the possibility of having their own patents as SEPs. The non-
disclosure conduct can influence the technological composition of a standard, exclude 
other competing technologies that would have agreed to license at a lower royalty and 
result in a dominant position being secured. Thus, it can eliminate competition for the 
incorporation of the patent into a standard in the technology market ex ante and so deprive 
the consumers of the opportunity to have access to lower priced products. As a result, the 
influence of the deliberate non-disclosure on the competition of candidate technologies in 
the standard setting process should not be ignored.  
9.2.2 The Proposals for Punishment and Remedies 
As a consequence, it seems not enough just to impose a fine for the ex post abusive 
conduct. The reason for the patent owners to be able to conduct patent hold-ups, to charge 
excessive royalties or to refuse to license is that they are dominant owners of SEPs secured 
on the basis of non-disclosure. Therefore, the factor of non-disclosure should be taken into 
account when determining the amount of the fine after a finding of abuse of dominance. 
Since China is still a technology importing country, a relatively stricter antitrust policy for 
standardization will guarantee stronger market competition and protect consumer welfare. 
It is proposed that a higher fine should be imposed on an abuse of a dominant position 
which was achieved from the non-disclosure. The fine is not only imposed to punish the 
abuse of dominance but also to punish the unfair acquisition of a dominant position that 
may eliminate the ex ante competition in the standard setting process. The fine should be 
high enough to cover the detrimental impact caused by the non-disclosure during the 





deceivers. At the same time, essential remedies should also be available to offset the 
adverse effects. For example, it is proposed that as an effective remedy, a failure to 
disclose should be regarded as an implied authorization of SEPs to standard users. In this 
situation, the users can directly apply the relevant SEPs when implementing the standard, 
without obtaining a licence. However, the SEP owners can still request reasonable royalty 
fees from the users. This is for the reason that no matter whether the patent owners disclose 
the patent information, as proprietors of the patent, they have the right to seek royalty fees 
to reward their investment in development and research. In addition, the proposed higher 
fines imposed on the SEP owners’ abuse of dominance have already taken into account the 
deterrent and punitive effects on non-disclosure in the standard setting process. 
However, the antitrust liability only plays a limited role in preventing the failure to 
disclose patent information in the standard setting process. This is for the reason that the 
conditions to apply the AML are difficult to satisfy. For those non-dominant SEP owners 
whose failure to disclose their patent interest does not fall within the scope of the AML, 
some penalty is proposed to be incorporated into the relevant private law. For example, in 
addition to the implied authorization, the patent royalty fees that patent owners are allowed 
to charge should be lower than the normal level. It is submitted that a ‘free licensing’ 
liability can also be levied in some situations on the SEP owners who fail to disclose their 
patent interest in the standard setting process as a more severe penalty to deter other 
potential patent owners from non-disclosing in similar circumstances. However, before 
imposing these penalties or granting remedies for SEP-users, it is important and necessary 
to balance the interests of both sides. If the SEP-users at the same time conduct patent 
hold-outs, such as conducting delaying tactics or unreasonably lowering the royalty fees, 
the SEP owners should still be able to resort to legitimate remedies to protect their legal 
interest. The standard users should be responsible for their infringement of patent rights. 
In addition, the SSOs’ internal IPR policies and the rules in Administrative Provisions for 
Patent-related National Standards (Interim) or other interpretations seem to be a much 
more common and effective way to resolve such disputes from the root. However, it is 
stated that non-mandatory disclosure obligation is hard to remove patent ambush.57 Stricter 
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IPR policies for SSOs are strongly recommended.58 Relevant responsibilities and remedies 
for violating the disclosure obligation should be further elaborated and defined by the 
SSOs. For example, the patent owner who intentionally concealed the patent information 
should be fined heavily, and/or should be restricted as to the level of the royalties that he 
could demand on SEP-users. Limitations can also be imposed on their right to seek 
injunctions before courts to prevent the use of the SEP. Moreover, the SSOs can alleviate 
these concerns of non-disclosure by improving their scrutiny to the patent interest of 
essential technologies to a standard, improve the quality and accessibility of disclosed 
information and timely update and share the relevant information.59 
9.3 Proposals for Regulating Injunctive Relief on SEPs within the Anti-
monopoly Law60 
The proposals made in this section concern the options to regulate seeking injunctions on 
SEPs in China (Section 9.3.1), the manner determining the violation of the AML (Section 
9.3.2) and the competent and appropriate body to determine the FRAND licensing terms 
(Section 9.3.3). 
9.3.1 The Options  
On the basis of Article 17 of the AML 61 and of relevant practices in other jurisdictions, 
there seems to be two options to regulate the abuse of injunctive relief by dominant SEP 
owners under China’s AML.62 The first option is to follow the approach adopted by the 
European competition authorities that in certain circumstances the seeking of injunctions 
by dominant SEP owners is treated as an independent abuse of a dominant position and, 
therefore, can be prohibited by the ‘catch-all’ provision of Article 17.7of the AML. The 
other option is that the SEP owners’ seeking injunctions will only be considered under the 
AML when it is used as a means to compel SEP-users to accept unreasonable conditions or 
excessive royalty fees which are already clearly prohibited by Article 17 of the AML. 
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According to the AMC draft IPRs guidelines and to the comments on the Huawei v. 
InterDigital, it seems that the Chinese AMEAs and courts favoured the second approach. 
However, it is proposed in this thesis that the first approach should be the one to be 
adopted in the final revision of the IPRs guidelines.  
The reason for recommending the first approach is that the second approach does not take 
into account sufficiently the detrimental impact on competition caused by the conduct of 
injunctive relief. The process of standardisation is a process that leads to an exclusion of 
competition. Once a standard is adopted, non-standard-compliant products will be 
substantially excluded from the market. When a patent is incorporated into a standard, the 
exclusivity of patent rights will combine with the public interest nature of a standard. Then, 
the network effects and the lock-in effects may provide the SEP owners with appreciable 
market power. In this context, the unrestricted seeking of injunctions by dominant 
FRAND-encumbered SEP owners will unreasonably exclude competitors from the market 
and eliminate competition. At the same time, injunctions will prejudice the alleged 
infringers who have invested sunk costs into the production on the basis of the belief that 
they will be licensed on FRAND terms. The nature of the second approach is to treat such 
injunctive relief by dominant FRAND-encumbered SEP owners only as a means to force 
the SEP-users to accept unreasonable conditions or excessive royalty fees. Within this 
approach, what the AML regulates is the concrete abusive practices such as charging 
unreasonable terms or excessively high royalties by the dominant FRAND-encumbered 
SEP owners, but not the conduct of seeking injunctions of SEPs. This approach does not 
take into account the anti-competitive effects of the abusive injunctive relief itself. To treat 
it as an independent abusive practice prohibited by Article 17 of the AML can more 
appropriately keep a balance between the interests of SEP owners and SEP-users, and 
protect competition on the market. Therefore, the final IP-related anti-monopoly guidelines 
should adopt the first approach. 
9.3.2 The Determination of the Violation of the Anti-monopoly Law 
After confirming the basic approach that the injunctive relief sought by the dominant 
FRAND-encumbered SEP owners should be classified as an independent conduct, the 
question arises as to the circumstances where such conduct will violate Article 17 (7) of 
the AML. It is necessary to emphasize that the prerequisite to initiate an anti-monopoly 





dominant in the relevant market. In addition, these dominant SEP owners must have 
committed to license their SEPs on FRAND terms as part of the standard setting process.63 
The FRAND commitments provide the SEP-users with a reasonable expectation of 
obtaining a FRAND licence. On the basis of this reasonable expectation, the seeking of 
injunctions by SEP owners may infringe the FRAND commitments and raise competition 
concerns.  
Although the AMC draft IPRs guidelines regards the seeking of injunctions on SEPs as a 
leverage to impose unreasonable conditions, the listed five factors are also relevant to be 
considered when treating the seeking of injunctions as independent conduct. The five 
factors proposed to be considered in the AMC draft IPRs guidelines provide general 
guidance and indicate that the subjective fault and the behaviour of both sides should be 
considered seriously. 64  However, in practice, these factors in the AMC draft IPRs 
guidelines are not sufficient or detailed enough to be applied. It is submitted that some 
detailed example guidelines should be embedded into the final adopted version to guide the 
determination of whether the SEP owners’ conduct comply with their FRAND 
commitments, whether the SEP-users are willing licensees and whether the seeking of an 
injunction violates Article 17 of the AML. In this respect, the conditions adopted in the 
Huawei v. ZTE 65  decision by the CJEU and the rules in the Guidelines for Patent 
Infringement Determination (2017)66 are good examples. The following proposed factors 
do not exhaust all the circumstances and are not fixed rules. They are some specific 
examples of procedural guidelines. Whether the seeking of injunctions by dominant SEP 
owners gives rise to competition concerns should be decided on a case-by-case basis. None 
one-size-fit-all solution is suggested. The relevant authorities and courts have discretion to 
examine the conduct concerned according to the specific circumstances in each case and 
reach an independent conclusion.  
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In principle, the seeking of injunctions by the dominant FRAND-encumbered SEP owners 
against willing licensees will constitute an abuse of dominance prohibited by the AML. 
When these SEP owners enjoy the benefits produced by the incorporation of their patents 
into a standard, they have to discharge additional obligations accompanying the benefits. In 
order to avoid anti-monopoly liability, the dominant FRAND-encumbered SEP owners 
have to satisfy certain conditions before they seek injunctive relief. First, they should 
initiatively contact the alleged infringers and alert them in writing of the alleged 
infringement, specifying the exact SEPs and the way in which they are being infringed, 
unless it is demonstrated that the alleged infringer is already aware of the infringement. A 
standard is normally composed of a large number of SEPs. SEP-users may not be aware of 
the fact that they are using valid and essential patents of a standard. Accordingly, it should 
be the SEP owners’ responsibility to inform the SEP-users of the alleged infringement. In 
fact, a similar spirit has been implied in Article 24 of the Interpretations (II) of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial 
of Cases Involving Patent Infringement Disputes (Interpretations (II)) by providing that if 
the two parties do not enter into negotiation on the licensing terms, the court can dismiss 
the request for an injunction.67 If necessary, the SEP owner should also substantiate the 
essentiality of its patent to the standard. Second, if the alleged infringers show their 
willingness to conclude a FRAND licensing agreement, the dominant FRAND-
encumbered SEP owners should provide them on their own initiative with a specific 
written offer within FRAND terms specifying precise royalty fees and the way in which 
the fees will be calculated. This requirement is reasonable and proportionate. The SEP 
owners have voluntarily committed to the SSOs to licensing their SEPs on FRAND terms 
to any interested third party. Therefore, the SEP-users may reasonably expect that such an 
offer will be prepared and provided by the SEPs owners.68 Besides, the licensing terms 
reached between the SEP owners and other users are mostly considered to be commercial 
secrets and are not made public. In this situation, it is the SEP owners that are in the 
appropriate and competent position to know whether the proposed licensing terms are non-
discriminated and compliant with FRAND commitments.69 
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As a willing licensee, the alleged infringer has an obligation to respond diligently to the 
initial offer of the SEP owner. If the alleged infringer does not accept the SEP owner’s 
initial offer, the alleged infringer must promptly submit to the SEP owner a specific 
FRAND-compliant counter-offer in writing. In the counter-offer, the alleged infringer 
should enumerate the terms within which he does not agree and explains why. At the same 
time, the alleged infringer should specify the terms that they think are FRAND-compliant. 
To reply to the SEP owner concerned, the alleged infringer must conduct in good faith and 
observe the relevant commercial practices. There should not be delaying tactics. If the 
alleged infringer thinks that the initial offer made by the SEP owner cannot be regarded as 
FRAND-compliant, the alleged infringer should not tactically and directly refuse to reply 
to the SEP owner’s initial offer. The SEP-user should reply because the alert notice and the 
initial offer have given them the notice of an allegation of infringement. In order to keep a 
balance between the interest of the SEP owner and that of the SEP-user, the alleged 
infringer does not have to provide a counter-offer; however, in order to show the 
willingness to negotiate, instead, the SEP-user needs to respond and require the SEP owner 
to provide a modified offer which should be FRAND-compliant. If no agreement is 
reached, the parties by common agreement can require an independent third party or the 
court to adjudicate. The question of what is a diligent and prompt reply should only be 
determined on a case-by-case basis and no fixed time should be prescribed. This is for the 
reason that the circumstances in each case will differ and the recognized commercial 
practices in different sectors are not all the same. Therefore, whether the alleged infringer’s 
response to the initial offer is tactically delayed should be flexibly determined on the basis 
of objective factors. No general benchmark can be suggested. This will pose challenges to 
the officials or judges who examine the relevant conduct and require them to have 
expertise and knowledge of the relevant industry. Other factors that can indicate the 
willingness of the prospective licensees should also be given appropriate consideration. If 
the counter-offer is not accepted by the SEP owner, the alleged infringer has an obligation 
to provide appropriate security for the use of the SEP concerned. At the same time, an 
account of the use of the SEP must be rendered and specified, such as the number of SEPs 
being used, the products incorporating the SEPs, the sales number of such products, etc.  
If the SEP owner has discharged the required obligations while the alleged infringer is 
unable to demonstrate their willingness, injunctions should be granted and the seeking of 
injunctions will not violate the AML. If the SEP owner does not satisfy the required 





willingness, the alleged infringer can raise an antitrust defence against the injunction and 
the seeking injunctive relieve itself may constitute an abuse of a dominant position 
prohibited by the AML. If both of the parties act well and comply with their respective 
obligations, in principle, the injunction should not be granted taking into account the 
purpose of standardisation and the FRAND commitments made by the SEP owners. The 
AML will not have been infringed. In this situation, the parties can, by common agreement, 
resort to an independent third party or to a court to settle their disputes. In certain 
circumstances, the compulsory licensing system may be triggered.70 If both of the parties 
commit substantive faults in the negotiations stage and do not satisfy their respective 
obligations, on the basis of the FRAND commitments, the SEP owner will principally not 
be granted an injunction unless the SEP-users conduct patent hold-outs.71 In this situation, 
whether to grant an injunction should be determined on a case-by-case basis according to 
the responsibilities of each party and the specific circumstances.72 A balance should be 
struck between the two parties. Moreover, whether the AML is violated should be 
established on the basis of the extent to which the dominant party’s conduct has negative 
effects on competition and the extent to which they respectively violate their requirements. 
These proposed criteria are basically recommended to be incorporated into the final IPRs 
guidelines. They should appear as unexhausted example instructions that are inserted under 
the general principle framework to facilitate the specific examination of the factors listed 
in the AMC draft IPRs guidelines. 73  This will help to keep a balance between the 
protection of patent rights and the protection of competition. More importantly, these 
proposed instructions can improve the predictability of the enforcement environment for 
SEPs. They make the general analysis factors to be concrete enough to positively guide 
parties’ behaviour in the licensing negotiations. Not only the enforcement activities by the 
SAMR can be enhanced, but also the disputes as to SEPs licensing can be reduced. In 
addition, these proposed criteria can provide complementary guidance for Article 24 of the 
Interpretations (II) to decide whether an injunction should be granted to a SEP owner. 
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However, owing to the special characteristics of SEPs, the relevant authorities and courts 
should still reserve some discretion to consider the specific circumstances in different cases 
or investigations when determining whether to grant an injunction and whether such 
seeking of injunctions amounts to an abuse of a dominant position. 
Looking back to the proposed criteria, several of them contain the word ‘FRAND’. The 
licensing terms should be FRAND-compliant and the SEP owners should comply with 
their FRAND commitments. The SSOs require the SEP owners to license their SEPs on 
FRAND terms but they do not provide clear guidance on the nature and scope of FRAND. 
Officially, FRAND is an abbreviation of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. FRAND 
is a concept that originally arose from the IPR policies of SSOs. However, the exact and 
specific scope of FRAND has not been further clarified by any SSO.74 The CJEU leaves a 
wide margin of interpretation for national courts to fill. As a consequence, this concept is 
still vague. By intentionally not clarifying the exact scope of FRAND commitments, the 
SSOs leave considerable discretion to address future contingencies. This to some extent 
shows the wisdom of the SSOs. However, this lack of clarity easily leads to disputes, 
especially on whether the royalty fees are FRAND-compliant or excessively high which 
will increase the product costs, undermine the production and harm consumer welfare.75 
Normally, the royalty rate is the core element to evaluate whether the proposed licensing 
terms in the negotiation are FRAND-compliant, and charging excessive royalty fees is an 
obvious abuse of a dominant position prohibited by the AML. The meaning of FRAND 
can be explained differently according to the divergent situations in each case of different 
sectors. Some general factors are proposed to consider when determining whether the 
licensing terms are FRAND. For example, the essentiality of the SEP to the relevant 
standard, the relationship between the real economic value of the patented technology and 
its incremental value obtaining from the market success of the relevant product or the 
incorporation into a wide-spread standard, the relationship between the patent royalties 
requested by the SEP owners and the ones expected by the prospective licensees, the extent 
to which the standard has been or will be spread and implemented, the comparison of the 
royalty fees charged to different prospective licensees (whether there is discrimination), the 
efficiency gains of the licensing practice, etc.  
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This section will not examine the methodologies used to determine a specific FRAND-
compliant royalty rate. The selection of the methodology to calculate a FRAND royalty 
rate should be on the basis of the specific circumstances of each case, for example the 
industry sector that the case is related to, the products concerned, the number of the SEPs 
of the standard concerned, etc. It is neither sensible nor reasonable to recommend a fixed 
methodology to determine the royalty rate in all cases. The determination of a FRAND 
royalty rate is quite complicated and concerns a significant amount of economic analysis, 
which is not the focus of this thesis but has been discussed widely in the literature.76 In the 
following section, the question of who in China should determine the FRAND royalty or 
terms when there is no agreement reached between the SEP owners and the SEP-users will 
be analysed. 
9.3.3 Who Is Appropriate to be in Charge of the FRAND Licensing Terms? 
It is submitted that in China a FRAND royalty rate or FRAND terms should be determined 
effectively by taking the following three steps. In principle, the most recommended way to 
agree on a FRAND royalty rate is by bilateral negotiation. This is for the reason that 
bilateral negotiations can best express each party’s real thoughts and considerations. 
Governmental organizations do not have much time or resources to assist each undertaking 
to make a proper decision. Each party has its own special circumstances and nobody else 
knows the value of their patents better than themselves. Both parties can negotiate 
efficiently and effectively in terms of their individual interests, proprieties, and resources. 
Bilateral negotiations are flexible enough for both parties to exchange and communicate 
their requirements timeously and, therefore, to facilitate and accelerate the conclusion of a 
commonly agreed FRAND licensing agreement. Moreover, nobody else can compete in 
the market on their behalf and they should have the ability to negotiate and strive for 
benefits by themselves. If an agreement cannot be reached through bilateral negotiations, 
judicial adjudication is the second best recommendation for China. Actually, arbitration by 
an independent third party should have been recommended after bilateral negotiations 
taking into account its advantages of flexibility, autonomy, professionalism and 
confidentiality. However, according to Article 9 of China’s Arbitration Law, ‘a system of a 
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single and final award shall be practised for arbitration. If a party applies for arbitration to 
an arbitration commission or institutes an action in a people’s court regarding the same 
dispute after an arbitration award has been made, the arbitration commission or the 
people’s court shall not accept the case.’77 ‘A single and final award’ means that there is no 
supervision from a second instance court over arbitration cases, though arbitration is faster 
and more convenient. Compared to arbitration, court litigation provides a wide range of 
further supervision and further relief. In addition, in China, the charges for arbitration are 
normally higher than those for litigation.78 In China, the costs of addressing the disputes on 
FRAND terms and royalty fees will be lower through litigation. Besides, there are strict 
statutory rules for the duration of trials, while in arbitration there is a possibility of time 
delaying tactics. 79  In recent years, the efficiency, transparency and effectiveness of 
litigation in China have been considerably increased. More importantly, judges of the 
people’s courts have more power than arbitrators. For example, for some types of evidence 
that cannot be provided or collected by the parties themselves, the relevant party can apply 
to the court for a disclosure order.80 While, this is not available in an arbitration. Moreover, 
in China a court judgment is more strongly enforced than an arbitration decision.81 The 
FRAND terms or royalty rate determined in a court judgment have a greater deterrent 
impact and referential value for future potential disputes. For example, in Huawei v. 
InterDigital, Chinese courts determined a royalty rate of 0.019% under the FRAND rules 
for InterDigital to license its portfolio of 2G, 3G and 4G SEPs to Huawei, which was 
calculated on the basis of the comparison of royalty rates with Apple.82 This is the first 
time that a Chinese court specified a FRAND royalty rate for SEPs and it has great impact 
on future cases. Therefore, in the context of the specific circumstances of China, it is 
proposed that currently the courts seem to be the appropriate and suitable fora to determine 
a FRAND royalty rate or the terms for SEPs licensing. 
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However, this is just for a short-term consideration. A standard is normally composed of a 
huge number of patents. Even if a small number of SEPs give rise to disputes over FRAND 
royalty rates and go to courts to seek resolutions, the number of cases will be tremendous 
and onerous. For the purpose of a long-term development, the SSOs themselves are the 
best places to address these problems. A mechanism for dispute-solving should be 
established within the SSOs. SSOs are the places where FRAND commitments are offered, 
so they should also be the places where FRAND-related disputes end. It is the SSOs that 
initiate and organise the setting of a standard. Accordingly, SSOs are in theory in a better 
position to know and access the necessary information, on the basis of which FRAND-
compliant royalties can be determined. In 2015, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE) Standardization Association amended its patent policy by recommending 
a methodology to calculate FRAND royalties and a requirement to SEP owners to waive 
their rights to seek injunctions unless there are special circumstances.83 The updated patent 
policy has received a favourable Business Review letter from the US Department of Justice, 
but it is concluded that the standardisation agreements on the basis of this policy may 
infringe Article 101 TFEU.84 Though the changes to the IEEE’s patent policy are not 
robust enough and have attracted a lot of controversy, the policy has contributed a 
meaningful and advanced step to setting up a kind of mechanism to determine the FRAND 
royalty rate within the SSOs themselves. In addition, VITA has required its members in its 
new patent policy to declare the maximum royalty rate for their patents in the standard 
setting process.85 The declaration of a maximum royalty rate before the standard is widely 
disseminated is an effective way to avoid excessive royalty fees and maintains the royalty 
rate at the original level without incremental value of the incorporation of the patent into a 
standard. However, it is submitted by Geradin that no convincing reasons seem to be found 
to explain why SEP owners should be prohibited from requesting a higher rate ex post than 
ex ante. 86  Therefore, when declaring a maximum royalty rate in the standard setting 
process, it is recommended here that a flexible discretion should be granted to the SEP 
owners to take into account the incremental value ex post in the final royalty rate, in order 
to encourage innovation and participation in the standard setting activities. Furthermore, 
the SSOs should adopt some effective measures to facilitate FRAND licensing. For 
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example, the first and basic step is to increase the transparency of SEPs disclosure.87 The 
information of the existence, the essentiality and the scope of SEPs plays an important role 
in evaluating the licensing terms and the royalty rate. Then, the SEP owners can be to some 
extent required to disclose their comparable royalty rates to different SEP-users. This 
disclosure may concern their commercial secrets, therefore, if so required, relevant 
supervision should be established to guarantee confidentiality and protect the legitimate 
interest of SEP owners. The SSOs play an important and necessary role in determining the 
FRAND licensing terms, but more efforts need to be made for the SSOs to function well.88 
9.4 Proposals to Regulate Reverse Payment Patent Settlement 
Agreements89  
In terms of another broad challenge—reverse payment patent settlement agreements 
(RPPSAs), basically, China should prepare itself by taking two steps. First, it is proposed 
to initiate a competition inquiry into the pharmaceutical industry on RPPSAs in China. 
Secondly, China should establish an appropriate anti-monopoly analysis framework for 
such agreements. It is proposed in this thesis that RPPSAs should be divided into two 
categories. Those restricting market entry after the patent expires should be prohibited by 
Article 13 of the AML as naked restrictive agreements. Those allowing market entry of the 
generic drug before the patent expires should be further examined on the basis of relevant 
factors. In addition to the normal factors considered in examining alleged horizontal 
restriction agreements, some important and common factors of RPPSAs are proposed in 
this thesis for specific consideration. For example, the objectives of the settlement 
agreements, the validity of the patent concerned, the size and forms of the reverse payment, 
the limitation on the entry and the market entry date, etc. are all important factors specific 
to these types of agreements. 
The process to regulate RPPSAs in the pharmaceutical industry is a balancing process of 
the interests protected by the AML and the Patent Law. Looking back at the US and the 
EU antitrust enforcement, the per se rules, either per se illegal or the pure ‘scope-of-the-
patent test’, cannot function well in this complicated area. At the very beginning, the 
approach adopted by China’s SAMR should neither be too strict nor too generous. 
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Discretion should be left for flexible and reasonable analysis. Taking this approach it will 
not only facilitate the anti-monopoly enforcement in the short term but also provide an 
opportunity for China’s SAMR to adjust the regulatory approach in accordance with future 
specific circumstances in this area. It is also proposed that detailed effects analysis be 
offered both for the sake of completeness and for the accumulation of enforcement 
experience and guidance. In 2018, China’s AML will have been in effect for 10 years and 
revisions will be considered by the relevant authority. China’s anti-monopoly IPRs 
guidelines are also likely to be adopted soon. Therefore, it is good timing to include in the 
IPRs guidelines some guidance on the approach to examine pay-for-delay agreements 
under the AML.   
Preparation work should start from two perspectives. On one hand, it is indispensable to 
undertake a competition inquiry into China’s pharmaceutical industry to investigate and 
assess the situation of RPPSAs. In this respect, what the EU has done can provide good 
practice. If necessary, continuous supervision should be conducted. Furthermore, the 
SAMR can refer to Section 112 of the US Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 200390 to require the notification of the RPPSAs that meet certain 
criteria.91 This can not only help China’s SAMR to supervise this industry but also impose 
some deterrent effects on the pharmaceutical companies who want to negotiate such 
agreements to restrict competition. Whether the SAMR will take further anti-monopoly 
action against the filed RPPSAs should depend on the specific circumstances of each case 
and be determined by the SAMR.  
On the other hand, the basic anti-monopoly analysis framework should be set out in the 
forthcoming IPRs guidelines. Here, anti-monopoly scrutiny will mainly focus on the patent 
settlement agreements containing value transfer from a brand-name drug company to a 
generic company in exchange of the latter’s commitment not to market its generic drug for 
a period of time or forever. Such patent settlement agreements are most likely to bring anti-
competitive effects to harm consumer welfare. 92  In principle, such RPPSAs are 
characterized as horizontal restrictive agreements and will be prohibited by Article 13 of 
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the AML.93 To establish the violation of Article 13, the parties to the agreement should be 
competitors in the market, the agreement should include at least one of the anti-competitive 
conduct listed in Article 13 and they should have failed to demonstrate that the agreement 
satisfy any exemption condition listed in Article 15 of the AML.94  
With regard to the complexity of RPPSAs, Article 13 will be applied differently according 
to the timing at which generic drugs are allowed to enter the market. If such RPPSAs 
restrict the market entry of the generic drug after the patent of the listed drug expires, they 
should be classified as naked market allocation and limitation of production and should be 
prohibited by Article 13 of the AML. This is similar to the restriction by object that falls 
within Article 101 TFEU. If the RPPSAs permit the generic drug to enter the market before 
the patent concerned expires, whether such an agreement falls within the scope of Article 
13 of the AML should be determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation of all the 
relevant factors and conditions. This is more like the rule of reason in the US or the 
restriction by ‘object + effects’ in the EU.  
 
In addition to the normal factors considered in examining alleged horizontal restriction 
agreements such as the level of competition in the market, the market power of each party, 
the relevant market, etc., some specific elements of RPPSAs should also be taken into 
account when scrutinizing the agreements that allow generic drugs to enter the market 
before the patent expires. These specific factors include but not limited to the objective of 
RPPSAs (Section 9.4.1), the validity of the patent (Section 9.4.2), the size and forms of the 
reverse payment (Section 9.4.3) and the limitation on market and the market entry date of 
generic drugs (Section 9.4.4). 
                                                          
93 The AML, Article 13. 
94 ibid, Article 15. 
RPPSAs
Restricting the market entry of
the generic drug after the
patent expires
Naked market allocation and
limiting the production,
prohibited by Article 13
Permitting the market entry of







9.4.1 RPPSAs as a solution to a patent dispute 
Given the complexities of the RPPSAs, it is necessary to balance the anti-competitive with 
the pro-competitive effects of such agreements. When analysing the reasons to conclude 
such RPPSAs, it is not difficult to see that there is rationale behind such agreements. The 
main objective of the settlement is to stop a dispute and it should not be ignored when 
assessing the antitrust legality of such agreements. In order to avoid the high costs, 
uncertainty and risks of patent disputes, and to save resources, settlements are in principle 
an encouraged legitimate way to resolve disputes and enjoy judicial preference. 95 
Settlements themselves do not restrict competition. In certain circumstances, they can even 
promote competition and benefit consumers.96 For example, settlements can stop patent 
disputes and allow competing products to enter the relevant market much earlier than 
otherwise. More importantly, the reverse payment is not always unreasonable. If the aim of 
the reverse payment is only to use fair value to obtain relevant services from the generic 
company but not to eliminate competition, competition concerns will not arise. In some 
circumstances, some payments from the patent owner to the alleged infringer are necessary 
to bring the patent dispute to an end. However, it has to be admitted that a reverse payment 
may not be the only way to end the disagreement. Whether there is another way other than 
a reverse payment to settle the dispute, should be seriously examined in order to determine 
the appropriateness of the payment and to identify the real purpose of the agreement. This 
does not mean that the objective to end a dispute itself can protect RPPSAs from anti-
monopoly scrutiny. If the real purpose of the settlement agreement is just to end the dispute 
and not to exclude competition, it will to some extent reduce competition concerns. 
However, if the pay-for-delay agreements are concluded to exclude generic drugs from the 
market and maintain a high price, they will be prohibited by the SAMR. 
9.4.2 The validity of the patent  
The validity of the patent concerned is an important and controversial element in 
evaluating the antitrust legality of pay-for-delay agreements. When the issues of validity 
and the infringement of the patent are clear and obvious, whether the pay-for-delay 
agreement is anti-competitive is easily established. If the patent is valid, if it is infringed by 
the generic version of the patented drug and the pay-for-delay agreement does not restrict 
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the generic’s market entry after the patent expires, then the agreement will probably fall 
within the legitimate scope of the patent and will be protected by Patent Law. In this 
situation, in the absence of strong opposite evidence, competition concerns will be raised 
seldom. If the patent concerned is valid but is not infringed by the generic drug, the 
restriction on the market entry of the generic drug will have no legal basis and should be 
prohibited by Article 13 of the AML. If the patent is not valid, the technology will not be 
protected by Patent Law. In this context, the pay-for-delay agreement equals a horizontal 
restriction agreement that allocates the market and should be proscribed by Article 13 of 
the AML. 
 
However, in most cases the main controversy of the dispute relates to the validity of the 
patent or to the establishment of the infringement. This is also the main reason why the 
parties choose to settle the dispute other than to continue the time-consuming, costly and 
risky litigation. In this context, this thesis submits that the patent validity issue should be 
separated from the anti-monopoly analysis of RPPSAs. Normally, it is not necessary to 
answer the competition concerns by litigating patent validity. Even if the patent is valid, 
there is still the possibility that the settlement agreements with payments will be anti-
competitive and prohibited by the AML. ‘And even a valid patent confers no right to 
exclude products or processes that do not actually infringe.’97 Patent settlement agreements 
are not automatically exempted from anti-monopoly scrutiny. According to Article 55 of 
China’s AML, the inappropriate exercise of IPRs to eliminate or restrict competition will 
be prohibited.98 If the anti-monopoly assessment of a RPPSA is established by confirming 
the validity of the patent, the costs of time and money will be extremely high. In China, a 
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party can challenge the validity of a patent before the Patent Re-examination Board.99 If a 
party is not satisfied with the decision of the Patent Re-examination Board, it is allowed to 
lodge an action before a competent people’s court.100 The whole process of determining the 
patent validity takes a rather long time. When the litigation finally comes to an end, it may 
be too late as illustrated by the Chinese cases discussed above.101 Moreover, if the patent is 
confirmed valid, the next step is to examine whether the generic drug infringes the patent. 
Again, this will take time. In addition, the confirmation of the patent validity or the 
establishment of patent infringement in an anti-monopoly analysis may discourage the 
parties from settling their dispute. This is because it may diminish the positive role of 
settlements to resolve private disputes peacefully and efficiently. Therefore, it is 
unreasonable to consider the validity of the patent as a necessary prerequisite when 
determining the legality of a RPPSA. The AML is not designed to deal with the patent 
validity issues and the anti-monopoly analysis can be undertaken without confirming the 
validity of the patent. However, it is proposed here that in a very difficult and complex 
case, if necessary and crucial, the relevant competition authority should have the discretion 
to suspend the investigation proceedings and refer the validity issue to the competent 
organization—China’s Patent Re-examination Board. For the sake of effectiveness and 
efficiency, certain kind of acceleration measure should be taken to confirm the validity or 
invalidity of the patent in this context. For example, in order to improve the efficiency and 
consistency, China’s Patent Re-examination Board have undertaken several joint trials 
with the competent courts over the patent infringement litigation in which the party 
requested to declare the patent invalid. 102  Similar measure should be given some 
consideration when the competition authority thinks the validity issue is of great 
importance to determine the antitrust legality of a RPPSA.  
Though it is not necessary to determine the validity of the patent in an anti-monopoly 
investigation, it is still a relevant element that should be given some consideration. The 
strength of the patent does to some extent contribute to identifying the real objective 
behind the settlement and can facilitate the anti-monopoly analysis. It can more or less be 
indicated by the facts and practices in the specific case, such as the size of the reverse 
payment. Whether the pay-for-delay agreement is anti-competitive should be decided on 
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the basis of analysing all the relevant factors. As long as the patent has not been declared 
invalid, the scope of the patent can still be applied to identifying the extent to which the 
RPPSA goes beyond that scope and to finding resulting anti-competitive effects. 
Nevertheless, it needs to be emphasized that the only finding of the relevant behaviour 
falling within the scope of the patent cannot be regarded as exempting it from anti-
monopoly scrutiny. As discussed above, it is not appropriate to apply the ‘scope-of-the-
patent test’ solely to examining RPPSAs.103 The consideration of the scope of the patent 
here should be understood as a part of the reasonable analysis of the competitive effects of 
a RPPSA. As long as the patent has not been declared infringed by the generic drug, as 
displayed above, the limitation on the market entry of the generic for a certain period of 
time (even allowing the entry before the patent expires) can probably be determined anti-
competitive. 
9.4.3 The size and forms of the reverse payment 
The thesis submits that the correct criterion to apply is the one established in the EU and 
US antitrust enforcement, namely that the size of the reverse payment is a strong and 
reliable indicator of the patent quality and of the anti-competitive effects. 104  ‘An 
unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has 
serious doubts about the patent’s survival.’105 The size of the payment may reflect the 
settling parties’ assessment of the possible litigation results based on the market. 106 
Accordingly, the anti-competitive objective behind the patent settlement agreements may 
be indicated. The larger the reverse payment, the more profits the brand-name drug 
company may earn by restricting competition from a generic company and the more anti-
competitive effects there will be.107 A large size payment can also imply the patentee has 
market power because normally the patentee will not make a payment beyond its 
anticipated returns.108 It is the consumer that will finally bear the loss. As a result, the 
objective of a large unexplained payment is likely to maintain the supracompetitive prices 
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and to exclude competition.109 This is not to say that a reverse payment in all cases will 
give rise to antitrust liability. In order to settle a patent dispute, it is reasonable and 
necessary in some circumstances to transfer an amount of value from the patent owner to 
the alleged infringer. Only when the size of the payment reaches a certain level — large, 
disproportionate and unjustified, can it indicate the patent quality and the anti-competitive 
motive. 
Several aspects should be taken into account when assessing whether the size of the 
reverse payment should be considered as ‘large, disproportionate and unjustified’. First, 
whether the payment is only a reasonable consideration for the possible past and future 
litigation costs without other purposes. Second, does the payment include the fair value of 
the goods, services or any complimentary transactions provided by the generic company? 
Third, whether the payment takes into account the estimated profits expected by the 
generic company if it had successfully marketed the generic version of the patented 
drug.110 Fourth, to what extent the size of the payment deprives the generic company of the 
incentives to enter the market to compete. In addition, some other convincing justifications 
for the reverse payment cannot be ignored, such as the risk/litigation aversion, information 
asymmetry, protecting the image of the company, etc.  
It is proposed in this thesis that the forms of the reverse payment should not be subject to 
cash and the value of non-monetary payment should also be calculated into the size of the 
reverse payment. No matter what the form is, the purpose of a disproportionate, large and 
unjustified reverse payment is the same. It is to buy off the generic company to delay the 
market entry and restrict competition. Traditionally, a reverse payment takes the form of 
direct monetary transfer, such as purchasing an asset. However, as more RPPSAs have 
been exposed to antitrust scrutiny, pharmaceutical companies have adopted more hidden 
forms of payments to avoid the attention of competition authorities. It is reported by the 
European Commission that a reverse payment can also take the form of ‘distribution 
agreements or a “side deal” in which the brand-name drug company grants a commercial 
benefit to the generic company’.111 For example, the generic company may commit to co-
promote the patented drug with the brand-name drug company; the generic company may 
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grant certain licences of its own patents to the brand-name drug company; and the brand-
name and the generic companies may together undertake a research and development 
project.112 These side-deals accompanying patent settlement agreements are likely to be 
concluded to provide a reasonable justification for the brand-name drug company to offer 
commercial benefits to the generic company. However, their real objective can probably be 
to exclude the competition in the market from the generic company. Additionally, the 
patent owner can transfer a value through licensing to permit the generic company entering 
the market.113 Other forms, such as the agreement to give up unrelated patent litigation and 
the exemption of some debts, should also be treated carefully. Attention should be paid to 
the situation in which the reverse payment can offset some amounts of the payment that the 
generic company should have paid to the patent owner. In this context, the size of the full 
payment cannot be easily calculated. There is another popular hidden form of a reverse 
payment which is called ‘no authorized generic agreement’. 114  This form will not be 
considered here because according to the available legal documents/measures China does 
not stipulate an exclusivity period like the US and such agreement does not have a basis in 
China. What has been proposed does not exhaust all kinds of reverse payment forms. The 
relevant AEMAs should flexibly assess these agreements on a case-by-case basis.  
9.4.4 Limitation on entry and the market entry date of generic drugs 
Normally, the RPPSAs will impose a restriction explicitly on the market entry of the 
generic version of the patented drug for a period of time. This is the typical and most direct 
form of limitation on entry in a pay-for-delay agreement. However, as reported by the 
European Commission, the brand-name drug company can also control the market entry of 
the generic drug through licensing terms and conditions.115 In this situation, the terms of 
the generic company’s entry is set out in the licence. ‘The generic company cannot enter 
the market with its own product’ or commercialize its generic drugs under its own will.116 
In addition, the distribution agreements may have the same restrictive effects on the market 
entry of the generic drug. Therefore, during the evaluation of the anti-competitive effects 
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of pay-for-delay agreements, the different forms of limitation on market entry should be 
identified. 
Normally permission to market the generic drug before the patent concerned expires has 
some pro-competitive effects, even though the pay-for-delay agreements delay their market 
entry. In this case, the generic version competes with the patented drug earlier than it 
would have otherwise done, i.e., at the end of the patent litigation or after the patent 
expires. Consumers can also benefit from the price reduction as a result of the earlier 
competition. However, whether the market entry before the patent expires is in fact earlier 
than it would normally have been cannot be determined so easily. In order to avoid raising 
obvious competition concerns, pharmaceutical companies nowadays usually allow the 
generic company to enter the market a little earlier than the expiration date of the patent 
concerned. Seldom will they restrict the market entry after the patent expires. The so-called 
earlier entry is likely to be used to conceal their non-confidence in their patent validity and 
to hide their anti-competitive objective. After all, if the patent is not valid, there will be no 
expiration date and the generic drug can enter the market immediately. If the patent is valid 
but is not infringed, the generic drug can also enter the market without restrictions. Though 
the patent owner may be exercising its patent rights, there is potential that the patentee has 
gone beyond the scope of the patent. In these situations, the seemingly earlier entry is in 
nature an actual delay. Therefore, the market entry before the patent expires cannot itself 
be a decisive factor to remove the anti-monopoly scrutiny and other relevant factors need 
to be assessed. 
9.4.5 Other relevant factors 
In addition to the main factors related to the reverse payment settlement agreements 
discussed above, further factors can also make some contribution to the anti-monopoly 
assessment. Whether the patent is on the primary active ingredient or on the secondary 
properties such as the process patents, can to some extent indicate the objective of the 
settlement agreements. It is argued that the validity rate of those process patents which 
have weak protection is much lower than the basic patent.117 Accordingly, RPPSAs on the 
basis of such patents are more likely to restrict or eliminate competition. In addition, 
whether there are alternative ways that are less restrictive to end the patent dispute is also a 
relevant factor to be considered.  
                                                          





This section only enumerates the important and typical factors that should be taken into 
account when evaluating the anti-competitive effects of RPPSAs. It does not exhaust all 
the relevant factors and leaves space for the SAMR to structure flexibly their anti-
monopoly analysis on a case-by-case basis. 
9.5 Summary 
The thesis examined comprehensively the situation of China’s competition enforcement in 
the exercise of patent rights from both the perspective of the regulating system and the 
perspective of the regulating practices. The achievements and success have been fully 
recognized and acknowledged but the problems have also been clearly identified. The 
proposals provided in the thesis first aim to resolve the problems from the very root to 
unify the relevant rules and establish a specific task force on competition concerns that 
arise from the exercise of IPRs. Thereby, the effective and consistent enforcement can be 
guaranteed in this field. Then, the proposals focus on the two globally debated competition 
concerns — the licensing of SEPs and the RPPSAs, with the aim of assisting China’s 
competition authority to prepare well for the prominent challenges in competition 
enforcement in the 21st century. 
2018 is an important year for the development of competition enforcement in China. In this 
year, China’s State Council adopted an institutional reform plan to merge all the anti-
monopoly responsibilities and competences into a newly established independent 
organisation—the State Administration for Market Regulation. In this year, China’s AML 
will have been in effect for 10 years and revisions will be considered. In this year, the 
drafting of the integrated anti-monopoly IPRs guidelines is at the crucial stage and will 
probably be adopted soon. Moreover, it has been argued that the exercise of IPRs has 
gradually become a significant enforcement area for China’s competition authorities. 
Therefore, it is a good time to make some proposals to provide solutions to the challenging 
problems faced by the competition authorities in China and to facilitate the effective and 
efficient application of the AML in respect of the exercise of patent rights. Hopefully, the 
research undertaken for the thesis will contribute to the development of China’s 
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